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This book presents a holistic framework for understanding, analyzing and assessing 
farm contracts and competitiveness. It incorporates the interdisciplinary approach and 
specifies different mechanisms of farm governance; defines types and features of farm 
contracts; identifies technological, institutional, behavioral, dimensional, and transaction 
costs factors for contractual choice; specifies effective modes for organizational and 
contractual arrangements; determines the effective boundaries of farms; defines farm 
competitiveness, its criteria and indicators. The book also analyzes structure and 
efficiency of farm contracts, and assesses farm competitiveness in Bulgaria. The analyses 
embraces the post-communist institutional and organizational modernization of farming 
sector; evaluates the efficiency of various modes for management of land supply, labor 
supply, service supply, inputs supply, finance supply, insurance supply, and marketing of 
different type of farms; and assesses the competitiveness of dominating unregistered, 
cooperative and business farms in the conditions of EU integration and CAP 
implementation. The book would be helpful for scholars, businessmen, farmers, civil 
servants, policy-makers, interest groups, representatives of agrarian, non-governmental 
and international organizations, and all individuals who want to understand farm contracts 
and competitiveness. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The issue of farm contracts and competitiveness is among the most topical in 
academic, business and political respect.  
Forms and factors of farm contracts have been intensively studied during the last 
twenty five years around the world [Bachev 1996; Bachev and Tsuji; Boger and Beckman; 
Eswaran and Kotwal; Fertő; Guo et al.; James et al.; Hayami and Otsuka; Little and Watts; 
Sporleder; Swain; Wilson]. A considerable progress has been made in understanding the 
economic logic and efficiency of contractual choice, “make or buy decision”, sharecropping 
and employment arrangements, vertically integrated forms, industries and countries 
specificities etc.  
Most studies focus on a particular type contract (land tenure, employment), a specific 
functional area of farming activity (land or labor supply, marketing), a generic mode of 
contract (private, public), an individual sector (horticulture, swine), a certain factor of 
contractual choice (agency or transaction costs, agents opportunism) etc.  
At the same time, a little attention is put on the importance and the combination of 
institutional, behavioral, economic, technological, ecological etc. factors of contractual 
choice as well as on the comparative efficiency, interdependency and complementarities 
of different governance arrangements.  
With a very few exceptions [Bachev and Tsuji; Boger and Beckman; Fertő; Guo et al.] 
there are no comprehensive studies on structure and factors of farm contracts in 
transitional economies in general and in Bulgaria in particular.  
Similarly, there have been numerous studies on farms competitiveness in developed, 
transitional and developing countries in the past two decades [Benson; Delgado et al.; 
Farmer; Fertő and Hubbard; Mahmood; Popovic et al.; Pouliquen; Shoemaker et al.;  
Zawalinska]. Nevertheless, up to date, there is no widely accepted and comprehensive 
framework for assessing farm competitiveness in different market, economic, institutional 
and natural environment.  
Usually farm competitiveness is not well defined and it is studied through traditional 
indicators of technical efficiency, productivity, profitability etc. At the same time, important 
aspects of farm competitiveness such as the governance efficiency, the potential and 
incentives for adaptation, and the sustainability are commonly ignored in the analyses. 
Furthermore, practically there is no comprehensive study on farm competitiveness in 
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Bulgaria during post-communist transition and EU integration.  
This book suggests a holistic framework for analysis of farm contracts and 
competitiveness, and investigates the contractual structure and competitiveness of 
Bulgarian farms.  
The first part of the book incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and 
Transaction Costs Economics (combining Economics, Organization, Law, Sociology, 
Behavioral and Political Sciences) and develops a framework for analysis of farm 
contracts and competitiveness.  
This new approach specifies different mechanisms of farm governance; defines types 
and features of farm contracts; identifies technological, institutional, behavioral, 
dimensional, and transaction costs factors for contractual choice; specifies effective 
modes for organizational and contractual arrangements; determines the effective 
boundaries of farms; defines farm competitiveness and its criteria efficiency, adaptability 
and sustainability; identifies indicators for assessing the individual aspects and the overall 
competitiveness of farms.  
The second part of the book analyzes structure and efficiency of farm contracts, and 
assesses farm competitiveness in Bulgaria.  
The analyses embraces the post-communist institutional and organizational 
modernization of farming sector; evaluates the efficiency of various modes for 
management of land supply, labor supply, service supply, inputs supply, finance supply, 
insurance supply, and marketing of different type of farms; and assesses the 
competitiveness of dominating unregistered, cooperative and business farms in the 
conditions of EU integration and CAP implementation.  
I am enormously thankful to VDM Publishing House for giving me the extraordinary 
opportunity to present my work on farm contracts and competitiveness to the larger world 
audience. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
1. MECHANISMS AND MODES OF FARM GOVERNANCE 
 
In modern society resources, activities and interactions of individual agents are 
governed by a number of distinct mechanisms (Figure 1).  
 
First, institutional environment or the “rules of the game”– that is the distribution of 
rights and obligations between individuals, groups, communities, and generations, 
and the system(s) of enforcement of these rights and rules [Furuboth and Richter; 
North].  
 
The spectrum of rights could embrace the material assets, natural resources, 
intangibles, certain activities, labor safety, clean environment, food security, intra- and 
inter-generational justice etc. 
 A part of the rights and rules are constituted by the formal laws, regulations, 
standards, court decisions etc. In addition, there are important informal rules and rights 
determined by the tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical and moral norms etc. The 
enforcement of various rights and rules is done by the state (administration, court, police) 
or other mechanisms such as community pressure, trust, reputation, private modes, self-
enforcement etc.  
Institutions and institutional modernization create dissimilar incentives, restrictions 
and costs for intensifying exchange, increasing productivity, inducing private and collective 
initiatives, developing new rights, decreasing divergence between social groups and 
regions, responding to ecological and other challenges. For example, (socially, legally) 
acceptable norms for use of labor, plant, livestock, and environmental resources; 
employment of certain forms of contracts or organizations; trade with particular resources 
and products etc., all they could differ even between various regions of the same country.  
The institutional “development” is initiated by the public authority, international actions 
(agreements, assistance, pressure), and the private and collective actions of individuals. It 
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is associated with the modernization and/or redistribution of the existing rights; and the 
evolution of new rights and the emergence of novel (private, public, hybrid) institutions for 
their enforcement.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Mechanisms of governance of agrarian activity 
 
The specific institutional environment is a key parameter which eventually determines 
the potential for and the particular type of development in different communities, regions, 
and countries [North]. 
In the contemporary society a great deal of individuals’ activities and relations are 
regulated and sanctioned by some (general, specific) formal and informal institutions. 
However, there is no perfect system of preset outside rules that can govern effectively the 
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entire activities of individuals in all possible (and quite specific) circumstances of their life 
and relations. Principally individual agent finds out (can not easily change) the institutional 
environment and frequently there is not a voluntary (“contractual”) choice - agent is to 
follow socially imposed rules of the game otherwise risks to be punished.  
 
Second, “invisible hand of free market” - market price movements and market 
competition. 
 
 The importance of market for the coordination (direction, correction) and stimulation 
of economic activities, exchanges and allocation of resources is among fundamentals of 
political economy for more than 200 years. Individual agents use (adapt to) markets 
profiting from specialization and mutually beneficial exchange (trade) while their voluntary 
decentralized actions govern overall distribution of efforts and resources between activities, 
sectors, regions, countries.  
Generally, individual agents can not affect the price level (“price taking”) but are free 
to accept or not (a voluntary contract) whether to use certain markets, counterparts, prices 
etc. and take associate costs and risks. However, there are also instances of lack of 
individual choices and unwanted exchanges (contracts) - e.g. missing markets, monopoly 
and power relations, externalities etc. Consequently, free market “fails” to govern 
effectively the entire activity, exchanges, and resources of individuals.  
 
Third, private modes (“private or collective ordering”) – those are diverse private or 
collectively designed special contractual and organizational arrangements governing 
bilateral or multilateral relations between private agents.  
 
Individuals take advantage of institutional, market etc. opportunities and deal with 
institutional and market deficiency by selecting or designing mutually beneficial private 
modes (rules) for governing of their relations and exchanges.  
Private mode negotiates own rules or accepts existing private (collective) order, 
transfers existing rights or gives new rights to counterpart(s), and safeguards absolute 
(assigned by institutions) and/or contracted rights. In most cases private governance is 
based on voluntary and mutually beneficial contracts. However, there are instances of 
unwanted private or collective order (contract) cased by a monopoly or a power situation of 
some private agents or organizations.   
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In modern society a great part of agrarian activity is governed by private negotiations, 
“visible hand of the manager”, or collective decision-making. Nevertheless, there are many 
examples of “private sector deficiency and failures” in governing of socially desirable 
activity such as environmental preservation, food security etc.  
 
Forth, public intervention (“public order”) – these are various forms of a third-party 
public (Government, community, international) involvement in market and private 
sectors such as public guidance, public regulation, public taxation, public assistance, 
public funding, public provision, property right modernization etc.  
 
Public modes are both mandatory and voluntary (e.g. public contract) for all or 
qualified private agents. 
The role of public (local, national and transnational) governance has been increasing 
along with the intensification of activity and exchange, and the growing interdependence of 
social, economic and environmental activities. In many cases, the effective organization of 
certain activity through a market mechanism and/or a private negotiation would take a long 
period of time, be very costly, could not reach a socially desirable scale, or be impossible 
at all. Thus a centralized public intervention could achieve the willing state of the system 
faster, cheaper or more efficiently1.  
Nonetheless, there are a great number of bad public involvements (inaction, wrong 
intervention, over-regulation) leading to significant problems of sustainable development 
around the globe. 
 
Fifth, hybrid forms – some mixture combining features of market and/or private 
and/or public governance. 
 
In modern agrarian economy there are widespread diverse hybrid modes (market-
private, private-collective, public-private, public-collective, national, transnational etc.) 
aiming to adjust governance to the specific needs of (cooperating, trading etc.) agents and 
the requirements of sustainable development. 
“Governance matters” and depending on the (efficiency of) system of governance 
“put in place”, the outcome of the development is quite different with diverse levels of 
socio-economic progression and environmental conservation (Figure 1). Subsequently 
                                                 
1
 At current stage (“globalization”) many of the challenges facing economical and agrarian 
development (food security, effective management of environmental resources, fight against 
diseases, climate change,) requite trans-border or even global governance. 
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there has been quite unlike results of agrarian transition of different industries and 
countries around the world [Bachev 2010]. 
A significant part of farmers relations with other agents are governed though various 
contracts.  
For instance, when chemicals or fuel are purchased on market a spotlight contract is 
used, indicating an acceptance to acquire a particular good for a certain price against 
agent’s obligation for at spot payment. When a labor is hired an employment contract is 
applied stipulating negotiated terms on how labor will be used, conditions and terms of 
work, modes of payment etc. In marketing of farm produce long-term contracts with 
wholesales, processors, and food-chains are frequently used specifying quantities, 
qualities, time of deliveries, prices etc.  
When a farmer sets up or joins a cooperative (firm) he signs accepting the terms of 
organization’s constitutive contract with members’ rights and obligations. Similarly, when a 
farmer joins a public funding, training etc. program he agrees to get a public contract for 
services, subsidies etc. for free or against some commitments - e.g. to use funding 
purposely, provide environmental protection services etc.  
The contract is a mean for a voluntary exchange of rights and obligations between 
two or more parties by which they govern their relations in a mutual benefit.  
The rights that agents give and receive could be on human capital, natural resources, 
material and financial assets, liabilities etc. The subject of contract are rights agents really 
posses as right of ownership, rights of management, user rights, rights to generate income 
etc. Rights can be transferred entirely (sale) or partially (hiring, lease).  
The exchange can occur instantly in the present (e.g. a cow for cash) or in some 
moment or period of time in the future after contracting (sale of future yield, land lease, 
employment of labor etc.). The later opens up possibility some of the parties to “steal” 
rights (non-fulfillment of promises) transferred with a contract [Furuboth and Richter]. 
The initial distribution of rights and obligations between agents in society is done by 
laws and regulations, tradition, moral, religion and ethical norms etc. In modern society a 
great part of relations between agrarian agents are regulated (governed) by laws and 
formals norms.  
For instance, it is not allowed to trade farm products not meeting formal standards for 
quality and safety; subject of sale could be only the right to use labor but not the 
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personality of the worker 2 ; employment of children is forbidden; marketing of certain 
products is to be done at fixed prices or by certified organizations etc.  
Preset outside rules and restrictions (should) facilitate relations of economic agents. 
However, they can hardly regulate all their aspects in the specific conditions of individual 
agents. The contract is the mean by which individual agents optimize relations creating 
private rules of exchange (of owned private rights) adapted to their specific conditions and 
needs [Williamson]. The only formal (institutional) restriction is that private contract must 
not contradict laws and harm interests of third parties.  
Furthermore, there are widespread informal (unwritten) contracts which enforcement 
through formal (e.g. court) system is difficult or impossible3. 
 
                                                 
2
 Slavery is prohibited around the world but still practiced in some countries. 
3
 Nevertheless they are quite effective and broadly applied in agrarian sector of transitional, 
developing and developed countries alike. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
2. TYPE OF FARM CONTRACTS 
 
There is a big variety of contractual relations in which agrarian agents participate or 
may take part in. Individual type of contracts have different specific characteristics – 
specific subject, formal requirements, possibility for an effective transfer and protection of 
various rights, costs for preparation, enforcement, disputing, and termination of contractual 
terms.  
“The rational” agrarian agents take into account the potential benefits, advantages 
and shortcomings of divers contractual forms when chose modes for governing of their 
relations with other agents.  
A particular attention is put on assessment of possibilities for opportunistic behavior 
of counterparts and inclusion of special contractual terms for safeguard against it. 
Tendency for opportunism means that if there is an opportunity for a party to get non-
punishably an extra rent from exchange (performing unwanted exchange by others) the 
agent will likely “steal” the rights of others [Williamson]. 
 
Agrarian contracts can be classified in some of the following major categories: 
 
• Sale-purchase contract – that type of contract arranges a permanent transfer of 
rights on particular resource or object against payment of a certain price.  
 
The major risk for buying farmer is from pre-contractual opportunism of seller. The 
buyer usually does not have full information for the quality of acquired object, and seller is 
not interested in revealing the existing shortcomings. For instance, when a second-hand 
tractor is purchased it is difficult to evaluate whether the technical state correspond to the 
claims of seller (problems appear later on during exploitation); real yield of a new seed 
variety is discovered in cropping time etc. In order to safeguard against these risks a 
preliminary testing, a trying period before final purchase, giving a guarantee by seller etc. 
are negotiated. 
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There is also possibility for post-contractual opportunism if a long-term asset (e.g. 
equipment) combined with after-sale technical service (e.g. maintenance, upgrading etc.) 
is purchased. Since the trade is completed (money transferred) the promise for future 
servicing is not fulfilled or it is executed badly or with delays. The opportunistic behavior of 
seller decreases (self-restricted) when a long-term contract is employed or there is a high 
likelihood for new contracts between counterparts in future. 
On the other hand, farmer as a seller often faces post-contractual opportunism in 
terms of delayed payment or non-payment for marketed farm output. In order to protect 
from this risk a safeguard term (e.g. advance payment, cash payment, cash and carry) is 
applied or interlink deals is contracted (crediting and/or inputs supply by buyer against 
marketing of farm produce). In any case, risk diminishes considerably when farmer 
chooses a seller/buyer to whom he trusts or selects market agents with built a good 
reputation. 
 
• Lease contract – this type of contract arranges the transfer of right on a temporary 
use of certain resource or object against payment of a rent.  
 
Major risks for farmers here are from pre-contractual opportunism associated with the 
quality of leased item (similar to a purchase contract) and from employment of a fix rent. 
For instance, when a fix rent is contracted the tenant takes the entire risk of losses (or 
benefits) from the variation of productivity and income of leased resource (object, land, 
animal). That sort of risk could be shared with the owner through contracting a share rent 
or even entirely eliminated through applying a market rent. 
The lease contract also gives possibility for pre- and post-contractual opportunism 
from the lease-holder. In the former case, the tenant does not declare his intention to use 
ineffectively leased resource (object) while in the later case he is practicing such behavior 
(bad maintenance of leased building and equipment, poor care of leased animals, 
improper crop rotation, insufficient compensation of nutrition intakes through fertilization, 
pirate sharing or trade of new variety seeds, software or technology). Moreover, it is 
common a delayed or non-payment of contracted rent by tenants. 
 
• Employment contract – this contract arranges the right to receive a particular 
service from hired for a certain period of time labor against payment of salary or wage 
by the employer.  
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A special feature of this “service” contract is that the one party (the employer) 
acquires the right to direct, control and fire another side – thus there is a relation of 
subordination. This mode gives possibilities for rapid adaptation to current labor needs of 
farm. Alternatively either is has to be prepared a very detailed service contract (with 
relevant rights and obligations of partners in all possible contingencies during the period of 
their relationship) or to permanently (re)negotiate new contracts along with changing 
conditions and needs of each partner. 
Major risks for farmers associated with this type of contract are from pre- and post-
contractual opportunism. In the first case, the applicant-worker could misinform for his 
capabilities or intentions in order to get the job. Farmers can protect asking 
recommendations, selecting candidates with certain education level or training certificate, 
organizing interview and/or test for determining the applicant’s ability etc. In the second 
case, hired worker may not put the necessary (contracted) efforts after receiving the job. 
The later is facilitating by the fact, that in agriculture permanent supervision of labor is 
impossible and/or productivity is not always proportional to the labor input (e.g. positive or 
negative impact of climate factor). Besides, a highly qualified worker may leave the job in a 
critical for the farm moment (e.g. combine operator during harvesting time) because of 
offered a higher salary by the competitor farm.  
In order to restrict these forms of opportunism farmers apply: a permanent 
employment contract, appointment of team-leaders (supervisors), output-based 
compensation, payment of bonuses, give incentives for improving productivity through 
labor participation in farm management, rights for pay holidays, providing free services, 
housing etc.   
 
• Service contract – this type of contract arranges the right to receive a certain 
service against payment of a price.  
 
The service could be material (cultivation of land, plant protection, transportation, 
advertisement, software, water and electricity supply) or for accomplishing a particular task 
(maintenance of equipment, veterinary service, agronomic advice, education, guarding, 
garbage collection). 
Unlike employment contract here both sides are in equal position (rather than of 
subordination). In many instances, the farmer is not even able to “direct” service provider 
as it is with medical treatment, education, consulting, guarding etc. Frequently it could be 
utilize an output-based payment which significantly restricts the opportunism of service 
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supplier. However, often the employment of a time-based or fixed payment is the only 
possible option. Principally a long-term supply contract improves the quality of provided 
service – getting familiar with a particular farm (land parcels, equipments, animals), desire 
to keep or renew the contract etc. In any case, selection of a supplier with a good 
reputation diminishes the risk from opportunistic behavior.  
Nevertheless, there are widespread instances of a (semi)monopoly situation when 
farmers have to accept the terms and the modes of implementation of a service contract –
in electricity and water supply, garbage collection, public (e.g. extension, information) and 
administration services etc.  
 
• Loan contract – this type of contract arranges a temporary transfer of property right 
on some amount of money (money loan) or product (loan in kind) against payment or 
not of a certain price (interest).  
 
Unlike lease contract the debtor is not obliged to return the identical money/product 
which is borrowed, but just the same quantity of borrowed assets (usually with some 
interest above the loan).  
In modern conditions most common is the contract for money loan from a commercial 
bank, private individual or entity, or public agency. The control over utilization of the loan 
by the creditor is very difficult because of the high “mobility” of money. In order to avoid the 
opportunism of debtor a strict selection of applicants is practiced by crediting agent 
(studying out credit history, reputation, papers of property ownership; requirement for 
guarantors), and a significant collateral, guarantee and/or coo-financing is requested. All 
these considerably increase the cost of (or entirely block) using that type of contract by 
farmers.  
On the other hand, farmers often face a pre-contractual opportunism of creditors 
taking advantage of their (“monopoly” or power) position and employing unfavorable for 
farmers terms and/or not informing borrowers about the “hidden” costs associated with the 
loan contract. 
Increasingly other more-efficient forms for giving loan are applied in package with 
sale of long-term assets (leasing), short-term assets (in installments or delayed payments), 
or interlinked credit against marketing of farm output or services. 
 
• Insurance contract – this contract arranges the transfer of particular risk-taking 
during a period of time against payment of a certain price. When event (incident) 
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covered by the insurance contract occurs, the insurer pays an insurance premium 
according to negotiated terms.  
 
Assurance is offered (sold) against various risks – damages on property, yield, 
animals and persons caused by natural (hail, frost, storm, flood, fire), health (injury, 
disease, dead) or social factors (destruction, theft). 
Usually, opportunism may occur by insured person before signing the contract (not 
disclosing the real information for possible risks) or during contract execution period (not 
taking actions for reducing damages when event occurs; consciously provoking damages 
in order to get insurance premium etc.). That augments considerably the insurance prices 
and restricts utilization of insurance contracts by farmers. 
On the other hand, farmers often “discover” the pre-contractual opportunism of 
insurers only after the occurrence of harmful event. Then they find out that not all 
assurance terms (protected risks, extend of coverage of damages, ways of assessment of 
damages, payments etc.) had not been well explained and/or adapted to farmers needs 
before signing the contract.  
For many kind of farm related risks markets evolve very slowly and/or insurance 
services are practically inaccessible by majority of farmers. What is more, for many 
important risks insurance is not available for purchase at all – e.g. risk of lack of market 
demand of farm products, fluctuation of prices of farm produce, possible opportunism of 
counterparts in contractual relations etc. That is why farmers have to develop other 
(private, collective) modes to safeguard their investments and rights or lobby for a public 
intervention in assurance supply [Bachev and Nanseki]. 
 
• Coalition contract – this type of contract regulates rights and obligations in 
coalition of actions and/or resources of two or more agents.  
 
Members of the coalition exchange certain rights associated with the ownership, 
control and direction of particular resources, management of the coalition, distribution of 
income and other benefits of the activity, coalition period, ways of expansion of the 
coalition and termination of membership etc.  
According to the specific goals different type of coalitions may be established – 
informal partnerships (coalition of resources and/or activity), cooperatives (non-for profit), 
firms (profit-making), associations (collective actions) etc.  
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In coalition contract most often there is a risk of post-contractual opportunism, when 
some member(s) does not fulfill obligations to the coalition or uses improperly the 
organization in their own private interest. In order to avoid that risk partners with a high 
mutual confidence are selected (family members, relatives, friends), and the membership 
of collation is restricted (mutual control on opportunism is practically possible). In coalition 
with open membership (cooperative, corporation) effective mechanisms are put in place to 
motivate members (preferences for working members of coalition) and secure direct 
members participation in the management and control of the coalition. 
In a very big open membership coalition it is possible a particular pre- and post-
contractual opportunism as well. Creation and development of such coalition is associated 
with significant costs (for initiation, establishment, registration, organizational 
modernization) while the efficiency and sustainability of the new form is uncertain. That is 
why there are no incentives for individuals to participate in that process and make the 
necessary investments of efforts and means. However, in case of a successful 
organization, the willingness to join and benefit (“free-riding”) from new the coalition greatly 
increases. 
In the real agrarian economy there is a great variety of contractual arrangements 
designed to fit the needs of counterparts – natural, pure, complex, interlinked, 
complementary, bilateral, trilateral, multilateral etc. forms.  
For instance, in the traditional (non-cash) agrarian economy natural exchanges are 
typical – goods, resources and services are traded against other goods, resources and 
services (barters, gifts); loans, interests, wages, rents and membership fees are paid in 
kind etc.  
Furthermore, in the modern economy there are wide spreading more complex and 
interlinked contracts arranging: inputs (service) supply and crediting, inputs (service) 
supply and/against marketing of farm output, acquiring a share in the property (cooperative, 
partnership) against servicing, crediting and marketing etc.    
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Chapter 3 
 
 
3. FACTORS FOR CONTRACTUAL CHOICE  
 
The choice of type of contract depends on a number of factors (Figure 2): 
 
First, personal characteristics of individual agents such as preferences, ideology, 
knowledge, capability, training, managerial experience, risk-aversion, reputation, trust, 
“contract” power etc.  
 
 
 
                                  
 
Figure 2. Factors for contractual choice in agriculture 
 
For instance, farming organization is often restricted to a family partnership. In some 
cultures, the cooperative is the preferred mode of agrarian organization. If farmer is a good 
manager he will be able to design, control and implement a bigger (more efficient) form 
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adapted to his specific needs – effective management of more internal (labor) and outside 
(specialized service, inputs supply, marketing) contracts.  
A risk-taking farmer will prefer more risky but productive forms - e.g. bank credit for a 
new profitable venture). When counterparts are family members (or close friends) there is 
no need for complex contracts since relations are easily “governed” by the good will and 
mutual interests of parties. Benefits for farmers from a contractual arrangement could 
range from monetary or non-monetary income; profit; indirect revenue; pleasure of self-
employment or family enterprise; enjoyment in agricultural activities; desire for involvement 
in environment, biodiversity, or cultural heritage preservation; increased leisure and free 
time; to other non-economic benefits. 
 
Second, natural and technological factors such as non-separability or inter-
dependence of activity, technological economies of size and scale, etc.  
 
In rare cases there is only one practically possible form for governing of agrarian 
activity. For instance, a natural minimal size of farm organization is determined by a 
technological parameter such as non-separability of activities (e.g. a biological 
nonseparability of individual animal). Also in Japanese dispersed paddy agriculture water 
supply could not have been conducted by individual farmers (high interdependency, 
nonseparability of water use) and since earliest period water use organization developed 
as public projects [Mori].  
Effective governance of some environmental activities requires a certain scale and 
thus collective actions at local, regional, national or transnational scale [Bachev 2009]. 
Nevertheless, beside few examples, in farming is almost impossible to find cases where 
the choice of form of governance is unilaterally determined by technological parameters. 
Another technological factor which could define the mode of governance (e.g. farm 
size) is possibilities to explore technological economy of scale and scope. For instance, in 
order to use a large harvester capacity a farmer increases the operational size; or he 
produces two or more products under different technologies in order to use “free” 
resources (e.g. available family labor).  
Nevertheless, development of technology usually follows demand and in fact is a 
changeable parameter as well4. Moreover maximum economy of scale can be reached not 
through internalizing activity but by market exchange with a specialized activity - e.g. 
                                                 
4
 Otherwise it is very difficult to explain widespread distribution of small scale machinery in 
agriculture. 
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selling or buying harvesting service. Free farm resources could also be traded (sell, lease 
out) more effectively in market place instead of using them in own non-specialized 
activities (opportunity costs reason).  
In fact there is an opposite tendency in the real agrarian economy - dependence of 
technological development from the governance structure. It is common when institutional 
restrictions (for land transfer, hiring labor etc.) and the high level of transaction costs (e.g. 
for outside credit supply) prevent exploration of the potential of available technologies. 
Domination of primitive technologies is a rule rather than an exception in the farming 
sector of transitional and developing countries.  
In other instances, high transaction uncertainty or imperfect institutional 
arrangements extend farming organization far beyond “technologically optimal” size. For 
instance, it has been typical “over-concentration” of East-European agriculture during 
communist era, and “over-integration and over-cooperation” in transitional period 
thereafter [Bachev 2006]. 
 
Third, institutional environment – formally and/or informally imposed social order 
(rules, norms, restrictions) and associated costs.  
 
Often the choice of governing mode is pre-determined by institutional restrictions as 
some forms for carrying out farming activities, land and labor supply, trade of output etc. 
could be socially unacceptable, very costly, or illegal in certain countries or period of time.  
For instance, corporate and cooperative organization of farming is forbidden in many 
countries; market trade of farmland, natural resources, and some outputs (inputs) is 
illegitimate; private management of natural ecosystems (parks, reserve zones) is not 
allowed; some type of farms, agrarian property or transactions are preferentially taxed by 
governments etc.   
Nevertheless, when costs associated with the illegitimate governance is not high 
(possibility for disclosure low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) while benefits are 
considerable, then the more effective modes prevail – large gray or black sectors of 
economy are common around the globe. 
Principally, the choice of contractual form will greatly depend on the efficiency of 
(outside) institutional environment – regulations, stability and enforcement of property 
rights, extend of direction of private relations, possibility for rapid and costless dispute 
resolution, efficiency of punishment of offenders etc.  
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For instance, in conditions of well-working public system of regulations (quality 
standards, price guarantees) and laws and contract enforcement a preference will be 
given to spotlight and classical (standard) contracts. On the other hand, if rights on major 
agrarian resources are not defined or not well defined, and absolute and contracted right 
effectively enforced (as was the case during most of the post communist transition) that 
lead to domination of primitive subsistence farming, informal, personal and over-integrated 
forms, unsustainable organizations, undeveloped and missing markets etc. 
 
Usually, every agrarian activity and exchange could be governed through a great 
variety of alterative forms.  
 
For instance, cultivation of land by a tractor can be governed in different ways:  
 
• a farmer can buy (unified ownership), rent (rent contract) or lease a tractor (input 
and credit supply interlinked contract);  
• a farmer could buy cultivation service from market (contract service);  
• a number of farmers may buy a tractor (joint ownership) and use it in a group 
(producers cooperative) or individually;  
• a farmer can join a cooperative providing cultivation services (non for profit 
organization);  
• a farmer may lease land out to a tractor owner and share output (share tenancy 
contract);  
• a farmer can hire a tractorist to work on farm (employment contract), and may even 
sell out cultivation service to market (profit making organization); 
• cultivation service to farms could be subsidized by Government (trilateral mode), or 
provided by a municipality or state company (public organization). 
 
One extreme for the farm manager is to specialize exclusively in governing of market 
transactions rather than production management. For example, leasing-in farmland and 
long-term material assets, purchasing all services for cultivation and harvesting of output, 
buying needed short-term material assets, selling all primary products on market.  
Another extreme is a close internal organization such as one-person or group 
subsistent farm - farmer(s) employ only own resources (land, labor, technological 
knowledge) and consume the entire product.  
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Between these two polls there is a spectrum of feasible modes for governing of 
agrarian activity and exchange: various sort long-term contracts, association, cooperation, 
interlinked organization, hybrid forms, farms of different type (partnerships, corporations, 
complex hierarchies) etc. 
The different governance modes are alternative but not equally efficient modes for 
organization of activities. Each of them has distinct advantages and disadvantages to 
protect individuals rights and investments, coordinate and stimulate activities, explore 
economies of scale and scope, save production and governance costs etc.  
The free market has a big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible hand of 
market”, “power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit from 
specialization and exchange. However, market governance could be associated with a 
high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to price instability, great possibility for facing an 
opportunistic behavior, “missing market” situation etc.  
The special contract form (“private ordering”) permits a better coordination, 
intensification, and safeguard of activity. However, it may require large costs for 
specification of contract provisions, adjustments with constant changes in conditions, 
enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms etc.  
The internal (ownership) organization allows a greater flexibility and control on activity 
(direct coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute resolution by a fiat). However, 
extension of internal mode beyond family and small-partnership boundaries (allowing 
achieving the minimum technological or agronomic requirements; exploration of 
technological economies of scale and scope) may command significant costs for 
development (initiation and design, formal registration, restructuring), and for current 
management (collective decision making, control on coalition members opportunism, 
supervision and motivation of hired labor etc.). 
The separation of ownership from management (cooperative, corporation, public 
farm/firm) gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity and transacting 
efficiency – internal division and specialization of labor; exploration of economies of scale 
and scope; introduction of innovation; diversification; risk sharing; investing in product 
promotion, brand names, relations with customers, counterparts and authorities. However, 
it could be connected with huge transaction costs for decreasing information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders, decision-making, controlling opportunism, and 
adaptation.  
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The cooperative and non-for profit form also suffers from low capability for internal 
long-term investment due to non-for-profit goals and non-tradable character of shares (so 
called “horizon problem”). 
The choice of governing mode greatly depends on transaction costs [Coase; 
Williamson]. Governance is usually associated with significant costs for protection, 
contracting and exchange of individual rights. For example, farmers have costs for finding 
best prices and partners; negotiating conditions of exchange; contract writing and 
registration; enforcing negotiated terms through monitoring, controlling, measuring and 
safeguarding; disputing through a court system or another way; adjusting or termination 
along with evolving conditions of exchange etc.  
Therefore, rational agents will seek, chose, and develop such modes for governing 
their activity and exchanges which maximize transacting benefits and minimize transaction 
costs. Moreover, both (current) transaction costs for using governing forms and long-term 
transaction costs for development (initiation, modernization, liquidation) of governance 
mode are taken into account.  
If transaction costs were zero then the mode of the governance would not be of 
economic importance [Williamson]. In such a world individuals would manage their 
relations with an equal efficiency though free market, or through private organizations of 
different types, or in a single nationwide company. All information for the effective potential 
of transactions (exploration of technological opportunities, satisfying various demands, 
respecting assigned and transferred rights) would be costlessly available. And the 
individuals would costlessly define new rights, and protect their (absolute and contracted) 
rights, and trade owned resources (and products) in mutual benefit until exhausting the 
possibilities for increasing productivity (situation known as “Pareto optimum/efficiency”).  
Thus the type of governance becomes crucial since various modes give unequal 
possibilities for participants to coordinate activities, and stimulate an acceptable behavior 
of others (counterparts, dependents), and protect their contracted and absolute rights from 
unwanted expropriation.  
Nevertheless, often the high costs make it difficult or block otherwise efficient 
(mutually beneficial) transactions. For instance, despite the great pay-off of investments in 
agrarian research and innovation, market and private agents do not organize such activity 
in a sufficient scale because of their high uncertainty and low market and private 
appropriability [Bachev and Labonne]. There is a strong need for a “third-party” 
(Government, NGOs, international assistance etc.) intervention in order to make such 
activity more effective or possible at all.  
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If there is a market and private sector failure but an effective government intervention 
is not introduced in a due time the agrarian “development” is substantially deformed (public 
failure is possible) [Bachev 2004].  
In Bulgaria for instance, there has been a great number of bad examples for 
Government under- and over-interventions in agrarian sector. Consequently, primitive and 
uncompetitive small-scale farming; predominance of over-integrated and personalized 
exchanges; ineffective and corrupted agrarian bureaucracy; blocking out of all class of 
agrarian transactions (such as innovation and extension supply, long-term credit supply, 
supply of infrastructure and environmental goods); and development of a large informal 
(gray) sector, all they have come out as a result [Bachev 1996, 2007].  
In the long term only effective governing structures for the specific economic, 
institutional and natural environment and personal characteristics of agents will dominate 
in agriculture [Bachev 2004].  
Thus there will be no singe (universal) mode for effective organization of all type of 
agrarian activity and exchange in any possible natural, institutional, and economic 
surroundings. In any particular moment of time agrarian activities will be carried out 
(governed) through a great variety of modes: some will be governed by “invisible hand of 
market”, other will be carried out through a special contract mode, some will be managed 
within hierarchy, some will be supported by a third party, some would require more 
complicated and mixed modes. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
4. EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT CHOICES 
 
In addition to production costs, the agrarian agents make significant transaction costs 
for governing relations with other agents - individuals, private entities, public authorities5. 
The institutional environment considerably affects the level of transaction costs of 
individual agents. For instance, when private rights are well defined and protected, and 
(public) system for contract enforcement work well - that facilitates transactions between 
individuals and the effective allocation of resources.  
(Development of) institutional environment also imposes significant transaction costs 
to agents – e.g. for studying out and complying with various institutional restrictions 
(community or state norms, regulations, standards), formal registration of contracts and 
entities, efforts to deal with bureaucracy etc. A good example in this respect are current 
problems of many Bulgarian farms to meet the new EU requirements (“institutionally 
determined” costs) related to new product quality, food safety, labor, environmental, 
animal welfare etc. standards [Bachev 2008]. Furthermore, EC is increasingly criticized for 
imposing unnecessary regulations (and related costs for agrarian agents) for the size, 
shape and color of vegetables and fruits for trade in EU etc. 
Transaction costs have two behavioral origins: individual’s bounded rationality and 
tendency for opportunism [Williamson].  
Economic agents do not possess full information about the system (price ranges, 
trade opportunities, adverse effects of activities on others, trends in development) since 
the collection and processing of such information would be either very expensive or 
impossible (e.g. for future events, for partners intention for cheating, time and space 
discrepancy between individual action and adverse impacts on others etc.). In order to 
optimize decision-making agents have to spent costs for "increasing their imperfect 
rationality" - for data collection, analysis, forecasting, training etc. 
                                                 
5
 Production costs are the cost associated with proper technology (“combination of production 
factors”) of certain farming, servicing, environmental, community development etc. activity. The 
transaction costs are the costs for governing the economic and other relations between individuals. 
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Individuals are also given to opportunism in two major forms: pre-contractual 
("adverse selection") - when some party uses "information asymmetry" to negotiate better 
contract terms; and post-contractual ("moral hazard") - when some counterpart takes an 
advantage of impossibility for full observation on his activities (by another partner or by a 
third party) or when he takes "legal advantages" of unpredicted changes in transacting 
conditions (costs, prices, environment etc.).  
A special third form of opportunism occurs in the development of large organizations 
(known as “free-riding”). Since the individual benefits are often not proportional to the 
individual efforts, everybody tends to expect others to invest costs for the organizational 
development and later on to benefit from the successful new organization [Olson]. 
Commonly, it is very costly or impossible to distinguish the opportunistic from non-
opportunistic behavior (because of the bounded rationality). Therefore, agrarian agents 
have to protect their transactions and rights from the hazard of opportunism through: ex 
ante efforts to protect their “absolute” (given by dominating institutions) rights, and find a 
reliable counterpart and to design an efficient mode for partners credible commitments to 
“contracted” (voluntary transferred) rights; and ex post investments for overcoming 
(through monitoring, controlling, stimulating cooperation) of possible opportunism during 
contract execution stage. 
Technological development also affects enormously the structure and level of 
transaction costs [North]. For instance, mechanization and standardization of farming 
operations (products) increases bounded rationality of farm manager, and diminishes 
possibility for opportunism of hired labor and counterparts. That leads to the extension of 
activities and transactions under a singe management (the farm size) – enlargement of 
internal transactions (internal division and specialization of labor) as well as outside market 
and/or contract transacting (procurement, trade, cooperation etc.).  
Possibilities that progression and application of modern production (e.g. precision 
farming), transportation, measurement, information, communication etc. technologies 
gives to coordinate and intensify transactions and minimize related costs are immense  - 
easy assessment and traceability; on line information, coordination, monitoring, detecting, 
advise; direct low costs exchanges (expressing demands, finding best prices and partners, 
negotiating, trading, disputing) and collective actions (coalitions) of interested agents at 
national and international scales; rapid detection of problems and interventions by the 
governments and international agencies; full participation of individuals in and control on 
public decision-making etc.  
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However, that enormous potential for increasing productivity, effective allocation of 
resources, conservation of environment etc. meets the restrictions of imperfect institutional 
arrangements which eventually slow-sown scientific and technological progress, impede 
individual market and private transactions, allow particular agents (bureaucrats, interest 
groups) to benefits from the status-quos, and lead to unsustainable “development”. It is 
widely recognized that constant “food crisis” has been a consequence not of the lack of 
sufficient (world) technologies and resources for food production but the bad governance - 
inefficient Governments, inefficient international organizations, and inefficient global 
governance. 
One direction for evaluation of efficiency of alternative contractual arrangement is the 
direct comparison of costs for each transaction in different forms. Organization which 
requires fewer costs is more efficient – e.g. it is more economical to use a marketing 
cooperative instead of own direct marketing of farm output.  
Part of the transaction costs can be easily specified – costs for management, 
licensing and registration, agro-market information, promotion and marketing of output, 
general management, hiring lawyers and court suits, guarding property and yields, 
payment of bribes etc.  
However, a significant portion of transaction costs is either very difficult (too 
expensive) or impossible to be assessed. In that group we can include the costs for finding 
best partners, negotiation, controlling and enforcement of contractual terms, organizational 
development, interlinked transacting, unrealized (failed) deals etc. Besides, it is often 
extremely complicated to separate transaction costs from traditional production 
expenditures6. For example, while executing farming operations a farmer supervises hired 
labor; during transportation of chemicals he negotiates marketing of output etc.  
Component comparison of transacting costs could not always give an idea for 
efficiency of organizations. Very often the alternative form decreases one type of costs 
while increasing another type transacting costs – e.g. internalization of a transaction 
(replacement of market with integral mode) is associated with reduction of costs for 
information supply (overcoming market uncertainty), permanent (re)negotiations along with 
constantly changing conditions of exchange, safeguarding investments from outside 
opportunism etc. On the other hand, it enlarges costs for organizational formation, decision 
making, integral management, supervising and motivation of hired labor etc. In above 
example with alternatives for marketing of farm output the “internal realization” (personal 
                                                 
6
 All these “measurement problems” make it impossible to extend the traditional Neoclassical 
models simply by adding a new "transacting" activity [Furuboth and Richter]. 
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consumption, production “consumption”, processing) could be chosen as more efficient 
form to direct sell or use of marketing cooperative.  
Often it is difficult to select a base for comparison in view that the high transacting 
costs entirely block development of an alternative organization. For instance, market for 
agrarian credit did not emerged in Bulgaria during most of the transition and the internal 
supply (utilization of own finance, direct outside co-investment) was the only possible form 
for finance supply of farms [Bachev, 2006]. Here it is impossible to determine the 
comparative level of transaction costs and appreciate the “high” efficiency of integral mode 
for financing. In that case funding with “own means” and with “bank credit” are not real 
alternatives but completely different governing arrangements. 
Finally, a good part of transactions in agriculture is governed not by “pure” but 
through complex, interlinked and/or supplementary modes - e.g. inputs supply in a 
“package” with know-how, credit, and/or service supply; crediting of production against 
marketing of output; governing of critical activities within own farm and membership 
cooperative  etc. Thus, it is important to take into consideration the overall (total) costs for 
organization of transactions of different types - all external and internal transaction costs of 
the farm. 
Another direction for evaluation of comparative efficiency of alternative governing 
forms is the Discrete structural analysis [Williamson]. Here the assessment of absolute 
levels of transaction costs of alternative governing structures is not necessary. This 
approach aims to evaluate the relative levels of transacting costs between alternative 
modes of governance, and selecting that one which most economizes on transacting costs. 
Actually, farm managers are interested not in absolute level of transaction costs in different 
form, but in organization with the lowest comparative costs for a particular transaction. 
 
In order to implement that new approach following steps is to be undertaken: 
 
First the “critical dimensions” of transactions, responsible for the variation of 
transaction costs, are to be identified. “Frequency”, “uncertainty”, and “asset specificity” 
have been identified as critical factors of the transaction costs by Williamson [Williamson] 
while the “appropriability” has been added by Bachev and Labonne [Bachev and Labonne]. 
 
When the recurrence of transactions between the same partners is high, then both 
(all) sides are interested in sustaining and minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding 
opportunism, building reputation, setting up adjustment mechanisms etc.). Besides, the 
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costs for development of a special private mode for facilitating bilateral (or multilateral) 
exchange could be effectively recovered by frequent exchange.  
When the uncertainty, which surrounds transactions increases, then costs for carrying 
out and secure the transactions go up (for overcoming information deficiency, 
safeguarding against risk etc.). Certain risks could be diminished or eliminated by a 
production management or through a special market mode (e.g. purchase of insurance). 
However, the governance of most transacting risk would require a special private forms – 
e.g. trade with origins; providing guarantees; using share-rent or output-based 
compensation; employing economic hostages; participating in a risk-pooling, inputs-supply 
or marketing cooperative; a complete integration [Bachev and Nanseki]. 
The transaction costs get very high when specific assets for the relations with a 
particular partner are to be deployed7. In this case it is impossible to change a partner of 
transaction (alternative use of assets) without a big loss in value of the specific capital. 
Relation specific (dependent) investments are "locked" in transactions with a particular 
buyer or seller (personality of partner matters), and cannot be recovered through a 
"faceless" market trade.  
Costless redeployment (alternative use) of specific assets is not possible if 
transactions fail to occur, they are prematurely terminated, or less favorable terms are 
renegotiated (in contract renewal time and before the end of life-span of specific capital). 
Therefore, dependant investment (assets) have to be safeguarded by a special form such 
as a long-term or tied-up contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint investment, quasi or 
complete (ownership) integration. Often, the later is quite expensive, investment in specific 
capital are not made, and activity either can not take place or occurs without (or loss of) 
comparative advantages in respect to productivity 
If symmetrical assets dependency (a regime of bilateral trade) exists there are strong 
incentives in both parties to elaborate a special private mode of governance. However, 
when unilateral dependency exists then dependent side (facing mini or total monopoly) 
has to protect investments against possible opportunism (behavioral uncertainty or 
certainty) either through integrating transactions (unified organization, joint ownership, 
                                                 
7
 Specificity is not a technological but transacting characteristic of assets. In one situation a 
particular capital (investment) could be highly universal (easy deployment to another internal usage 
or outside trade) while in others - highly specific (a big dependency from the relations with a certain 
counterpart (buyer, seller, coalition partner). 
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cooperative) 8 ; or safeguarding them with interlinked contract, exchange of economic 
hostages, development of collective organization to outstand asymmetrical dependency 
(for price negotiation, lobbying for Government regulations) etc. 
The transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on products, 
services or resources is low. "Natural" low appropriability has most of the agrarian 
intellectual products - agro-market information, agro-meteorological forecasts, new 
varieties and technologies, software etc. Besides, all products and activities with significant 
(positive or negative) externalities are to be included in this group.  
If the appropriability is low the possibility for unwanted (market or private) exchange is 
great, and the costs for protection (safeguard, detection of cheating, disputing) of private 
rights and investments extremely high. Agents would either over produce (negative 
externalities) or under organize such activity (positive externalities) unless they are 
governed by an efficient private or hybrid mode - cooperation, strategic alliances, long-
term contract, trade secrets, or public order. 
 
Second, we have to “align transactions (differing in their attributes) with the 
governance structures (differing in their costs and competence) in discriminating (mainly in 
transaction cost economizing) way” [Williamson].  
 
According to the combination of the specific characteristics of each activity and 
transaction, there will be different the most effective form for governance of that particular 
activity (Figure 3). 
Agrarian transactions with a good appropriability, high certainty, and universal 
character of investments (the partner can be changed anytime without significant 
additional costs) could be effectively carried across free market through spotlight or 
classical contracts. Here the organization of transactions with a special form or within the 
farm (firm) would only bring extra costs without producing any transacting benefits. 
Recurrent transactions with low assets specificity, and a high uncertainty and 
appropriability, could be effectively governed through a special contract. The relational 
(”neoclassical”) contract is applied when detailed terms of transacting are not known at 
outset (a high uncertainty), and a framework (mutual expectations) rather than a 
specification of obligations is practiced. Partners (self)restrict from opportunism and are 
                                                 
8
 When technological opportunities for economy on scale (scope) on specific assets can be 
achieved. Otherwise integration of transactions will be lost-making comparing to outside price 
(production costs) competition. 
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motivated to settle emerging difficulties and continue relations (situation of a frequent 
bilateral trade). Besides, no significant risk is involved since investments could be easily 
(costlessly) redeployed to another use or users (no assets dependency exist). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
Critical dimensions of transactions 
Appropriability 
High Low 
Assets Specificity 
 
Low High 
Uncertainty 
Low High Low High 
Frequency 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
Free market          
Special contract 
form 
  
 
  
 
   
Internal 
organization 
    
 
 
 
  
Third-party 
involvement 
   
 
   
 
 
Public intervention          
       - the most effective mode;  - a necessity for a third party involvement 
  
Figure 3. Effective modes for contractual arrangement in agriculture9 
 
A special contract forms is also efficient for rare transactions with a low uncertainty, 
high specificity and appropriability. Dependent investment could be successfully 
safeguarded through contract provisions since it is easy to define and enforce relevant 
obligations of partners in all possible contingencies (no uncertainty surrounds 
transactions) 10 . Here the occasional character of transactions does not justify 
internalization within the farm (firm). 
Transactions with a high frequency, uncertainty, assets specificity (dependency), and 
appropriability, have to be organized within the farm/firm (internal ownership mode).  
                                                 
9
 Differences in personal characteristics of agents are disregarded. Only extreme levels (high-low) 
of the critical factors are considered. In the real agrarian economy there is a big variation of critical 
dimensions, and thus of the effective governing forms (including mixed, hybrid, interlinked etc. 
governance). 
10
 Practically it is difficult (costly) or impossible to write a complete contract for complex transaction 
[Williamson]. 
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For instance, managerial and technological knowledge is quite specific to a farm, and 
its supply has to be always governed through a permanent labor contract and coupled with 
ownership rights [Bachev, 2004]. Capital investments in land are to be made on owned (or 
long-leased-in) rather than a seasonally rented land (high site and product specificity). All 
“critical” to the farm material assets will be internally organized - production of forage for 
animals; important machineries; water supply for the irrigated farming etc. While universal 
capital could be effectively financed by a market form (e.g. a bank credit), the highly 
specific investments can be only made through an internal funding (own funds, equity sell, 
joint venture).  
If the specific and specialized capital cannot be effectively organized within the farm 
(economy of scale and scope explored, funding made)11, then an effective governing form 
outside farm-gates is to be used - group farming, joint ownership, interlinks, cooperative, 
lobbying for a public intervention. 
When a strong assets (capacity, technology, time of delivery, site, branding) inter-
dependency with an upstream or downstream partner exists, then it is not difficult to 
govern transactions through a contract mode (strong mutual interests for cooperation and 
restriction of opportunism). For instance, effective supply (procurement) contracts between 
farmers and processors are widely used in dairy, meat, vine, organic industries 
(symmetrical dependency). 
However, very often farmers face unilateral dependency and need an effective 
(ownership) organization to protect their interests. Transacting costs for initiation and 
maintaining of such “collective organization” is usually great (big number of coalition, 
different interests of members, opportunism of “free-riding” type) and it is either 
unsustainable or does not evolve at all. That creates serious problems for the efficiency 
(and sustainability) of individual farms - missing markets, monopoly or quasi-monopoly 
situation, impossibility to “induce” a public intervention etc. 
Serious transacting problems arise when condition of assets specificity is combined 
with a high uncertainty, low frequency, and good appropriability. Here the elaboration of a 
special governing structure for a private transacting is not justified, specific investments 
are not made, and activity (restriction of activity) fails to occur at an effective scale 
("market failure" and "contract failure"). Similar difficulties are also encountered for rare 
transacting associated with a high uncertainty and appropriability.  
                                                 
11
 Integration of transactions would either increase management costs (needs to buy from or sell to 
a competitor) or it would be loss-making comparing to outside production costs (price) competition. 
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In all these cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, public authority) involvement in 
transactions is necessary (through assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make 
them more efficient or possible at all. Emergence and unprecedented development of 
organic farming, and systems of trade with origins and “fair-trade” are good examples in 
that respect. There is an increasing consumer’s demand (a price premium) for organic, 
original, and fair-trade products in many countries. Nevertheless their supply could not be 
met unless effective trilateral governance (including an independent certification and 
control) has been put in place. 
When appropriability associated with a transaction (activity) is low, there is no pure 
market mode to protect and carry out activity effectively. Nevertheless, respecting others 
rights (unwanted exchange avoided) or “granting out” additional rights to others (needed 
transactions carried) could be governed by a “good will” or charity actions of individuals, 
NGOs, government or international organizations.  
For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental initiatives (agreements) have 
emerged driven by the competition in the food industries, farmers’ preferences for eco-
production, and responds to the public pressure for a sound environmental management. 
Unprecedented development of “codes of behaviors”, eco-labeling and branding, 
environmental cooperatives, and “green alliances”, all they are good examples in that 
respect. Nevertheless, environmental standards are usually “process-based”, and 
“environmental audit” is not conducted by an independent party, which does not guarantee 
a “performance outcome”. Therefore, most of these initiatives are seeing as a tool for an 
external image manipulation. Recent huge food safety, animal safety, and eco-scandals 
have demonstrated that such private schemes could often fail (result of high bounded 
rationality and possibility for opportunism).  
In any case, voluntary initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire social demand 
especially if they require significant costs. Some private modes could be employed if a 
high frequency (a pay-back on investment is possible) and a mutual assets dependency 
(thus an incentive to cooperate) exists.  
For example, inter-dependency between a dairy farm and a milk processor in a 
remote region (capacity and site dependency); or a bee keeper and a neighboring orchard 
farm (symmetric dependency between needs of flower and needs for pollination).  In all 
these instances, unwritten accords, interlinking, bilateral or collective agreements, close-
membership cooperatives, codes of professional behavior, alliances, internal organization 
etc. are used.  
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However, emerging of special (private) large-members organizations for dealing with 
low appropriability (and satisfying the entire “social” demand) would be very slow and 
expensive, and they unlikely be sustainable in a long run (“free riding” problem). Therefore, 
there is a strong need for a third-party public (Government, local authority, international 
assistance etc.) intervention in order to make such activity possible or more effective 
[Bachev 2004]. 
For example, supply of environmental goods by farmers could hardly be governed 
through private contracts with individual consumers because of low appropriability, high 
uncertainty, and rare character of transacting (high costs for negotiating, contracting, 
charging all potential consumers, disputing). At the same time, the supply of additional 
environmental protection service is very costly (in terms of production and organization 
costs) and would unlikely be carried out on a voluntary basis. Besides, the financial 
compensation (price-premium) of farmers by willing consumers through a pure market 
mode is also ineffective due to the high information asymmetry, massive enforcement 
costs etc. A third-party mode with a direct public involvement would make that transaction 
effective: on behalf of the consumers the State agency negotiates with individual farmers a 
public contract for “environment conservation and improvement service”, coordinates 
activities of various agents (including a direct production management), provides public 
payments for compensation of farmers, and controls implementation of negotiated terms. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
5. ECONOMIC BOUNDARIES OF FARM 
 
The analysis of efficiency and factors of agrarian contracts let better understand and 
determine the effective size (boundaries) of farms and other agrarian organizations for the 
specific institutional, economic and natural environment of a particular industry, country etc.  
In the traditional (Neoclassical) framework, the farm is presented as a “production 
structure” and analyses of efficiency are restricted to production costs - “factors 
productivity”, “optimization of technological factors according to marginal rule”.  
However, the traditional approach fails the explain: why (given competitive setting) 
there exist so many farms with different productivity of resources utilization12, and why 
there is so big variety of agrarian organizations at all (one-person farms, group farms, 
cooperatives and firms of different kind, subsistent farms, small and large farms etc. 
The modern approach studies farm and other agrarian organizations as a 
governance structures which efficiency depends not only on their capacity to minimize on 
production costs, but also to economize on transaction costs [Bachev 1996, 2004]. 
In a one-person subsistent farm there are no transaction costs (one agent), but 
limited possibility for extension of farm size through investment in specialized (and 
specific) human, material and natural capital, expansion of consumption etc.  
“Internal” opportunities for increasing productivity (through division of labor, 
investments, exploring economy of scale and size, new demand) augments along 
increasing the members of coalition (family or group farm, partnership) and/or outside 
trade of resources and products. The later is associated with additional transaction costs 
for making the coalition (finding complementary and reliable partners), increased internal 
costs for management (coordination, reducing bounded rationality, controlling opportunism 
of coalition members) and for outside market or contract trade (employment of labor; land 
and inputs supply; financing, marketing of output). 
                                                 
12
 For instance, production costs productivity of Bulgarian cooperatives has been 5 times lower 
than in private farms [Bachev 2006]. 
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Thus the effective boundaries of farms will be determined by the trade-off between 
the additional gain in benefits (productivity, consumption etc.) and the transaction costs.  
Furthermore, the high costs of outside exchange make it more profitable to carry out 
division and cooperation of labor (a transaction) within an organization (firm, group farm) 
instead across the market13. For instance, a specialized livestock farm organizes internally 
a crop (forage) production activity (hiring additional labor and farmland) because of the 
significant costs and risks for market procurement of needed forage. 
Nevertheless, the internal management of transactions is also associated with costs 
(for directing, stimulating and supervising hired labor; coordination and controlling activity 
of partners) which restricts unlimited expansion of borders of an organization14.  
Thus a transaction will be carried in an organization if the costs are lower than for 
governing that transaction across market or in another organization [Coase, 1937]. 
Accordingly a farm becomes bigger if integrates the governance of more internal and 
outside transactions. Similarly, the farm becomes smaller if ceases previously organized 
transaction(s) and let them to market or another organization(s). 
Moreover, the effective size and economic boundaries of farm will be determined 
through optimization of total benefits and minimization of the total (production and 
transaction) costs [Bachev 2004]. Consequently, the distribution of overall (agrarian) 
activities between different farms and agrarian organizations will be determined by the 
comparative costs (efficiency) for using various governing arrangements. 
Transacting modes and acceptable net benefits vary according to individual’s 
preferences, entrepreneurship ability, risk aversion, opportunity costs of owned resources 
etc.  
Depending on the personality of resource owners and the (transacting) costs and 
benefits of their coalition, different type of farm will be preferred - one-person farm (firm), 
family farm (firm), group farm or partnership (firm), cooperative farm, and corporative 
farms (firm) [Bachev 2004].  
Expected benefits for farmers could range from the monetary or non-monetary 
income; profit; indirect revenue; pleasure of self-employment or family enterprise; 
enjoyment in agricultural activities; desire for involvement in environment, biodiversity, or 
                                                 
13
 Fundamental “discovery” that "there are costs of using the price mechanism" [Coase 1937] 
explained why production can not be carried out without any organization and why there are 
organizations of different type and size in agriculture. 
14
 Otherwise all agricultural production could be effectively carried on by one big company. 
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cultural heritage preservation; increased leisure and free time; to other non-economic 
benefits15. 
In the specific economic, institutional and natural environment (socio-economic 
development, legal framework, support policies, tradition, access to new technology, level 
of transacting costs) various types of farm will have quite different effective horizontal and 
vertical boundaries.  
For instance, in transitional conditions of high market and institutional uncertainty, 
and inefficient property rights and contract enforcement system, most agrarian 
investments happened to be in a regime of high specificity (dependency). As a result 
(over)integrated modes such as low productive subsistent household and group farming, 
or large production cooperatives and agro-companies, have been dominating in most 
East-European countries.  
Alternatively, in more matured economies, where markets are developed and 
institutions stable, the agrarian assets (activity) are with more universal character. 
Therefore, farm borders are greatly determined by the family borders, and more market 
and mixed (contract rather than entirely integrated) forms prevail. 
Transaction costs minimizing helps us understand the reason of emergence and the 
efficiency of a great variety of agrarian organizations in the modern world – economic 
boundaries of farms (“make of buy decision”; extend of internal division and specialization, 
and product diversification), divers contractual arrangements and  type of coalitions 
(partnerships, firms, cooperatives), economic needs for cooperation with competitors 
(inputs supply, marketing, lobbying etc. associations) or vertical (downstream, upstream) 
counterparts, joint ventures, pace and limits of development of agrarian markets etc.  
What is more, efficiency of a particular organization can hardly be assessed without 
analyzing the efficiency of complementary and/or competing organization(s). For instance, 
“high” efficiency of small-scale farms and the producers (inputs supply, marketing) 
organizations in most countries can not be properly evaluated without analyzing their high 
complementarities16.   
 
In order to assess the farm’s efficiency we have first, put individual transaction in the 
centre of analysis, and assess the level of associated costs and benefits.  
 
                                                 
15
 For instance, “desire for preservation of farm for future generation” has been a major reason for 
the persistence (sustainability) of a great number of part-time farms in Japan. 
16
 e.g. the high efficiency and sustainability of small scale subsistence and semi-market farms, and 
production cooperatives in transitional Bulgarian agriculture [Bachev 2006]. 
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Major types of transactions of a farm entrepreneur are associated with:  
 
• management supply, 
• know-how supply, 
• innovation supply,  
• supply of land and other natural resources,  
• labor supply,  
• inputs supply,  
• service supply,  
• finance supply,  
• insurance supply,  
• marketing of services and products. 
 
Next, we need to identify alternative forms for organization of different farm 
transactions in the specific market, institutional and natural environment, and assess their 
comparative efficiency.  
 
For example, the identified principle modes for governing of transactions in major 
functional areas of Bulgarian farms are presented in Figure 4. 
The comparative efficiency is assessed for the specific conditions of each farm as 
contractual (governance) form providing the biggest net benefits is selected. 
For instance, in order to explore technological economies of scale a farmer is 
considering an expansion through application of modern machineries and leasing cheaply 
available farmland (Figure 5).  
Three contractual forms for securing needed machineries are feasible – a partnership 
with another farmer, buying mechanization service from a specialized market provider, and 
a purchase of necessary machineries. While alternative forms for machinery supply (inputs 
and services) are associated with the same additional transaction costs, the later mode 
gives biggest additional benefit in terms of growth in productivity and additional income. 
Nevertheless, the considerable transaction costs for outside funding (securing a bank 
loan) make it impossible (inefficient) to select the third form otherwise allowing maximum 
productivity (and farm expansion). 
Generally, the contract with the highest transaction costs (for credit supply in the 
above example) eventually determines (limit) the farm boundaries.  
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Functional areas 
Alternative contractual modes 
Market contract Special contract Special 
organization 
Supply of 
management 
na Employment contract with 
guaranteed minimum salary and 
output-based bonuses 
Cooperation 
Partnership 
Supply of land and 
other natural 
resources 
Purchase 
Short-term lease 
Long-term lease with a fix rent  
Long-term lease with a share rent 
Long-term lease with a market rent 
Cooperation 
Partnership 
 
Labor supply Daily hire 
Seasonal hire 
 
Permanent labor contract with a fix 
remuneration 
Permanent labor contract with 
result based payment 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Supply of short-
term material 
assets 
Purchase with a 
spotlight contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term procurement contract 
Supply contract interlinked with a 
credit supply, service supply, 
and/or marketing of farm produce 
Cooperation 
Supply of long-
term material 
assets 
Purchase with a 
spotlight contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term lease contract 
Contract for purchase interlinked 
with crediting (leasing) and/or 
services 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Service supply Purchase with a 
spotlight contract 
Standard contract 
Long-term supply contract 
Supply contract interlinked with 
other services, products or 
crediting 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Innovation and 
know-how supply 
Purchase with 
spotlight contract 
Standard contract 
Free consultation 
in the farm 
advisory system 
Long-term supply contract 
Supply contract interlinked with 
supply of material assets and/or 
crediting 
Cooperation 
 
Financing Bank loan 
Loan from an 
individual agent 
Loan from a private 
organization 
Co-investment 
Crediting interlinked with supply of 
material assets and services 
Contract with a public funding 
program  
Partnership 
Cooperation 
Insurance Purchase of 
insurance 
Purchase of 
“assurance 
service” 
Insurance contract interlinked with 
material assets 
Long-term insurance contract 
Cooperation 
Marketing of 
products and 
services 
Retail sale 
Wholesale trade 
Standard contract 
 
Long-term contract for marketing 
Marketing contract interlinked with 
crediting, supply of material assets 
and/or services 
Partnership 
Cooperation 
 
Figure 4. Principle contract forms for functional areas of Bulgarian farms 
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Criteria 
Alternative contract forms 
Partnership Service contract Purchase of machinery 
1. Additional benefit 
(growth in productivity 
and income)  < 
 
 
 
< 
 
 
2. Additional transaction 
costs 
 
   - for inputs and service 
supply 
 
 
   - for financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
= 
 
 
 
< 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Net benefits negative positive negative 
The most effective form  ☺  
 
Figure 5. Assessment of alternative contract forms for farm expansion 
 
A major factor restricting farm extension, which is generally identified around the 
world, is the enormous costs for enforcement (monitoring, measuring, controlling) of non-
family labor contracts [Hayami and Otsuka]. That is why an owner-operated farm is the 
most common form for farm organization around the world.  
On the other hand, the enormous “credit supply” and “marketing” costs were specified 
as the critical factors limiting farm enlargement in the transitional Bulgarian agriculture 
[Bachev and Kagatsume]. Subsequently, despite favorable natural environment, cheap 
labor and farmland, good tradition, and growing market demand, a great part of overall 
farming activity has been carried out in numerous small, semi-market and subsistence 
farms with primitive technology, productivity and eco-standards. 
 
Finally, we can use our new framework to define the sustainability of different farms 
and agrarian organizations. 
 
A farm will be sustainable if it manages all transactions in the most economical for the 
owner(s) way – that is the situation when exist no activity which could be carried out with a 
net benefit [Bachev 2005; Bachev and Peeters]. 
If a farm does not govern activity or transactions effectively, it will be unsustainable 
since it experiences high costs and difficulties using institutions (possibilities, restrictions) 
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and carrying out activity (transactions) comparing to other feasible organization. In that 
case, there will be strong incentives for exploring the existing potential (adapting to a 
sustainable state) through reduction or enlargement of farm size, or via reorganization or 
liquidation of the farm. Thus either alternative farm or non-farm application of resources; or 
farm expansion through an employment of additional resources; or trade instead of internal 
use of owned land and labor; or taking over by (or merger with) another farm or 
organization17, will take place. 
Furthermore, we have to estimate farm’s potential (incentives, ability) for adaptation 
to evolving market, institutional and natural environment through effective changes in the 
governing forms (saving on transacting costs) and production structure (exploring 
technological possibilities for growth in productivity) [Bachev 2005; Bachev and Peeters]. 
Thus if a farm does not have a potential to stay at or adapt to new more sustainable 
level(s) it would be either liquidated or transformed into another type of farm.  
For instance, if a farm faces enormous difficulties meeting institutional opportunities 
and restrictions (e.g. new quality and environmental standards, production quotas); or has 
serious problems supplying managerial capital (as it is in a one-person farm when an aged 
farmer has no successor), or supply of needed farmland (a big demand for non-agricultural 
use of land), or funding activities (insufficient own finance, impossibility to sell equity or buy 
credit), or marketing output (a changing demand for certain products, strong competition 
with the imported products), then it would not be sustainable despite high historical or 
current efficiency.  
Currently there are numerous unsustainable farms in Bulgaria and most EU countries, 
which can hardly adjust to fundamental changes in CAP and associated enhanced 
competition and new safety, environmental, animal welfare etc. standards [Bachev 2010].  
The traditional statistical, farming system, accountancy etc. data are little suitable to 
assess the overall efficiency and sustainability of different farms. In order to apply 
suggested new approach it is necessary to (get) use a great amount of micro-economic 
data (for different type of transactions governed by divers organizations, and for costs and 
benefits associated with the alternative governance modes) as well as data about specific 
(economic, institutional, natural etc.) environment in which different organizations evolve.  
The goal of such analysis is not only to test the adequacy of this new approach, but 
also to identify transaction difficulties, and suggest directions for improvement of public 
policies, and farming and business strategies. 
                                                 
17
 In most developed countries, the sustainable development has been associated with 
disappearance of traditional farming organization in major sectors (poultry, beef, pig) which is 
taken over by or integrated into related industries [Barry et al.; Martinez]. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
6. ASSESSMENT OF FARM COMPETITIVENESS  
 
Farm competitiveness characterizes the ability (internal potential, incentives) of a 
farm to compete on (a) market successfully. It is a feature only of the “market farms” 
whatever their specific type is – semi-subsistence (semi-market) holdings, family farms, 
cooperatives, business enterprises etc. If a farm is non-market (subsistence holding, 
member oriented cooperative), or it is quasi or entirely integrated in a larger venture 
(processing enterprise, food chain, restaurant, eco-tourism etc.) it has no such attribute.  
A good competitiveness means that a farm can produce and sell out its products and 
services effectively. The later could be a result of the competitive prices, variety, quality, 
time of delivery, location or other specificity (newest, uniqueness, organic character, origin 
etc.) of farm and/or its products. Contrary, the insufficient competitiveness indicates that a 
farm is experiencing serious problems in producing and marketing its output effectively (or 
at all) because of the high production and/or transaction costs. 
The farm competitiveness usually refers to farm’s ability to compete on a certain 
market(s) – retail, wholesale, local, regional, international, niche, for commodities for direct 
consumption or processing, mass or specific products, services, etc.  
In some cases, a segment of farm’s activity could be competitive while other(s) not.  
For instance, in many mix Bulgarian farms the crop production is usually highly 
competitive while livestock operations are not. Besides, there are various reasons for 
keeping “profitable” and “unprofitable” activities within a farm – e.g. preferences, internal 
use of “free” resources, technological and transaction costs economies of scale and scope, 
interdependency of assets or activities, risk management etc. [Bachev 2004]. Therefore, 
farm efficiency and competitiveness characterize the overall rather than the partial 
performance of a farm.  
 
The level of competitiveness of a particular farm depends on two groups of factors: 
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• internal factors - managerial capital, owned resources, potential for innovation and 
adaptation, productivity, relative power, location, relation specific capital, reputation 
etc. and 
 
• external factors - evolution and maturity of agrarian markets, number and power of 
competitors, development of downstream and upstream industries, level of public 
support to agriculture, institutional restrictions, border control measures, liberalization 
of local markets and international trade etc. 
 
The specific level of competitiveness of a particular farms, or farms in individual sub-
sectors, regions and countries depends on internal and outside factors. However, the farm 
competitiveness is always a characteristic of the farm and expresses its internal potential 
(ability) to compete successfully in the specific economic, institutional etc. environment. 
Farm competitiveness is usually assessed in a relative term (comparing to other 
similar farms) or absolute term (comparing to other competitors on a market). A particular 
farm could have a higher, average or lower performance than the other similar farms, and 
be competitive or uncompetitive on a particular market. Namely, because of the insufficient 
competitiveness of most (or some of) domestic farms some countries apply a public 
protection mode – subsidies, state purchase, price guarantee schemes, border restrictions 
etc.  
 
A farm will be competitive if it is efficient, and adaptive, and sustainable. Thus, there 
are three criteria for assessing the competitiveness of a farm (Figure 6). 
 
First, farm efficiency – that is the potential of a farm to organize effectively the 
production and transaction activity (of farmer, coalition of members), and minimize 
the overall production and transaction costs.  
 
Broadly applied traditional approach can not assess adequately the efficiency of 
farms since it restricts analysis to the technical efficiency (productivity) and/or financial 
efficiency (profitability). At the same time, significant transaction costs associated with the 
farming organization and farm’s potential to economize on governance costs are 
completely ignored. 
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Figure 6. Criteria for assessing competitiveness of farm  
 
Farm is not only a production but a governance structure [Bachev 1996, 2004]. 
Therefore, the overall production and transaction costs and benefits of a farm are to be 
taken into account in the assessments of farm efficiency.  
Furthermore, different types of farms (subsistent, semi-market, part-time, family, 
group, cooperative, firm, corporative etc.) have unlike missions, goals, costs and benefits 
for owners, modes of enhancement of efficiency etc. Therefore, they apply quite different 
strategies for development – e.g. preservation or expansion of a family farm, income 
support, group farming, innovation, commercialization, market domination, specialization, 
diversification, cooperation with competitors, environmental conservation, integration into 
processing and food chain, direct (on farm) marketing, international trade etc.  
Consequently, diverse farms would have quite different ways for expression of their 
proper efficiency. Thus, it is to be expected a significant variation in the rate of profitability 
on investments in an agro-firm (a profit-making organization) from the "pay-back" of 
expenditures or resources in a family farm (a major or supplementary income generation 
form), in a cooperative (a member oriented organization), in a public farm (a non-for profit 
organization) or in a semi-market farm (giving opportunity for productive use of otherwise 
"non-tradable" resources such as family labor, land etc.).  
 
Farm 
adaptability 
 
Farm 
sustainability 
 
 
Farm efficiency 
 
Farm 
competitive 
ness 
 
Farm 
competitiveness 
 48 
Indeed, a significant variation in productivity and profitability has been found in all 
estimates on “efficiency” of different farms during transition now in countries from Central 
and East Europe [Bachev, 2004; Csáki, C. and Lerman; Gortona and Davidova; Mathijs 
and Swinnen; Zawalinska]. 
Furthermore, there are many highly effective (non-market, cooperative etc.) farms 
which are not competitive since they do not compete on market at all. In order to be 
competitive a farm must be effective and be able to govern effectively its marketing 
transactions.  
Therefore, the system of assessment of farm competitiveness is to take into account 
the farm’s specific and market efficiency.  
 
Second, farm adaptability – that is farm’s potential (ability, incentives) to adapt to 
constantly changing market, economic, institutional, and natural environment. 
 
A market farm could be very effective (in optimization of current production and 
transaction costs) but unless it posses a good adaptation potential it will not be competitive. 
A market farm must have not only high historical or current efficiency but a long-term 
ability to perform effectively.  
The later implies existence of a good potential for farm adaptation to: liberalization of 
markets, globalization and augmentation of competition; dynamics of demand and prices 
of farm products; evolution of supply and prices of agrarian inputs, labor, services, finance 
etc.; progression of public support to farms; development of market and institutional norms, 
standards and regulations; changes in natural environment (e.g. global warming, extreme 
weather, water shortages etc.).    
For instance, in Bulgaria there are many highly productive (small scale, livestock etc.) 
farms which are not able adapt (lack of managerial ability and/or needed resources) to 
increasing competitive pressure, and new EU quality, safety, environmental preservation, 
animal welfare etc. standards, and/or challenges associated with the global climate 
change [Bachev and Nanseki; Bachev 2010].  
There are also marketing farms which have no incentives to adapt to new 
environment. For instance, if a farm/firm is in the end of its life cycle (an old age farmer 
with no successors) it does not have stimulus for a long-term investment for enhancement 
of adaptability and competitiveness. 
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Similarly, despite the huge public support for restructuring of so called “semi-market 
farms” in Bulgaria, the progress in implementation of this measure has been very slow 
(merely 3% of the targets) because of the lack of interests in beneficiaries. 
The farm adaptation is achieved through progressive improvement of the factors of 
production (resources, technologies, varieties of plants and livestock), production structure 
and/or organization of the farm (labor organization, internal management structure, 
management of contractual relations, modernization of organizational form etc.).  
Thus the system of assessment of farm competitiveness is to take into account the 
farm’s potential for adaptation to specific market, institutional and natural environment. 
 
Third, farm sustainability – that is farm’s ability to maintain (continue) over time. 
 
A farm could be efficient and adaptive but unsustainable in a medium or long-term. 
Therefore, such farm is not going to be competitive.  
For instance, around the world there are many part-time farms which “sustain” during 
the economic crisis (high unemployment, low income) and “suddenly” disappear once the 
economic situation improves. Likewise, in western countries there are many unsustainable 
family farms which managers are in retirement age but there is no successor willing to 
undertake the enterprise.  
Similarly, in Bulgaria there are a great number of otherwise efficient but highly 
unsustainable in a short to medium-term farms. Most of these farms are individual or 
family holding operated by old managers18, or they are located in mountainous regions and 
specialized in tobacco production (declining markets, limited alternative employment 
opportunities), or they are old style production cooperatives (crisis in management, 
reduction in membership).  
Furthermore, a market farm could be inefficient and inadaptable but highly 
“sustainable” – e.g. during transition there were many such farming organizations in 
Bulgaria (various public farms and firms in the process of privatization, reorganization or 
liquidation).  
Thus the system of assessment of farm competitiveness is to take into account the 
farms sustainability in shorter and medium terms along with its efficiency and adaptability. 
The evaluation of the overall competitiveness of an individual farm, or farms of 
different types, specialization or regions, requires a complex qualitative analysis. This 
                                                 
18
 40% of the farm managers in the country are older than 65 (MAF). 
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assessment is to determine the factors and levels of farm efficiency, adaptability and 
sustainability in the specific market, economic, institutional and natural environment.  
Furthermore, for each criteria one or more indicators is to be selected giving idea 
about (measuring) the level of farm efficiency, adaptability and sustainability.  
 
Indicators for farm efficiency 
 
There are a great variety of indicators for evaluating farm’s technical and financial 
efficiency suggested in textbooks (manuals) and/or practically used by various types of 
farms in diverse sub-sectors of agriculture and different countries. For assessing farm 
competitiveness, there is to be selected few (key) indicators which best characterize the 
technical and financial efficiency of the specific type of farm in the conditions of a particular 
sub-sector, region and country. 
For instance, for the conditions of Bulgarian market farms the quantitative indicators 
for the levels of labor productivity, land and livestock productivity, profitability of farm, 
profitability of own capital, liquidity, and financial autonomy, are the most appropriate for 
evaluation of farm’s technical and financial efficiency (Koteva and Bachev) (Figure 7).  
 
Criteria Indicators 
 
 
Farm efficiency 
Level of labor productivity 
Level of land and livestock productivity 
Level of profitability of farm  
Level of profitability of own capital 
Level of liquidity 
Level of financial autonomy 
Level of governance efficiency 
 
Farm adaptability 
Level of adaptability to market environment 
Level of adaptability to institutional environment  
Level of adaptability to natural environment 
Farm sustainability Level of sustainability 
 
Figure 7. Indicators for assessing farm competitiveness 
 
For assessing farm’s governance efficiency a qualitative analysis is needed 
embracing farm’s goals, ownership structure, personal characteristics of the farmer and 
labor, critical dimensions of different farm transactions, level of internal and outside 
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transaction costs, available governance alternatives; competition, cooperation, integration 
and/or complementarily with other organizations etc.  
Furthermore, according to the farmer’s personal preferences, and farm’s transacting 
costs and benefits, it could be found that a particular farm would be highly efficient (or 
inefficient) with various levels of (combination of the) productivity, profitability, financial 
security, and financial dependency.  
For instance, despite the low productivity, profitability and financial independence of 
many Bulgaria cooperatives, their efficiency for members has been high - non-for profit 
organization of highly specific for members assets and services with minimum production 
and/or transaction costs [Bachev 2006]. 
 
Indicators for farm adaptability 
 
For assessing farm’s adaptability three qualitative indicators could be used – the level 
of adaptability to market environment, the level of adaptability to institutional environment 
and the level of adaptability to natural environment (Figure 7). Moreover, the level of the 
overall adaptability of the farm will be determined by the indicator with the lowest value.  
For instance, in spite of the high adaptability to market and natural environment of 
many Bulgarian farms, their overall adaptability has been low since the level of adaptability 
to the new institutional requirements and restrictions is low [Bachev 2005; Bachev 2010]. 
 
Indicators for farm sustainability 
 
For assessing farm’s sustainability a qualitative analysis of the farm and its 
environment is needed. Some of the factors reducing farm sustainability are internal for the 
farm (e.g. natural “life cycle” of the farm, low efficiency, insufficient adaptability) while 
others are external and associated with the evolution of market, economic, institutional and 
natural environment.  
In order to assess the overall sustainability of a farm a quantitative indicator “level of 
sustainability” could be calculated.  
Initially, the managerial problems associated with the effective supply of needed 
factors of production and the marketing of output are to be identified, and their severity 
ranged (Table 1). Persistence of serious unsolvable problems in any of the functional 
areas of the farm management would indicate a low governance efficiency and 
sustainability. 
 52 
Next, the level of sustainability in supply of each of the factors of production and in the 
marketing of output is to be determined through transformation of the “level of problems in 
management” into the “levels of sustainability” (Table 2).   
 
Table 1. Identification of type of farm’s problems in supply of factors of production 
and marketing of output  
 
 
Serious problems in: 
Character of management problems  
None Insignificant Normal Big Unsolvable 
Effective supply of needed land and  
natural resources 
       ☺    
Effective supply of needed labor 
 ☺     
Effective supply of needed material and 
biological inputs 
       ☺    
Effective supply of needed innovation and 
know-how 
    ☺   
Effective supply of needed services 
    ☺   
Effective supply of needed funding 
    
      
Effective utilization and marketing of 
produces and services 
   
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Scale for conversion of levels of management problems in levels of 
sustainability  
 
 
Seriousness of problems Level of sustainability 
None Very high 
Insignificant High 
Normal Good 
Big Low 
Unsolvable Unsustainable 
 
 
The level of the overall sustainability of a farm will coincide with the lowest level of 
sustainability of supply of any of the factors of production or the marketing of products.  
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For instance, despite the high sustainability of supply of natural, human and material 
factors of production, the overall level of sustainability of most Bulgarian farms is low 
because of the low sustainability of the management of finance supply and/or marketing of 
output [Bachev 2005]. 
In addition to traditional statistical, farming system, and accountancy data, a new type 
of micro-economic data for farm’s specific characteristics, activity and governance as well 
as data for farm’s market, institutional and natural environment are needed to access the 
level of competitiveness through various indicators. These new data are to be collected 
through interviews with farm managers and/or experts in the area. 
The analysis of various aspects of farm competitiveness let not only to determine its 
level but also to identify the critical factors impeding its improvement, and assist farm 
management and public policies modernization.  
Often, the values of different indicators for individual criteria are with different 
directions. For instance, the efficiency and sustainability of a farm(s) could be high while 
adaptability low and vise versa.  
In order to get idea about the overall competitiveness of a farm and to be able to 
make comparison of competitiveness of different farms it is necessary to calculate an 
Index of Farm Competitiveness.  
Initially, we have to convert the specific value of indicators for efficiency, adaptability 
and sustainability into universal unitless values. An exemplary scale for conversion of the 
qualitative indicators for overall efficiency, adaptability and sustainability into universal 
(unitless) indicators is presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Scale for conversion of qualitative indicators for overall efficiency, 
adaptability and sustainability into universal indicators 
 
Qualitative value of indicators  Quantitative 
       value Level of efficiency Level of adaptability Level of sustainability 
Very high Very high Very high 1 
High High High 0,75 
Good Good Good 0,5 
Low Low Low 0,25 
Insufficient Insufficient Insufficient 0 
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Next, we could calculate an integral Index of Farm Competitiveness (Ic) by multiplying 
the Index of Farm Efficiency (Ie), Index of farm adaptability (Ia) and Index of Farm 
Sustainability (Is) using formula: 
 
Ic = Ie . Ia . Is 
 
The value of Ic would vary between 0 and 1, as a farm would be highly competitive 
when Ic is 1, uncompetitive when Ic is 0, and with a range of different (low, good etc.) 
levels of competitiveness when Ic is between 0 and 1.  
The specific ranges and weights of indicators for assessing farm efficiency and 
integral competitiveness as high, good, low and insufficient is to be determined by experts 
according to the specific conditions in each country, subsector of agriculture or type of 
farming organization.  
Depending on identified ranges and weights for assessment, a particular farm would 
have quite unlike level of the overall competitiveness.  
For instance, if there is no competition with imported products in a local market, a 
farm with relatively low productivity will be competitive. On the other hand, the same farm 
would be uncompetitive in an opened and matured market with a strong internal and 
international competition. 
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PART 2. FARM CONTRACTS AND COMPETITIVENESS IN BULGARIA 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
1. POST-COMMUNIST INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION  
 
A fundamental transformation of Bulgarian economy has taken place since 1989 
when a transition from a centrally planned to a market economy started.  
“Bulgarian” model for agrarian reformation and institutional modernization has a 
number of specific characteristics: 
 
First, a specific form for privatization of agricultural lands and a gradual removal of 
restrictions for acquisition and management of farmland. 
 
The 1991 Law for Ownership and Use of Agricultural Lands (known as Land Law) 
restored private rights of ownership on agricultural lands pulled into cooperative and state 
farms or otherwise nationalized after 194619. Rights on farmlands have been restored to all 
previous owners - individuals, legal entities, schools, Church, and municipalities. After the 
essential 1992 amendment of the Land Law restitution of land is made only in real 
boundaries - historical real borders (if they exist or could be easily recovered) or in new 
comparable real borders in the original locations of land plots. 
Modifications of the Land Law in 1993 removed existing restrictions for the maximum 
size for compensation of landowners 20 . The 1998 amendments of the Law made it 
possible for juridical person with foreign capital to acquire ownership on agricultural lands. 
Since January 2007 an ownership on agricultural lands can be taken by physical and 
juridical persons from countries of the European Union and the Agreement on the 
European Economic Area. 
The restitution of private rights on agricultural lands was an unprecedented and 
complex process. It affected more than 85% of agricultural lands in the country turning 
three-quarters of households into land owners [MAF]. More than 1,7 million claims for 
                                                 
19
 Until the end of Communist period (1989) most part of agricultural activity was carried out in a 
small number of large public farms - cooperatives, state farms, agro-industrial complexes etc.  
20
 30 ha in North-Eastern “Dobrudja” region, and 20 ha for the rest of the country. 
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restoration of farmlands were processed with an average size per claimant 2,7 ha for 
property usually situated in a number of different locations. Eighty six percent of the claims 
were made by heirs of previous owners who (according to Inheritance Law) get equal 
shares in the restituted farmland. Thus acquired “new” private rights on lands affected 
several millions plots in many instances smaller than 0,1 ha. 
The process of land restoration continued almost 10 years due to frequent changes in 
legislation, technical difficulties associated with identification and practical allocation of 
lands, a great number of disputes and complicated procedures for resolution, insufficient 
funding for land surveys and preparation of land division plans, little competence and 
existing corruption in some Land Commissions etc. [Bachev 2000]. Besides, most new 
owners were not eager to get land titles since the lack of interests in farming or a strategy 
to prolong a 5 year tax holiday period after full restitution of land rights. 
By 1994 most claimants got recognized their rights on farmland and had it restituted 
in so called “ideal borders”. Owners were able to get up to 90% of declared land for 
temporary (one season) use before land reallocation is entirely finished. Until the middle of 
1999 merely a quarter of owners restored full rights (with notaries acts) on their land 
predominately in "old real boundaries" and mountainous and semi-mountainous regions of 
the country.  
The 1999 amendment of the Land Law ruled for the decisions and sketch plans of 
Land Commissions to act as juridical documents for ownership. Consequently, by the end 
of that year the restitution of almost all agricultural lands were completed (Figure 8).  
The Land Lease Law was passed in 1996 with aim to facilitate the effective transfer 
of farmland management. Its 1999 amendments removed existing restrictions for the size 
of leased land (maximum 600 ha for individual tenants) and for the period of lease contract 
(between 4 and 50 years). Besides, transfers of ownership and user rights on agricultural 
lands were not taxed in order to promote the evolution of farmland markets. 
 
Second, implementation of a specific form for reorganization and privatization of 
former farming structure.  
 
The 1991 Land Law ruled out for all non-land assets of ancient cooperative farms and 
other organizations established on their bases to be distributed into individual shares 
between members and workers of these organizations. In accordance with the important 
1992 amendments of the Law all old cooperatives and other organizations established on 
their bases have been liquidated and their assets transferred to eligible share-holders.  
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Figure 8. Restitution of agricultural land in Bulgaria (% of land subject to restoration) 
 
Most of divisible cooperative assets (livestock, equipment, fruit trees, vineyards etc.) 
have been physically distributed among the eligible shareholders. A great part of 
machinery and buildings have been sold out on internal auctions while the remaining 
portion of individual shares (predominately passive assets) transferred to the new 
emerging cooperatives. Initially a significant amount of farmland had been cultivated in 
“organizations under liquidation” (Table 4). However, by 1995 the management of all 
agrarian activity was transferred to newly evolving private structures.  
The liquidation of ancient cooperative structures took more than 4 years as for some 
individual assets the final distribution was not completed until recently. In most cases the 
reorganization has been associated with large direct costs (for identification, allocation, 
disputing), enormous physical distortion of cooperative assets, mismanagement of 
production process, and unfair allocation of individual shares [Bachev 2000]. 
The 1992 Law for Transformation and Privatization of State and Municipal 
Enterprises launched privatization of state farms and agri-firms. Most agrarian assets have 
been sold through actions (public tenders), contests (competitive selection) or direct 
negotiations, while in some instances buyer has been the managers or workers teams of 
these organizations. The majority of agrarian enterprises were privatized during the period 
1996-2000 (Table 1). Nevertheless, implementation of the Government program for overall 
privatization continued until recently21. 
Following the 2001 Water Users Associations Act a process for privatization and 
demonopolization of the state company “Irrigation Systems” started and its assets 
                                                 
21
 The process of privatization is still incomplete for some assets. 
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transferred to newly evolving Water user associations. Around 70 associations have been 
formally registered servicing 30% of the total equipped for irrigation area [MAF]. Expected 
“boom” in efficiency from collective management of irrigation has not materialized because 
of semi-monopoly situation (terms, pricing) of regional water suppliers, few incentives for 
water users to innovate facilities and expand irrigation, and uncompleted privatization of 
state assets [Bachev 2010]. 
 
Table 4. Pace of privatization of ancient agrarian structures in Bulgaria 
 
 
Year 
Organizations under liquidation State farms and agri-firms 
Number Share in cultivated 
land (%) 
Number Share in cultivated 
land (%) 
1992 2101 - - - 
1993 1166 42.2 1340 8.6 
1994 500 18.1 1251 7.9 
1995 157 0 1002 7.2 
1996 0 0 488 5.4 
1997   475 5.3 
1998   308 5.7 
1999   311 3.6 
2000   232 1.7 
Source: National Statistical Institute 
 
Privatization of some state agrarian property has been slow because of the problems 
with the identification and separation of state property, the excessive debt of some 
companies, the existing opposition of various interests parties in rapid completion of the 
process etc. The privatization and restructuring of state companies have been associated 
with ineffective organization of activity, bad management and corruption, and in certain 
cases with formation of new (quasi)monopolies concentrating critical assets and services. 
 
Third, a lack of efficient system for public support to agriculture.  
 
Transitional Bulgarian farming was one of the least supported in Europe. Until 2000 
the public aid was mainly in the form of preferential short-term credit for grain producers 
and insignificant support to capital investments. There were also sporadic inefficient 
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measures to support producers through price guarantees and foreign trade regimes 
[OECD]. Besides agricultural income, farmland, and cooperative transactions with 
members have not been taxed during transition now. Nevertheless, the Aggregate Support 
to Agriculture was close to zero and even negative until 2000 (Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Aggregate Producer Support Estimate in Bulgarian agriculture 
 
There has been a considerable progress in public support to agrarian sector since 
2000 in form of current and investment subsidies, preferential credits, minimum price 
guarantee etc. However, most public aid before 2007 EU accession affected cereals and 
tobacco producers, and the overall support to farms were very low.  
For instance, EU Special Pre-accession Program for Agrarian and Rural 
Development (SAPARD)’s investments and subsidies in the Gross Value Added (GVA) 
were 3,6% and 1,8% accordingly [Bachev 2007]. At the same time, portions of the State 
Fund Agriculture (SFA)’s investment credit in the GVA were 0,4% while short-term (credits 
and subsidies) support in Gross Agricultural Product was 0,8%.  
Besides, only a small proportion of farms benefits from some form of public 
assistance most of them being large enterprises in most developed regions of the country. 
For example, SAPARD supported merely 7,7% of the agro-firms, 2,3% of the 
cooperatives, and 0,1% of the unregistered farms.  
Since 2007 there are huge EU and national funds to support agriculture (Figure 10). 
EU financial support goes for ”agrarian and rural development” (€733 million), “area based 
direct payments” (722 million), and “market support” (€388 million) [MAF]. In addition, 
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Bulgarian agriculture receives considerable funding from the EU Structural Funds and top-
ups from the national budget.  
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Figure 10. Public funding for Agrarian and Rural Development in Bulgaria22 
 
However, public assistance continues to benefit unevenly different farms as bulk of 
subsidies goes to few farms - the larger operators specialized in field crops (Table 5). Less 
than 16% of all farms get EU Area Based Payments and around 13% of them receive 
national top-ups [MAF]. Registered beneficiaries of direct payments with farm’s size bigger 
than 1000 ha are only 13% but they obtain support for more than 54% of totally subsidized 
farmland in this group. Similarly, unregistered beneficiaries with farm size smaller than 5 
ha are more than 60% but they get payments for merely 9% of supported area in the 
group.  
Furthermore, due to mismanagement and corruption SAPARD (along with other EU 
funds) was suspended by the EC in 2008, and a considerable EU funding under that 
scheme lost. What is more, the progress in implementation of National Plan for Agrarian 
and Rural Development (NPARD) has been very slow23 due to the lack of awareness and 
experiences, poor design and restricting criteria, complicated and costly procedures, and 
enormous mismanagement and corruption [Bachev 2010]. 
 
                                                 
22
 Actual funding for 2000-2006 and planed funding for 2007-2013.  
23
 By the end of 2009 only 7,54% of the funds for 2007-2013 NPARD were effectively utilized in 6 
out of 22 approved measures [MAF]. 
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Table 5. Share of EU and national support in Net Income of 
different Bulgarian farms in 2008 (percent) 
 
Type of farm Share of subsidies in farms Net Income 
Current subsidies Investment subsidies 
Field crops 63.2 2.1 
Horticulture 1.3 1.8 
Permanent crops 0.4 2.2 
Livestock 0.3 0 
Source: MAF Agro-statistics 
 
In the last few years before EU accession, country’s laws and standards were 
harmonized with the immense EU legislation24. The Community Acquis have introduced a 
modern framework for agrarian governance including new rights, rules and restrictions, 
strict public regulations, and effective control and support measures. Nevertheless, there is 
not enough readiness for an effective implementation of the new public order because of 
the lack of experience in agents, adequate administrative capacity, and/or practical 
possibility for enforcement of novel norms (lack of comprehension, funding, deficient court 
system, widespread corruption etc.). 
What is more, modern public institutions and infrastructure crucial for farming 
development have not been built in the country: public system for enforcement of laws, 
regulations, and contracts does not work well; essential property rights (on environmental 
resources and biodiversity, special and organic products, intellectual agrarian property 
etc.) are not well defined or enforced; public support programs are rarely governed 
effectively and in the best interest of legitimate beneficiaries; newly established agricultural 
advisory system does not serve the majority of farms; urgently needed public system for 
agrarian insurance has not been introduced; crucial agrarian and rural infrastructure 
(wholesale markets, irrigation, roads, communication technologies) has not been 
modernized; public support for initiating and developing farming associations has not been 
given; multifunctional role of agriculture has not been recognized and supported etc.  
Furthermore, there have been a great number of bad government (under and over) 
interventions in agrarian sphere during the transition now which affected adversely 
development of new farming structures [Bachev, 2010]. 
                                                 
24
 The Acquis Communitaire adapted before EU accession (January 1, 2007) contains 26000 
pieces of legislation accounting for 80000 pages. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
2. EVOLUTION OF NEW FARM STRUCTURES 
 
Privatization of agrarian resources has contributed to a rapid development of private 
farming in the country. There emerged more than 1,7 million private farms of different type 
after 1990 (Table 6). 
Majority of newly evolved farms are unregistered farms (Physical persons). They 
concentrate the main portion of agricultural employment and key productions like livestock, 
vegetables, fruits, grape etc. (Table 7). 
Unregistered farms are predominately subsistence, semi-market and small-scale 
commercial holdings. According to the official data the farms smaller than 2 European Size 
Unit (ESU)25  comprise the major share of all farms in main agricultural subsectors (Figure 
11). What is more, in livestock activities they account for the bulk of the Standard Gross 
Margin (SGM) in related subsectors. 
Agrarian reform has turned most households into owners of farmland, livestock, 
equipment etc. An internal organization of available household resources in an own farm 
has been an effective way to overcome a great institutional and economic uncertainty, 
protect private rights and benefit from owed resources, and minimize costs of transacting 
[Bachev 2000].  
During transition, market or contract trade of much of household capital (land, labor, 
money) was either impossible or very expensive due to: unspecified or completely 
privatized rights, “over-supply” of resources (farmland, unemployed labor), “missing” 
markets, high uncertainty and risk, asymmetry of information, enormous opportunism in 
time of hardship, little job opportunities and security etc. Running up an own farm has 
been the most effective (or only feasible) mode for productive use of available resources 
(free labor, land, technological know-how), providing full and part-time employment or 
                                                 
25
 1 ECU=1200 Euro. According to the EU classification farms with a size of 2-4 ESU are 
considered as “semi-market farms”. The actual number of subsistence and semi-subsistence farms 
is unknown since many of them are not covered by the Agricultural Census. 
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favorable occupation for family members, and securing income and effective (cheap, safe, 
sustainable) food supply for individual households. 
 
Table 6. Evolution and importance of different type farms in Bulgaria 
 
 Public farms Unregistered Cooperatives Agro-firms Total 
Number of farms 
1995 1002 1772000 2623 2200 1777000 
2000 232 755300 3125 2275 760700 
2005  515300 1525 3704 520529 
2007  458617 1281 5186 465084 
Share in number (%) 
1995  99.7 0.1 0.1 100 
2000  99.3 0.4 0.3 100 
2005  99.0 0.3 0.7 100 
2007  98.6 0.3 1.1 100 
Share in farmland (%) 
1995 7.2 43.1 37.8 11.9 100 
2000 1.7 19.4 60.6 18.4 100 
2005  33.5 32.6 33.8 100 
2007  32.2 24.7 43.1 100 
Average size (ha) 
1995 338.3 1.3 800 300 2.8 
2000 357.7 0.9 709.9 296.7 4.7 
2005  1.8 584.1 249.4 5.2 
2007  2.2 613.3 364.4 6.8 
Source: National Statistical Institute and Ministry of Agriculture and Food  
 
Specialization or diversification into small-scale farming has taken place [Bachev 
2008], and even now the agriculture is an “additional source of income” for one out of 7 
Bulgarians [MAF]. 
Management of the small-scale farms is not associated with significant costs. They 
are mainly individual or family holdings, and farm size is exclusively determined by 
household resources – family labor, own farmland and finance. Internal governing costs 
are non-existent (one-person farm) or insignificant because the coalition is between family 
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members (common goals, high confidence, and no cheating behavior dominate). Farmers 
have strong incentives to increase efficiency adapting to internal or market demand, 
intensifying work, investing in human capital etc. since they own the whole residuals 
(income).  
 
Table 7. Share of different type farms in all holdings, agrarian 
resources and productions in Bulgaria 
 
Indicators Physical 
persons 
Coope-
ratives 
Sole 
traders 
Com-
panies 
Associ-
ations 
Number of holdings with Utilized 
Agricultural Area (UAA) (%) 
99.0 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.05 
Utilized agricultural area (%) 30.3 40.3 11.7 16.1 1.6 
Average size (ha) 1.4 592.6 118.8 352.5 126.2 
Number of breeders without UAA (%) 96.1 0.2 1.9 1.7 0.1 
Workforce (%) 95.5 1.2 0.8 1.4 0.3 
Labor input (%) 91.1 4.1 1.4 2.8 0.6 
Cereals (%) 26.6 41.8 13.0 17.3 1.3 
Industrial crops (%) 20.5 45.1 14.2 18.6 1.6 
Fresh vegetables (%) 86.4 4.4 4.2 4.6 0.4 
Orchards and vineyards (%) 52.3 29.5 2.9 10.7 4.6 
Cattle (%) 90.2 5.1 1.5 2.5 0.7 
Sheep (%) 96.0 1.4 0.8 1.0 0.8 
Pigs (%) 60.3 1.4 7.0 30.5 0.8 
Poultry (%) 56.5 0.2 13.3 29.3 0.7 
Source:  MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census in Bulgaria’2003 
 
Nevertheless, there has been a constant decrease in the number of unregistered 
farms as a result of labor exodus (competition with other farms or industries, retirement, 
emigration), organizational modernization (change in type of enterprises), increasing 
market competition (massive failures and take-overs), and impossibility to adapt to new 
institutional requirements (standards) for safety, quality, environmental preservation, 
animal welfare etc.  
More than 3000 new production cooperatives emerged during and after liquidation of 
ancient “cooperative” structures in 1990s (Table 6). They have been the biggest farms in 
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terms of land management concentrating a major part of cereals, oil and forage crops, and 
key services to members and rural population (Table 7). 
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Figure 11. Share of farms with SGM smaller than 2 ESU and bigger than 100 ESU in 
total SGM and farms with different specialization (percent)  
  
The cooperative has been the single effective form for farming organization in the 
absence of settled rights on main agrarian resources and/or inherited high 
interdependence of available assets (restituted farmland, acquired individual shares in the 
actives of old cooperatives, narrow specialization of labor) [Bachev 2000].  
After 1990 more than 2 millions Bulgarians have got individual stakes in the assets of 
liquidated ancient public farms. In addition to their small size, a great part of these shares 
have been in indivisible assets (large machinery, buildings, processing and irrigation 
facilities). Therefore, new owners have had no alternative but liquidate (through sales, 
consumption, distortion) or keep these assets as a joint (cooperative) ownership. In many 
cases, the ownership rights on farmland was restituted with adjoined fruit trees and 
vineyards, and much of the activities (e.g. mechanization, plant protection, irrigation) could 
be practically executed solely in cooperation.  
Most “new” landowners happened to live away from rural areas, have other business, 
be old of age, or possess no skills or capital to start own farms. In the absence of a big 
demand for farmlands and/or confidence in emerging private farming during first years of 
transition, more than 40% of the new owners pulled their land and assets in the new 
production cooperatives.  
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Moreover, most cooperatives have developed along with the new small-scale and 
subsistent farming. Namely, “non-for-profit” character and strong member (rather than 
market) orientation have attracted the membership of many households. In transitional 
conditions of undeveloped markets, high inflation, and big unemployment, the production 
cooperative has been perceived as an effective (cheap, stable) form for supply of highly 
specific to individual farms inputs and services (e.g. production of feed for animals; 
mechanization of major operations; storage, processing, and marketing of farm output) 
and/or food for households consumption.  
The cooperative rather than other formal collective (e.g. firm) form has been mostly 
preferred. Cooperatives have been initiated by older generation entrepreneurs and a long-
term “cooperative” tradition from the communist period has a role to play. Besides, this 
mode allows individuals an easy and low costs entree and exit from the coalition, and 
preservation of full control on a major resource (such as farmland), and “democratic” 
participation in and control on management (“one member-one vote” principle).  
In addition, the cooperative form gives some important tax advantages such as tax 
exemption on sale transactions with individual members and on received rent in kind. Also 
for coops there are legal possibilities for organization of transactions not legitimate for 
other modes such as credit supply, marketing, and lobbying at a nation-wide scale26. 
Relatively bigger operational size gives cooperatives a great opportunity for efficient 
use of labor (teamwork, internal division and specialization of work), farmland (cultivation 
in big consolidated plots, effective crop rotation, environment protection), and material 
assets (exploration of economies of scale and scope on large machinery etc.).  
In addition, cooperatives have a superior potential to minimize market uncertainty 
(dependency) and increase marketing efficiency (“risk pooling”, advertisement, storing, 
integration into processing and direct marketing); and organize some critical transactions 
(better access to commercial credit and public programs; stronger negotiating positions in 
input supply and marketing deals; facilitate land consolidation through simultaneous lease-
in and lease-out contracts; introduce technological innovations; effective environmental 
management); and invest in intangible capital (good reputation, own labels, brand names) 
etc.  
In a situation of “missing markets” in rural areas, the cooperative mode is also the 
single form for organization of certain important activity such as bakery, processing, retail 
trade, recreation etc.  
                                                 
26
 Forbidden for business firms by the Double-taxation and Antimonopoly Laws. 
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The cooperative activity is not difficult to manage since internal (members) demand 
for output and services is known and “marketing” secured (“commissioned”) beforehand. In 
addition, cooperatives concentrate on few highly standardized (mass) products (such as 
wheat, sunflower etc.) with a stable market and high profitability.  
Furthermore, the cooperative applies low costs long-term lease for the effective land 
supply from members. Output-based payment of labor is common which restrict 
opportunism and minimize internal transaction costs.  
Besides, cooperatives provide employment for members who otherwise would have 
no other job opportunities - housewives, pre- and retired persons. Moreover, they are 
preferable employer since they offer a higher job security, social and pension payments, 
paid day-offs and annual holidays, opportunity for professional (including career) 
development.  
Giving the considerable transacting benefits most cooperative members accept a 
lower (than market) return on their resources - lower wages, inferior or no rent for land and 
dividends for shares.  
There have been some adjustments in cooperatives size, memberships, and 
production structure. A small number of coops have moved toward a “business like” 
(popularly known as “new generation cooperative”) governance applying market 
orientation, profit-making goals, close and small-membership policy, complex joint-
ventures with other organizations etc. That has been a result of overtaking the 
cooperatives management by younger entrepreneurs, improving the governance, taking 
advantage from new market opportunities and public support programs, and establishing 
of some of coops as key regional players.  
Besides, some cooperatives have benefited significantly from the available new 
public support (product or area based subsidies), and the comparative advantages to 
initiate, coordinate and carry out certain (environmental, rural development etc.) projects 
requiring large collective actions.   
At the same time, many cooperatives have shown certain disadvantages as a form 
for farm organization. A big membership of the coalition (averaging 240 members per 
coop) makes individual and collective control on the coop’s management very difficult and 
costly. That gives a great possibility for mismanagement and/or let using cooperatives in 
the best interests of managers or groups around them (on-job consumption, unprofitable 
for members’ deals, transfer of profit and property, corruption)27.  
                                                 
27
 The latter has been “assisted” by the lack of any (outside) public control on the cooperative’s 
activity.  
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What is more, majority of the new cooperatives did not overcome the incentive 
problems associated with the collective team working in the old public farms - over 
employment, equalized remuneration, authoritarian management, adverse feeling towards 
private farming, system of personal plots etc. [Bachev 2006]. 
Furthermore, there are differences in the investment preferences of diverse members 
(old-younger; working-non-working; large-small shareholders) due to non-tradable 
character of cooperative shares (so called “horizon problem”). While working and younger 
members are interested in long-term investments and growth of salaries, income in kind, 
other on-job benefits, the older and not working members favor higher current gains 
(income, land rent, dividend).  
Given the fact that most cooperative members in the country are small shareholders, 
and older in (pre-retired and retired) age, and non-permanent employees, the incentives 
for long-term investment for land improvement and renovation of outdated and physically 
amortized machinery, buildings, orchards, vineyards etc. have been very low.  
Finally, many cooperatives fall short in adapting to diversified (service) needs of 
members, and evolving market demand and growing competition. For all these reasons, 
the economic performance of production cooperatives has not been good. Accordingly, the 
efficiency of cooperatives has diminished considerably in relation to other modes of 
organization (market, contract, partnership etc.). Many landlords have pooled out their land 
from the cooperatives since property rights on farmland were definitely restored in 2000. 
Consequently, a significant reduction of cooperative activity has taken place and a big 
amount of cooperatives ceased to exist in recent years. 
There has been a “boom” in creation of different type agri-firms after 1990 as their 
number and importance have augmented enormously (Table 6). They account for a tinny 
portion of all farms but concentrate a significant part of UAA, material assets, major 
productions and significant portion of the SGM of cereals, industrial crops, orchards, 
poultry and swine (Table 7, Figure 11). 
Business farms are commonly large specialized enterprises. Most of them have been 
set up as family and partnership organization during first years of transition by younger 
generation entrepreneurs - former managers (specialists) of public farms, individuals with 
high business spirit and know-how etc.  
Majority of these farms are formally registered as Sole Traders. In addition, some 
state farms and agri-firms have been taken over by former managers and teams and 
registered as Shareholdings (Companies, Associations). Furthermore, different sort of joint 
ventures with non-agrarian and foreign capital increasingly appear as well.  
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The specific management skills and the “social” status as well as the combination and 
complementarities of partner’s assets (technological knowledge, business and other ties, 
available resources) have let a rapid extension of business farms through enormous 
concentration of (management of, ownership on) resources, and exploration of economies 
of scale and scope, and modernization of enterprises [Bachev 2000].  
The specific mode and the pace of privatization of agrarian resources have facilitated 
a fast consolidation of the fragmented land ownership and agrarian assets in the large 
farms. During the long period of institutional and market transformation (unsettled rights on 
resources, imperfect regulations, huge uncertainty and instability) the personal relations 
and “quasi” or entirely integrated modes have been extensively used to overcome 
transaction difficulties.  
Furthermore, the large operational size of these enterprises gives enormous 
possibilities to explore technological opportunities (consolidation of land, economies of 
scale and scope on machineries, cheap and standardized produce etc.) and achieve a 
high productivity. Business farms have been constantly extending their share in managed 
agrarian (and related) resources taking over smaller farms, incorporating new types of 
activities, and applying new organizational schemes. 
Business farms are strongly market and profit-oriented organizations. Farmer(s) have 
great incentives to adapt to market demand and institutional restrictions investing in farm 
specific (human, material, intangible) capital because they are sole owners of residual 
rights (benefits). The owners are commonly family members or close partners, and the 
internal transaction costs for coordination, decision making, and motivation are not high. 
Increased number of the coalition (partnership) gives additional opportunity for internal 
division of labor and profiting from specialization – e.g. full-time engagement in production 
management, technological development, market and “public” relations, paper works, 
keeping up with changes in laws and standards etc. 
Their large size and reputation make business farms a preferable partner in inputs 
supply and marketing deals. Besides, these farms have a giant negotiating power and 
effective (economic, political) mechanisms to dominate markets and enforce contracts. 
They also possess a great potential to collect market and regulatory information, search 
best partners, promote products, adjust to new market demand and institutional 
requirements, use outside experts, prepare business and public projects, meet formal 
(quantity, quality, collateral) requirements, “arrange” public support, bear risk and costs of 
failures.  
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In addition, business farms effectively explore economies of scale and scope on 
production and management - e.g. “package” arrangement of outside funding for many 
projects; interlinking inputs supply with know-how supply, crediting, marketing etc.  
Furthermore, large farms have strong incentives and potential for innovation – 
available resources to test, adapt, buy, and introduce new methods, technologies, 
varieties; possibility to hire leading (national, international) experts and arrange direct 
supply from consulting companies or research institutes.  
What is more, they are able to invest a considerable relation-specific capital 
(information, expertise, reputation, lobbying, bribing) for dealing with funding institutions, 
agrarian bureaucracy, and market agents at national or even at international scale.  
The last but not least important, these farms have enormous political power to lobby 
for Government support in their best interests. All these features give considerable 
comparative advantages of business type of farming organization. 
 
The firm mode is increasingly preferred since it provides considerable opportunities:  
 
•  to overcome coalition difficulties - e.g. formation of joint ventures with outside 
capital, dispute ownerships right through a court system etc;  
• to diversify into farm related and independent businesses - trade, agro-tourism, 
processing etc;  
• to develop firm-specific intangible capital (advertisement, reputation, brand names, 
public confidence) and its exploration (extension into daughter company), trade (sell, 
licensing), and intergeneration transfer (inheriting);  
• to overcome existing institutional restrictions - e.g. for direct foreign investments in 
farmland, trade with cereals, vine and dairy etc;  
• to have explicit rights for taking parts in particular types of transactions - e.g. export 
licensing, privatization deals, assistance programs etc.    
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Chapter 9 
 
 
3. MANAGEMENT OF FARM LAND SUPPLY  
 
According to the latest data the greatest part of the UAA in the country is owned by 
physical persons (Figure 12). At the same time, owner-farmed land comprises around a 
fifth of utilized land while the main portion of used farmland is under some sort of leased-in 
contracts (Figure 13).   
 
2%1%3%
94%
State Minicipalities Legal persons Physical persons
 
 
Source: MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census, 2003 
 
Figure 12. Ownership on Utilized agricultural area 
 
Our survey28 has found out that there is a significant distinction in forms of land 
supply in different type farms (Figure 14). The ownership is a major governing mode for 
most unregistered and smaller-size farms while leasing is a dominant form in large agro-
firms and cooperatives. There is a tendency with the enlargement of farm size to increase 
                                                 
28
 Interviews with farm managers were held in the eve of the first (and the latest) post-communist 
2003 Agricultural Census in Bulgaria.  Survey covers 2,8 % of the cooperatives, 1,2 % of the agro-
firms, and 0,3% of the unregistered farms in the country as all holdings were selected as 
representative for the nation’s main regions. 
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the portion of leased land. Hence, the lease-in contract has been the main form for the 
extension of cultivated land in surveyed farms. 
 
21%
79%
Owner-farmed land Leased-in farmland
 
 
Source: MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census, 2003 
 
Figure 13. Type of tenure of Utilized agricultural area 
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Figure 14. Governing of land supply in different type of farms 
 
Group cultivation is practiced by insignificant amount of surveyed farms. Nevertheless, 
contract for joint cultivation of land covers a significant portion of farms applying this form 
of land organization. In many instances, this mode of governance is associated with a 
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number of advantages to intra-farm cultivation. In some cases it gives opportunity for 
“group” exploration of technological economies of scale and size (equipment, operations 
etc.) unachievable within individual farm. Very often it is combined with some transacting 
benefits for individual farms such as: protection of dependant assets, access to outside 
credit, meeting (size, membership) requirements for taking part in certain public programs, 
exploring economies on management and overhead (e.g. for security guards) costs etc. 
Our survey demonstrates that a main form for acquisition of land property in all types 
farms is “ownership restoration, inheritance, or getting as a present”. Only a forth of 
surveyed farms has acquired ownership on agricultural land through “purchase” with a 
significant share of the larger farms participated in such transactions.  
Acquisition of ownership rights (purchase of land) is an alternative form of land supply 
to lease-in contract (the later only concern the purchase of “cultivation rights”). The former 
mode is associated with significant capital investments (for paying land price, preparation 
of papers and formal registration of deals), and efforts (for finding good land plots, 
checking out and securing purchase provisions etc). Besides, it allows a low flexibility in 
optimization of farm size through reallocation of land plots and/or quick emergency sell. 
Despite that, it is often a preferable mode since it gives a reliable protection of long-term 
investments in land against possible opportunism of outside landlord (e.g. termination of 
lease contract before the end of the effective life-span of invested specific capital).  
Our survey proves that land supply trough procurement of ownership governs 
transactions only if there is a condition of high mutual (or unilateral) dependency of assets 
with adjoint land plots. All farms applying that mode indicate using purchased land for 
buildings, orchard and vineyard, irrigation or other long-term amelioration of land. When 
there is no assets dependency and/or cite-specificity of investments to a land plot is 
insignificant, then either short lease or middle-term lease-in contracts are the most 
effective forms for extension of farm operations (less capital intensive or one season crop 
productions). 
All surveyed farms participate either “never” or “rare” in purchase transactions for 
agricultural lands. It means that actual costs for land supply through a purchase contract 
are insignificant. Besides, more than a half of farms carry out purchase deals with 
“relatives”, and these transactions are facilitated by close relationships, confidence, and 
cooperation between partners. Typical partners for the remaining farms are “non farmers”. 
Similarly, these deals are not associated with high costs for professional farmers since: 
they either know (from previous lease-in contract) or easily determine the real value of 
traded land parcels (seller can not behave opportunistically). Furthermore, agricultural land 
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does not pose a special value for non-farmers, and they tend to complete deals fast 
according to existing market norms. 
Lease-in contact is an alternative form of land supply to a land purchase contract. For 
surveyed farms, that has been a dominant form for farm extension through integration of 
new land plots. One of the reasons for preferences to this mode for organization has been 
unsettled property rights on farmland during transition now - lack of notary certificates, 
uncompleted land division process, disputed rights between claimants or heirs etc.  
Another principal factor for domination of this form for land supply is its comparative 
efficiency for individual farm:  
 
First, land lease requires less direct investment in comparison with a land purchase. 
Economy on capital investments has been a crucial factor for preferences to that mode in 
the transitional conditions of significant lack of own funding, and extremely high costs for 
credit financing, and absence of public programs for new land procurement29. 
 
Second, this form allows a greater flexibility for rapid optimization of farms size along 
with current market and technological changes (e.g. quick inclusion or exclusion from 
operation of needed land plots).  
 
Third, this mode permits inexpensive verification (“production test”) of real values of a 
particular land for the certain farm. Thus it restricts the risk in case of bad deals (e.g. 
unsuitable partners or land plots) to the period of lease contract. Forth, in some instances 
(e.g. mono culture) that is the best form for annual (or seasonal) supply of divers new land 
plots to any alternative modes of land supply and organization (purchase, exchange, group 
farming, and crop rotation)30.  
 
Finally, until recently the lease contract was one of two the legitimate ways to acquire 
rights on farming the land by a foreign entrepreneur31. 
                                                 
29
 While short-term, and recently long-term public credits are becoming available through various 
support programs (SFA, SAPARD, CAP measures, National Plan for Agrarian and Rural 
Development - NPARD), for participating in public projects there is an explicit requirement to 
possess needed farmland.   
30
 However, widespread application of short-lease contracts have created serious problems in 
some regions of the country as a result of not observing crop-rotation, soil and water pollution, 
inadequate compensation of extracted from soil N,P and K, abandoning of large areas of 
productive lands etc. [Bachev 2010]. 
31
 Second to the joint venture with a local partner owning agricultural land. 
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Nonetheless, when significant farm-specific long-term investments in land are to be 
made (e.g. long-term improvement, permanent crops, trees, building etc.), then a special 
form is designed to safeguard land supply from possible opportunism of the partner – e.g. 
use of long-lease contract, acquisition of ownership, joint venture with the landlord etc.  
Furthermore, one-third of lease-in contracts are with relatives and familiar farmers, 
and mainly personal (rather than anonymous market) relationships govern transacting. 
The later form, based on personal ties, is preferred since: it permits an efficient information 
exchange (in respect to demand and supply, partner’s reliability), cooperation in 
contracting and dispute resolution, and low cost control (self-control) on obeying 
contractual terms. Besides, leasing business and cooperative farms are often a provider of 
jobs and services for landlord’s households. These interlinks additionally diminishes any 
opportunistic behavior in land deals.  
Portion of surveyed farms which sell-off land gradually increases since 1995 but it is 
still at a very low level of 3.3%. What is more, prevailing part of farms participates in land 
sells either “rare” or “not at all”.  Selling out cultivation rights (lease-out) is an alternative 
form for selling-off the land property (all “residual” rights). One of the reasons for 
domination of this mode has been the lack of full ownership rights on land (incomplete 
process of restitution or disputes over land), and therefore a practical possibility for 
complete trade with changing ownership titles.  
Another main reason is the condition of some specificity (dependency) between 
temporally free land and other farm assets (adjacent plots, accomplished improvements 
etc.)32. That is why, farms tend to transfer management rights rather to lose the entire 
control (full ownership rights) on such agricultural lands. 
The alternative form for leasing out of (owned) land is the internal organization 
through utilization of available land within the farm, investing additional capital, hiring 
additional labor etc.  
The manager prefers to lease the land-out to another farm instead of organizing new 
operations within own farm (on available land) because of the comparative advantages of 
this form of governance. The internal management of a particular land plot would increase 
farm income, but also would be associated with augmentation of costs for management of 
additional transactions. For example, it would require supplementary efforts for hiring, 
directing, and monitoring labor; extra efforts to find working and investment capital; 
additional cares for protection and marketing of farm output etc. That is why, instead of 
internal organization the manager prefers much cheaper outside “land supply” (a lease-out 
                                                 
32
 In a long run, these plots are indispensable for optimization of farm size.  
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contract). In this case, either reduces farm size or extends farm with land saving 
transactions (e.g. intensive crops, livestock operations, processing, marketing etc.). 
Manager’s transacting costs for lease-out plots are limited to finding a partner, 
negotiating, and controlling contractual terms. Those are exclusively costs for managing 
land property rather than costs for organizing farming activity (which are actually brought 
by the tenant). Generally, there are economic or another incentives for preferring the form 
of a temporary transfer of cultivation rights in contrast with selling out the “excessive” (for a 
farm) land. As our surveys shows, those are the plans for farm extension in future; desire 
to keep up an emergency reserve from owned land; expectation for appreciation of value 
of a particular land plot; special (“traditional”) respect to farmland, desire to keep land for 
future (after retirement) use or next generations. 
Share of farms leasing out land has increased three times comparing to the period 
before 1993, and now more than one-fifth of surveyed farms are involved in such deals. 
Only few unregistered and small farms practice this mode for optimization of resources. 
Reduction of farmland through lease takes increasingly place after 1996 for 13% of 
cooperatives. For agro-firms, large and middle-size farms, leasing out turns to be the main 
form for optimization of size of cultivated farmland. Namely, these farms are highly 
sensitive to market signals and tend to manage their resources according to efficiency rule. 
Predominant part of surveyed farms either does not take part in land lease-out 
transactions or they do it rarely. Solely cooperatives share, involved in this kind of deals is 
higher - 45%, including 22% which report doing it “frequently”.  
In fact the goal of a producer cooperative is to farm instead of trading (profit on) 
members land 33 . Nevertheless, cooperatives have a number of extra advantages in 
carrying (mediation of) land deals between landlords and tenants in comparison to other 
modes (direct trade; using of market agent or state agency). The later are mainly 
associated with: scale economy on lease in and out activities (information, transacting and 
operational costs), technical opportunity for consolidation and reallocation of land plots 
within large managed area, authority and power to enforce land deals etc. That new “free 
service” (mediation of land deals) makes production cooperatives a specific and effective 
mode for governing of land supply in Bulgarian conditions. 
For most of the farms frequency of lease-out transactions with a particular partner is 
high. That is caused by the lower costs for contract renewal in comparison with new 
contracting; stronger incentives for self-restriction of opportunistic behavior of tenant; 
                                                 
33
 2000 changes in the Cooperative Law have ruled out possibility for cooperatives to own farmland, 
and thus entire land supply of cooperatives comes through lease-in contracts.  
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opportunity to elaborate effective control and dispute resolution mechanisms etc. 
Nonetheless, a significant portion of lease-out contracts (43%) is with low recurrence, and 
it is particularly true for the cooperatives and the firms. The later farms often have other 
devices for preventing possible opportunism and careless utilization of land such as 
economic influence, strong regional authority and power, interlink transacting (e.g. land 
plus service supply) etc.  
However, there are a number of instances, of inefficient for members’ land deals at 
the best interests of the coops managers or related private interests (mismanagement, 
corruption).  
Considerable share of land purchase and sell deals in surveyed farms are carried out 
through “written contract”, which in most instances is “notary legalized” or “registered in 
agricultural office”. To a great extend the written mode and formal registration of (changes 
in) ownership titles are determined by the official regulations. However, preferences to a 
paper form are usually strong when “residual rights” on a unique resource like farmland 
are transferred. This form provides a long-term legal protection of rights on indispensable, 
“eternal”, and often a highly specific to a farm asset. 
Part of investigated farms report they use a “verbal agreement” as the form for 
accomplishing purchase and sell contracts (21% and 14% accordingly). Informal transfer 
of ownership presumes a high trust between partners and existence of reliable (informal) 
mechanisms for effective contract enforcement (e.g. family or friendship relations). In 
many cases, this mode assumes an unfinished (uncompleted) ownership transfer 
transaction. For examples, a land purchase is negotiated, but a payment is not made (due 
to shortage of cash, desire for a “trial” period); or actual utilization of land is undertaken, 
but partial payment over several years, is in place. It is not an accident that later form for 
ownership transfer is practiced by less stable and financially weak structures – 
unregistered and smaller-size farms. 
A good part of land lease-in deals and a significant part of lease-out deals are 
governed by “oral agreement” between partners (28% and 45% correspondingly).  
Since mutual expectations of parties are to a great extend standardized, and contract 
terms well-defined and understood by counterparts, there is no need for written 
specifications of transactions. The economic value of different land categories in a 
particular region is generally well known (often “officially” determined). Therefore, a 
standard (market) rent reflects quality variations, and technological specificity are easily 
negotiated (e.g. situation of land plots, accomplished improvements etc.). Specificity of 
investment in agricultural land is low and mostly restricted to a season (one-year crop
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Contract term is not of importance for either partner since transactions can be terminated 
any time (after each season) without significant loses for neither party. Agreement is 
reached easily and it is not difficult to enforce contract provisions (cares for land, rent 
payments etc.). Putting into a written form of standardized obligations has no sense, and 
all notary and formal registrations are only coupled with useless additional costs (for 
preparation, registration, disputing etc.).   
Formal lease contracts are used mainly by cooperatives, firms, and bigger farms. 
They are put to use because of the explicit legal requirements (as in the case of 
cooperatives) when violation of such institutional restrictions is easily discovered by 
authority. However, a major reason for selecting written and formally registered contracts 
is existence of considerable economic advantages for this mode of organization. Our 
surveys proves that, those are possible direct economies for big tenants (farms, firms, 
cooperatives) from applying standard contracts to numerous (usual small) land owners, 
and avoiding individual negotiations of universal transactions.  
Besides, these farms commonly practice a long-term lease and therefore realize 
economies form constant (annual) renewal of contracts after each season.  
Next, formal contracts better safeguard pay-back of investment in leased-in land 
through third-party (e.g. court) enforcement of agreements and against possible early 
termination of contracts. The later is particularly important for large farms, which cultivate 
land in big and consolidated plots investing significant capital with high farm (and land) 
specificity.  
And finally, for participation in public support programs usually there is a requirement 
for land ownership or a signed long-term lease contract which makes that written mode 
necessary.  
In lease-in contracts around 43% of surveyed farms use a “share rent” as that portion 
is higher for unregistered and cooperative farms and small and middle-size farms. “Fix-
rent” is employed by rest 30% of farms, as firms and large farms favor more that sort of 
rent. One-forth of farms use “mix rent” contract.  
For all farms the major factor for rent choice is “the specific product grown on land”. 
Next important factor for rent selection is “good/bad relations with land owner”. In the rent-
formation process the firms and large farms use “as a base the dominant rent in region”. 
The small and unregistered farms fix the rent “through a concrete negotiation”. 
Cooperatives and middle-size farms apply equally both market and negotiated rent 
arrangements. 
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In lease-out contracts unregistered farms and firms, and small and large farms give a 
priority to prior rent fixing. Mix form is preferred by most of cooperatives and middle-size 
farms. Specific product grown on land is the most important factor for rent choice in firms 
and cooperatives, and medium farms. Unregistered and small size farms report as the 
main consideration “good/bad relations with a partner”. Besides, “economic 
stability/instability in the country” is a significant factor for all kind of farms, and the most 
important for the large farms. While majority of firms employ as a base the predominant 
rate in the region, all cooperatives and nearly all of unregistered farms form the rent 
through concrete negotiation. 
Rent choice is important for minimization of overall cots for lease contract. When a fix 
rent is adopted a land owner saves the cost for controlling of tenants conscientiousness (in 
respect to efficiency of land use, and fair payment of negotiated share-rent). This mode 
also contains strong incentives for intensive exploitation of leased land since tenant keeps 
the entire surplus product of his efforts. On the other hand, all risk in fix-rent contract is 
bearded by the tenant-farmer.  
Generally, in farming a great natural uncertainty (climate, diseases and pests attacks, 
yields) is coupled with a big economic uncertainty (level of production costs, demand, 
output prices). Therefore, most surveyed farms give a preference to shared or mixed-rent 
(some share participation in the output) in lease-in deals. As land owners (in lease-out 
deals) the same agents favor fixed rent due to high uncertainty associated with 
transactions. 
In land purchase and lease in deals merely one-third of surveyed farms “usually do 
not have any problems”. The portion of farms not confronting any problems in sell-off deals 
is a forth and very tiny for lease-out contracts. For dealing with transacting problems farms 
mostly apply “additional negotiation”, “go to dispute in Court”, need to “hire a lawyer”, or 
resort to “other measures”34.  
Nevertheless, a good proportion of farms report they can “do nothing” to resolve 
conflicts but undertake a (cost saving) “waiting strategy”. Consequently, otherwise 
effective deals either do not take place or are not carried out according to wishes, 
expectations, or agreements of parties.  
The most common reasons for size reduction (through land sells-off or lease-out) in 
surveyed farms are: “lack of gain from land cultivation”, “accumulation of funds for 
financing other activities”, “impossibility to manage all owned land”, and “ceasing some 
                                                 
34
 In some cases, those are illegal means to enforce contracts. 
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activities”. That proves that a main factor for the reduction of scale of land supply is the 
high level of transaction costs for organization of farmland within the farm borders.  
The management of outside deals (sell-off or lease-out contracts) is much more 
economical than the internal integration through hiring new workers, providing necessary 
finance, and organizing new activities on available lands. Farms restricting the internal 
land supply either minimize the farm size or extend the farm through organization of land-
saving transactions (intensive crops, livestock operations, agricultural services etc.).      
 Land deals are not only a means for changing the farm size but also a way for 
rationalization of land organization. Resulting land concentration enhances farm efficiency 
since: it minimizes considerably technological expenditures (allowing effective exploration 
of economies of scale and scope from utilization of machinery, saving on transportation 
costs etc.); it leads to a significant economy on transacting costs from an effective labor 
direction and supervision, quality control on contacted services, lesser needs for security 
guards etc.; it permits farm extension since it increases the possibilities for effective 
organization of more internal and outside transactions under a single management.  
Thus in a situation of a significant portioning (scattering) of land ownership in the 
country the trade with rights on agricultural land has been a major way for consolidation of 
land plots. Our survey indicates that more than 40% of leasing-out farms simultaneously 
take part in lease-in transactions. Every tenth of leasing-in farms also lease-out land. Not 
small portion of farms applying other forms for land supply (such as purchase, sell, lease 
out, lease in) at the same time practice “compensating” opposite deals (sell, purchase, 
lease-in, lease-out). 
According to most managers of surveyed farms the “contract enforcement” requires 
great “time and efforts” (Table 8). In addition, for the majority of large farms and agro-firms 
land supply contracts takes a big deal of the overall management efforts. A good part of 
cooperative and middle-size farms also spend significant transaction costs for “finding 
partners selling or leasing land”.  
In the last several years the sale deals with agricultural lands and the traded area 
increased almost 6 times (Figure 15). However, the share of sold farmland (“without 
changing of the agricultural use”) in overall UAA is not significant. There is also a good 
dynamic of the number of formally registered lease contracts as the share of newly leased 
area overpass 10% of the UAA in some years.  
Rising preference to a formal lease contract is caused by increasing efficiency of that 
mode of carrying out lease deals - lower cost, higher security, better enforcement, and 
possibility to meet markets (banks, partners) and institutional (e.g. public programs) 
 85 
requirements for land supply arrangement. The formal user rights are particularly important 
for getting EU area-based subsidies and other public support which motivates bigger farms 
to accept the additional costs for preparation, registration and enforcement. 
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Figure 15. Trends in sale and lease contracts for farmland in Bulgaria 
 
After 2000 the state participation in agricultural land market has been active though 
selling out, leasing out, exchanging and giving away state lands.  
The state land has been mostly lease-out (though auctions or direct contracts for 
growing seasonal or permanent crops) to larger private operators (including foreign) or to 
landless and poor individuals35. To a lesser extend the state farmland has been sold out 
on auctions or granted to landless and poor. There has been a small amount of exchanges 
of the state with private agricultural lands aiming to consolidate farming land, concentrate 
lands for large investment projects, or extend land ownership related to privatized 
buildings.  
Nevertheless, the state participation in land markets has not be significant and 
affected merely 1,5% of the overall UAA (Figure 16). Generally, there has not a big 
demand for buying state farmland while purchases and exchanges of highly valuable 
agricultural lands are associated with inefficiency and corruption. 
 
                                                 
35
 Using the State and municipality agricultural lands for land settlement of landless and poor 
individuals has been ruled out by the Land Law (1991). However, this process practically started 
after 2000 when land restitution was largely completed. 
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Figure 16. Share of deals with State agricultural lands in total UAA (percent) 
 
In 2007 certain state pastures (0,6% of UAA) has been designated for common 
exploitation by livestock farms as some of them contracted to individual farms making 
them eligible for EU area based direct payments36. 
                                                 
36
 Most small-scale livestock producers manage insufficient (for EU area based subsidies) 
farmlands or have no lands at all. That is why this Government intervention actually aimed to give 
access of small livestock producers to EU subsidies. 
Table 8. Time and efforts for governing of farm transactions (percent) 
 
Efforts and time for: Level Type of farms 
Unregistered Cooperative Firms Small Middle Large Total 
Finding new workers  big 18,91 14,28 12,5 18,91 18,18 0 15,46 
moderate  8,10 42,85 37,5 5,40 45,45 31,25 27,83 
Finding partners selling or leasing-
out farmland                      
 big 18,91 35,71 12,5 13,51 31,81 12,5 21,64 
moderate  29,72 14,28 62,5 18,91 40,90 62,5 36,08 
Finding suppliers for needed 
materials, equipment etc. 
 big 24,32 21,42 50 21,62 34,09 50 31,95 
moderate  29,72 67,85 25 35,13 45,45 31,25 39,17 
Finding markets for outputs             big 37,83 42,85 56,25 27,02 56,81 56,25 45,36 
moderate  13,51 35,71 28,12 27,02 20,45 31,25 24,74 
Finding the rest of needed 
information                            
 big 45,94 17,85 15,62 40,54 18,18 25 27,83 
moderate  10,81 21,42 40,62 8,10 31,81 37,5 23,71 
Negotiating and preparing contracts  big 18,91 35,71 40,62 16,21 40,90 37,5 30,92 
moderate  27,02 21,42 37,5 21,62 27,27 50 28,86 
Controlling implementation of 
contractual terms 
 big 48,64 42,85 37,5 45,94 36,36 56,25 43,29 
moderate  5,40 14,28 31,25 5,40 22,72 25 16,49 
Resolving conflicts associated with 
quality and contracts 
 big 29,72 14,28 59,37 29,72 31,81 56,25 35,05 
moderate  5,40 50 21,87 16,21 31,81 18,75 23,71 
Relations with banks and preparing 
projects for crediting 
 big 35,13 42,85 59,37 32,43 47,72 68,75 45,36 
moderate  8,10 42,85 37,5 5,40 45,45 31,25 16,49 
Associating with registration regimes  big 18,91 17,85 15,62 18,91 18,18 12,5 17,52 
moderate  2,70 21,42 9,37 10,81 13,63 0 10,30 
Relations with administration  big 24,32 10,71 18,75 21,62 15,90 18,75 18,55 
moderate  21,62 42,85 40,62 32,43 38,63 25 34,02 
Relations with membership 
organizations 
 big 18,91 21,42 6,25 16,21 20,45 0 15,46 
moderate  5,40 25 43,75 2,70 40,90 25 23,71 
Others  big 5,40 14,28 0 0 13,63 0 6,18 
moderate  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: interviews with farm managers  

 89 
 
 
 
Chapter 10 
 
 
4. MANAGEMENT OF FARM LABOR SUPPLY 
 
Family labor is the major form of labor supply in Bulgarian farms (Figure 17). 
Nevertheless, there is an increase in number and share of hired labor in recent years.  
Furthermore, fully employed is only a quarter of family labor and there is a tendency 
for enlargement of the share of part-time family workers. On the other hand, the hired labor 
is predominately for full time employment with a rising portion of part-time contracts in last 
years. Seasonal workers are typical for agriculture and their stake is Annual Work Units 
increased from just over 3% in 2003 to almost 5% in 2007 [MAF]. 
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Figure 17. Number of labor force in Bulgarian agriculture 
 
Our survey of farms has found out that different type of farms employ unlike modes 
for labor supply.  
More than 40% of surveyed farms use own and family labor as share of non-
cooperative farms in that type of employment is particularly big. The greatest part of agro-
firms and farms rely on own labor (self-employment) while most of unregistered and 
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relatively smaller farms apply family labor. The share of own labor in overall workforce of 
farm is largest for unregistered and smaller farms (Figure 18). Family labor also accounts 
for a considerable portion of average workforce in all farms its part being especially big in 
employing family labor small, unregistered and cooperative farms. 
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Figure 18. Share of different type of labor in average annual workforce of farms 
 
Farm efficiency to a great extend depends on quality and timely implementation of 
“critical” operations such as sawing; watering; spreading chemicals and pesticides; 
protecting, harvesting and marketing of farm output etc. At the same time, high uncertainty 
and dependence from climatic factors make it very difficult to verify relationship between 
individual contribution and final output.  
Since individual role (in team production) is often impossible to estimate and a 
permanent control of labor (not rare in large geographical areas) is extremely expensive, 
own labor or low-cost family labor is generally used for farm critical operations. Therefore, 
utilization of family labor is the major form for governing of labor supply in most of the 
farms.  
Family labor has significant advantages comparing to both outside supply of labor 
(service supply contract), and internal organization of hired labor (market based 
employment contract). Family members are unified by common business and family 
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interests. That creates strong incentives for cooperation in decision making, reviling 
complete information, conflict resolution, and self-controlling opportunistic behavior. That is 
why the effective limits for farm extension through labor supply are mostly determined by 
possibility to carry out critical operations by own or family labor [Bachev 2004].  
For instance, the potential for farm enlargement mainly depends on managerial 
capital of the owner/manager and his personal capacity to control additional internal (hired 
labor) and external (contacting services, marketing etc.) transactions. In fact, the level of 
that managerial skill creates an additional rent which could be explored though internal 
organization of transactions37. Namely that differentiation of managerial capital explains 
why in the same farming industries exists so big variation of farm sizes [Bachev 2004]. 
Employment of cooperative members is a major form for labor supply only for most of 
the cooperatives as 64% of them apply that mode. That is logical since majority of that 
production organizations exist in order to provide employment for their members. More 
than a half of the overall workforce in these farms is of cooperative members. On the other 
hand, only 11% of unregistered farms use cooperative labor but the share of this type of 
labor supply is quite significant in the average annual workforce of there farms.  
Cooperative labor contains additional incentives for intra-farm realization since it 
participates in (share) ownership, management, and finale distribution of non-human 
assets. All these advantages of cooperation could be exploited only if it is possible an 
effective mutual control of activity and there are low-cost mechanisms to link individual 
contribution to overall (final) results of the team work. That mode of labor coalition is 
especially effective when the number of the members of cooperative (group farm) is not 
very big and most of them are working-owners in the coalition [Bachev 2004].   
Hiring (employment) contracts are broadly used form for labor supply in surveyed 
farms. Since possibilities for farm enlargement through own and family labor are usually 
(naturally) restricted an additional labor is hired (from market). A big part of surveyed farms 
organize labor supply through that mode - almost 68% of unregistered and small farms, 
more than 85% of cooperatives and middle size farms, more than 90% of firms, and all of 
the large farms. Moreover, the hired labor accounts for a significant share in the workforce 
of hiring farms. 
Internal labor contract is an alternative form for farm extension to outside (market) 
contract for service supply. That mode possesses a number of transacting advantages 
such as: economy of costs for multiple negotiations and detailed specification of 
                                                 
37
 Otherwise, farmer would sell his standardized labor on market (instead of self-employing in own 
farm) and will get the normal price for labor. 
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obligations; protecting transactions from possible opportunism in critical (labor demanding) 
moments; opportunity for effective investment in farm specific human capital etc. That 
mode for farm enlargement is often preferred because of undeveloped (missing or 
unstable) market for agrarian services, or the high potential for profiting on internally 
organized specific human capital (learning by doing experience, training etc.). 
In many instances, the outside employment of labor comes to be an alternative for 
outside supply of agrarian inputs – e.g. buying instead of producing feed for animals, 
buying machinery and “replacing labor” etc. A main reason for the selecting that form for 
transacting is again the relative costs. In some cases, that is the “impossibility” to find a 
reliable supplier, or the high risk from strong dependency of farm from outside providers 
(e.g. forage supply for animals), or the necessity for finding “expensive” credit for market 
procurement of inputs etc.  
In other instances, grounds for choosing the internal mode is the availability of 
needed non-human assets (e.g. land, machinery) for intra-farm organization of 
transactions or existence of strong interdependence (specificity) of different farm assets 
requiring an integration. 
Finally, outside labor supply is an alternative for lease-out contract of available 
(owned, rented etc.) land38. In this case the farm size is reduced through (partial or full) 
transfer of land management to another farm entrepreneur. 
Permanent employment is the main form for labor organization in all type of farms – 
around 80% of unregistered farms, and almost all cooperatives and firms apply that mode 
of labor supply.  
The permanent (labor) contract with a specific farm assumes a high frequency of 
transactions between a farm entrepreneur and a worker throughout the year. It allows 
realization of considerable economies on governing of labor supply. Instead of negotiating 
each particular activity (a service supply contract, “daily” hiring etc) the manager and the 
worker sign a permanent employment contract. In that way both sides save costs for 
permanent (re)negotiations, and the farmer economizes on efforts to find “good” workers, 
for testing labor’s skills and reliability etc.  
Besides, a high recurrence of transacting between the same parties (a permanent 
contact) let develop “good” relationships between partners (getting to know each other, 
mutual efforts to avoid or overcome conflicts etc.), and creates incentives to invest in farm 
specific human capital (getting knowledge about quality of different land plots, learning the 
                                                 
38
 Namely that relationship (between labor supply and land supply); and incentives, costs 
minimizing, and risk bearing futures of alternative forms of land tenure has been commonly studied 
by traditional agrarian economy [Eswaran and Kotwal]. 
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technology for specific products on farm, intimate acquaintance with individual animals 
etc.).  
The permanent employment also allows avoiding the risk of uncertainty in labor 
market (e.g. shortage of highly qualified labor) which is significant in agriculture in some 
activities and (pick) periods of time.  
For highly specific to a farm human capital (managerial, technological knowledge, 
personal contacts etc.) that mode is essential for protecting critical labor supply 
transactions. For example, acquired (through training, “learning by doing”) knowledge for 
the management of a particular farm is very often highly specific for that farm asset39. That 
is why its supply is usual “integrated” through a contract for permanent employment. 
In one-person farms (self-employment) the permanent employment is a result of the 
combination of functions of farm management and effective (“own”) execution of intrafarm 
production and related activities. In Bulgarian conditions it is often a consequence of the 
low opportunity for alternative employment of labor (high redundancy, low qualification, old 
age) and other owned resources (e.g. farmland, livestock). In that case the only possibility 
for “business” is an internal organization of available resources (labor, land etc.).  
When it is impossible to utilize own labor throughout the year (during all seasons) it 
either stays unused (seasonal or part-time occupation, redundancy) or it is applied in other 
farms and industries (selling out labor). For instance, more than a fifth of surveyed farms 
have no permanent mode for labor supply.  
Finally, the ownership on a great part of the material (non-human) assets of a 
particular farm is frequently used to “secure” own employment in these (family, 
cooperative) farms without any economic (production, transaction) reason for internal 
organization of transactions.  
The permanent labor accounts for more than a half in the average annual structure of 
workforce in surveyed farms (Figure 19). This form of employment presents a major share 
in the average annual workforce in applying small, unregistered and cooperative farms. On 
the other hand, large farms and agro-firms which use permanent contacts rely to the lesser 
extend on that mode for supplying needed labor. 
Almost tree-forth of surveyed farms apply seasonal supply of labor. That is caused by 
the “seasonal” character of (some) activities in farming and necessity for “oversupply” in 
particular periods of the year (summer, autumn). Needed labor for extension of farms in 
such periods is secured by a temporary (short-term) contract.  
                                                 
39
 Unlike other industries market for farm managers usually do not develop. 
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That mode allows flexibility in labor supply in accordance with the internal necessities 
of farm enlargement. It saves costs for a permanent contract (for finding permanent work 
for hired labor, for supervising etc.) and for daily renewal of contracts (for labor or service 
supply) during the active season. At the same time, seasonal form protects transactions 
for specialized labor supply from failures in pick periods, certain campaigns etc.  
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Figure 19. Share of different type of employment in annual structure of workforce of 
farms 
 
Bigger farms, cooperatives and firms use to a greater extend that mode for labor 
organization, while a considerable part of unregistered and smaller farms obtain labor 
supply through other forms. On average the seasonal employment accounts for a good 
share in the workforce of farm applying that form of labor supply. 
Around 41% of surveyed farms use also irregular employment, as a half of agro-firms 
and a tree-forth of large farms apply that form for governing of labor supply.  
That organization of workforce is related to the necessity for “internal” organization of 
labor in particular days or short periods (e.g. seedling, harvesting etc.). In certain cases 
those are critical operations for the farm. Therefore, an internal employment under the 
management control rather than outside service supply contract is preferred. Usually, 
those are specialized and not rarely highly-qualified activities where labor market works 
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well. Finding out and securing needed labor is not expensive while major material assets 
for carrying out critical transactions are generally integrated within the farm (harvesters, 
dryers, irrigation facilities etc.).  
In some cases there is a need for additional low-qualified labor for various 
insignificant and for non-standardized operations. Since it is uneconomical to negotiate 
details for each individual service (“activity by activity”) moreover with different agents, 
irregular employment is used (daily, weekly, for a certain period) and labor is directed 
according to the specific needs. 
Finally, in agriculture there are technological operations which require in certain 
moment of time a big number of low-qualified labor for standardized activities (e.g. manual 
harvesting, manual cultivation etc.). Such labor is supplied through contracts for irregular 
employment which character is little different from standard service supply contracts 
(“output base” compensation). 
More than one-third of annual workforce in unregistered farms and firms which 
employ irregular labor is secured through that form of supply. Cooperatives supply 
insignificant share of workforce through that mode. In many instances, farms preferences 
to temporary contracts (seasonal, irregular) are associated with opportunities to 
economize on compulsory social and other (e.g. redundancy) payments which would be 
hardly escaped with permanent labor contacts (due to inspections, auditing, labor-unions 
pressures etc.). 
More than 11% of surveyed farms apply “other” employment along with the extension 
of variety of effective modes for supplying labor (mixed, “double” employment, interlinked 
contracts etc.). Mostly agro-firms innovates the modes for labor supply and use forms 
which are typical for business organizations. In overall workforce structure of farms 
applying that form, the share of labor supplied through that mode is still insignificant and 
varies according to the types of farms.  
A dominant part of surveyed farms use labor in production (94%). That is “natural” 
since farms are main production structures in agriculture. In the overall structure of 
workforce above 74% is employed in production, and that share is higher in unregistered 
farms and lower in cooperatives and firms. Besides, small-size farms employ lesser share 
of their workforce in production in comparison with larger farms40.   
The portion of farms employing labor for coordination and controlling of various 
(internal and external) transactions of the farm is significant: accordingly 71% in 
administration and 63% in management. As much as 18% of the total workforce of farms is 
                                                 
40
 Intrafarm specialization (and thus productivity) is less developed in small farms. 
 96 
engaged in these specialized activities. The share of cooperatives and agro-firms, and 
middle-size and large farms using their labor in that way is particularly high.  
Furthermore, various types of farms have quite different part of their workforce in 
administration and management activities. While in firms and large farms the portion of 
workforce in management is slightly above 4%, for other type of farms it is much higher. 
Likewise agro-firms and large farms apply relatively lesser share of its workforce in 
administration. All that demonstrates that governance efficiency in large farms and agro-
firms (measured through direct relative costs for management and administration) is 
comparatively higher than in unregistered and cooperative farms. 
One-forth of unregistered and small farms utilizes labor for security. The segment of 
cooperatives and firms using specialized workers for protection from internal and outside 
stealing, and expropriation of property is especially great - 71% and 94% accordingly. The 
relative share of labor for security in the total workforce of farms is 9%. Unregistered farms 
apply considerably lower part of their workforce for that activity than cooperatives and 
firms. 
“Extension of business” is the reason for hiring a labor for each forth of surveyed 
farms. Share of agro-firms and bigger farms, which use that form for labor supply for 
enlargement of farm, is significantly bigger – 35% and 45% accordingly.  
For one-third of agro-firms the rationale for hiring additional labor is “for assisting own 
labor”. For large portion of unregistered farms (35%) the reason for applying that mode is 
“for assisting family labor”. Around 17% of farms hire labor in order to “substitute family 
labor”. Firms and middle-size farms are major employers of labor for extension of farm 
business, while unregistered and small farms hire labor mainly for assisting and 
substituting family labor. 
More than 43% of farms utilizing outside labor use hired labor in production, and 
around 23% hire labor for administration. Every tenth farm employs hired labor in farm 
management as share of cooperatives applying that form of hired labor is higher than in 
other farms (indicating bigger “needs” and less efficiency).  
One-fifth of farms hire labor for security, and that portion is minor only for 
unregistered and small farms (6% and 11% accordingly). The latter is a result of lesser 
needs for security in small farms (small amount of property, insignificant output, single 
location of property and output, safer location of farms within or nearby residential areas) 
as well as smaller means (practical possibility) to invest in that activity. 
Diverse type of contracts is used for governing relations with different kind of hired 
labor.  
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Written contract is the major form for hiring permanent labor in 62% of unregistered 
farms, in almost all cooperative and middle-size farms, and in all firms and large-scale 
farms. However, unwritten agreement for employing permanent labor is also practiced in a 
considerable part of unregistered and smaller farms (38% and 33% accordingly).  
The written form gives a greater transparency and security of employment relations 
as well as an opportunity to use a third party (e.g. court, local public and private authority 
etc.) for resolution of possible conflicts between parties.  
However, formal (written) permanent contract is associated with additional costs for: 
preparation, juridical consultations, in some cases - notary registration, compulsory 
payments (for working off-limits, for allowed leave of absence, for social security etc.), and 
termination (redundancy compensations). That is why it is not preferred mode by a part of 
farms. Moreover, in compact rural community everybody knows everybody and permanent 
relations are often governed by good will, trust, reputation, and community pressure. 
“Detailed specification” of obligations of both parties in permanent contracts with 
hired labor is practiced in main portion of firms and middle-size farms.  
Majority of the rest kind of farms negotiate each side responsibilities only “in general”. 
Most operations in agriculture are less standardized and hardly predicted. Often it is either 
extremely expensive or practically impossible to specify (plan) obligations of each side in 
all possible situations, and to put them in a written form. That is why in a good part of 
farms’ permanent labor contracts only a general negotiation of obligations dominates.  
For hiring seasonal workers written contracting is applied by a majority of firms and 
large farms as well as by a big part of cooperatives and middle-size farms. At the same 
time a major portion of unregistered and smaller farms favor oral agreements.  
For hiring irregular workers all small and unregistered farms, and a majority of other 
type of farms practice unwritten agreements. Merely a greater share of cooperatives use 
written form as a half of them give preferences for that mode for governing relations with 
irregular hired labor. 
Most farms negotiate obligations with hired seasonal and irregular labor only in 
general. Besides, 17% of farms do not make any negotiation of obligations in contracts 
with hired irregular labor. The period of duration of temporary contract in farming is 
relatively short, and the character of obligations of both sides is usually “not specific” (and 
well understood by either party). Therefore, in such contracts parties frequently economize 
costs for detailed negotiation and written specification of obligations. 
Personality of the labor is of a particular importance in employment contracts.  
 98 
For instance, one-fifth of surveyed unregistered farms and firms most often hire 
relatives for permanent work. Number of close friends employed in these farms is also 
significant. Each forth of all farms prefers to sign a long-term labor contract with person 
who is known prior to hiring. Previous information about the quality of partner and the trust 
minimize considerably the costs for finding labor, negotiation the terms of employment 
contract, controlling and overcoming conflicts of contract execution. More than 16% of 
farms hire permanent labor from universities, agricultural schools etc. and here the 
expectations for high qualification are important for selecting the employed labor. 
For hiring seasonal labor most of farms have a preference to “person who is known 
prior to hiring” and “renovation of contracts with the same person every time”. Relatives 
are also among employed seasonal labor in one-forth of unregistered farms. A good 
portion of cooperatives hire seasonal workers among close friends. All these proves that 
personal, rather than market relations are essential for selecting that sort of labor. Only 
larger share of agro-firms report they chose “unknown before initial hiring” for seasonal 
work.  
Similarly, employed irregular labor is usually known before hiring and the same 
person every time for most farms. Therefore, for all forms of outside labor supply the 
previous knowledge about skills and reliability of workers are essential for initiation or 
renovation of employment contracts. In the close rural communities “everybody knows 
everybody” and built (good or bad) reputation is a principal factor for minimizing labor 
supply costs. 
“Unknown persons before hiring” are also used in temporary labor contracts 
(seasonal, irregular). However, they are usually employed for routine, standardized and 
low-risk activities. Besides, temporary character of contract diminishes the risk of making 
mistakes in selection of proper labor (with inappropriate qualification, unwillingness for 
intense work, criminal behavior etc.). Undesired qualities are easily realized in course of 
labor utilization, and hired labor is either dismissed or contract is not renewed in next 
season or campaign. That contract mode gives the employer an opportunity for a rapid 
and low-cost enforcement (ceasing or not renewing labor contract without any payments of 
compensation etc.), and restricts significantly the opportunistic behavior of hired labor. 
The analysis of dominant forms of labor compensation for hired workers in different 
farms shows that they depend on the character of activity. When individual contribution of 
employed labor is difficult to measure then time-based (monthly or daily) compensation is 
used (e.g. for employees in management, administration, security). In these cases, 
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additional mechanisms for controlling reliability of work are also applied such as direct 
monitoring and control, employment of division managers etc.  
For permanent workers various forms for connecting labor compensation with final 
(annual, overall) productivity is commonly applied. The later mixed mode increases 
incentives for amelioration of the overall efficiency of organization (through mutual control 
and self-control) turning hired labor in a co-owner of the final output (and a bearer 
entrepreneurial risk).   
When labor productivity is relatively easy to measure (standardized and routine 
activities) and there is a strong link with individual efforts then an output based 
compensation of labor is typically applied (e.g. livestock and services). Employment of 
labor under such payment mode contains strong incentives for increasing efficiency and 
self-restricting opportunism. In fact it is very close to a service supply contract. 
Majority of surveyed farms report they do not have or rarely have problems with 
permanently hired labor which lead to termination of employment contracts. That kind of 
problems encounter about 23% of unregistered and small farms, one-tenth of cooperatives, 
and only 9% of firms.  
None of the large-scale farms have serious problems with hired permanent labor 
which lead to failure of contract relations. Needs for a permanent employment contract are 
a consequence of the high frequency of transactions between both parties, and/or the 
existence of developed specificity (profitability) of human capital to assets of a particular 
farm (higher remuneration, higher productivity from exploitation etc.). Here continuation of 
contract relationships is in interests of both parties, and there are strong bilateral interests 
for a rapid and “peaceful” resolution of emerging disagreements. 
The “lack of entrepreneurial spirit” is indicated as a main reason for conflicts with 
hired permanent labor in more than 30% of farms.  Furthermore, “tendency for cheating, 
stealing etc.” is a main factor for conflicts in majority of cooperatives and agro-firms. The 
“lack of qualification” of employed permanent labor is a ground for disputes in 27% of firms 
while the “unwillingness for intensive work” is an important reason only for a greater part of 
unregistered farms (32%). 
Provisional feature of contracts with seasonal and irregularly hired labor is a 
consequence of the inferior or “temporary” mutual dependency of parties. Therefore, 
possibilities for opportunistic behavior are much greater for this type of contract. That is 
why the share of farms having often or always problems reaches 36% for seasonally hired 
labor, and a half for irregularly employed labor. For majority of the farms main reasons for 
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conflicts with various kinds of temporary haired workers are “unwillingness for intensive 
work” and “tendency for cheating, stealing etc.” 
According to the managers of surveyed farms in production related activity they 
spend considerable efforts and time devoted for “organizational activity”, “current planning 
of activity”, and “direct involvement in production activities”. At the same time, “controlling 
purchased services”, “directing and supervision of applied labor”, “introduction of new 
technologies”, and “strategic planning” are relatively less costly. Nevertheless “efforts and 
time for directing and supervising applied labor” are reported “high” or “moderate” by two-
third of the managers of surveyed farms.   
Furthermore, in non-production activities the efforts and time for “finding new 
workers” is great only for 15-22% of farms. Thus the high governing costs associated with 
labor contracts (for finding a partner, negotiation contract terms, planning activity and 
innovations, direction and monitoring of labor, contract disputing and enforcement etc.) are 
among crucial factors restricting farm enlargement of farms at present stage of 
development. 
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Chapter 11 
 
 
5. MANAGEMENT OF FARM SERVICE SUPPLY 
 
Surveyed farms govern is a diverse ways the supply of different kind of services 
(Table 9). Share of farms using an own supply (“without outside provider”) of major 
agrarian services is significant. Mostly, larger operators benefit from the integration of 
services through exploration of the internal potential for economies of scale and scope on 
specialized and/or specific investments.  
What is more, very often an outside (market) supply of farm services is “too 
expensive” because of undeveloped markets of specialized services (high market prices, 
monopoly supply, missing markets), or a great risk from external supply (unilateral 
dependency) of “critical” to a farm activities. 
Due to the high market uncertainty (insecurity, possibility for opportunism of supplier), 
and the critical character of supply in particular time and quality, a particular service is self-
supplied (internal organization) in order to avoid risk of production failure (not carried agro-
technical activities, low yields and product quality, unharvested yields etc.).  
According to surveyed farms the main reasons for “not using” outside supply of 
different sort of services are: “possessing necessary qualification” or “having needed 
worker to carry out that activity”. That proves that a good part of farms integrate supply of 
critical for farm development (farm-specific) transactions through training, learning by 
doing experience, or hiring a specialized labor. 
Inner integration of “services” is efficient only when they are strongly specific to a 
farm (e.g. market fails to supply highly specialized technological knowledge to farm), and 
when it is necessary to protect unilaterally dependant transactions (such as irrigation, plant 
protection, veterinary care etc.).  
However, when technological economy of scale and scope from investments in 
specialized assets can not be explored within farm boundaries (for meeting own demand 
or outside sells of services), then a special (private, coalition) organization is usually used - 
cooperative, farm organization, group supply etc. The latter is more frequently applied for 
veterinary and mechanization services, and spreading chemicals and pesticides. 
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Table 9. Governing of service supply in different farms (percent of farms) 
 
 
Type of 
services 
Modes Unregistered Coopera- 
tives 
Agro-firms Small Middle 
size 
Large 
 
 
Technological 
knowledge 
and advises 
Own supply 24.32 39.29 25.00 24.32 18.18 68.75 
Own 
cooperative 
0.00 3.57 15.63 2.70 11.36 0.00 
Jointly with 
other farms 
10.81 10.71 0.00 10.81 6.82 0.00 
Market 
supplier 
13.51 10.71 25.00 13.51 25.00 0.00 
 
 
 
Mechanization 
services 
Own supply 18.92 42.86 40.63 13.51 40.91 56.25 
Own 
cooperative 
2.70 14.29 6.25 5.41 11.36 0.00 
Your farm 
organization 
10.81 0.00 12.50 10.81 0.00 25.00 
Jointly with 
other farms 
18.92 14.29 25.00 18.92 15.91 31.25 
Market 
supplier 
10.81 7.14 28.13 8.11 15.91 31.25 
 
 
Maintenance 
of machinery 
and 
equipment 
Own supply 32.43 42.86 34.38 29.73 36.36 50.00 
Own 
cooperative 
0.00 32.14 15.63 10.81 18.18 12.50 
Jointly with 
other farms 
5.41 10.71 12.50 5.41 6.82 25.00 
Market 
supplier 
8.11 7.14 12.50 8.11 13.64 0.00 
 
 
 
Spreading 
chemicals and 
pesticides 
Own supply 40.63 39.29 28.13 28.13 38.64 43.75 
Own 
cooperative 
0.00 7.14 0.00 3.13 2.27 0.00 
Your farm 
organization 
0.00 0.00 12.50 0.00 6.82 6.25 
Jointly with 
other farms 
15.63 14.29 9.38 18.75 13.64 0.00 
Market 
supplier 
12.50 32.14 28.13 21.88 20.45 37.50 
 
 
Veterinary 
services 
Own supply 31.82 57.14 15.00 24.00 28.00 83.33 
Own 
cooperative 
0.00 21.43 15.00 0.00 24.00 0.00 
Jointly with 
other farms 
13.64 7.14 0.00 16.00 0.00 0.00 
Market 
supplier 
36.36 50.00 60.00 40.00 52.00 66.67 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
Nevertheless, many needy small-scale farms can not develop or participate in such 
collective organization (unaffordable development or maintenance costs) and these 
transactions either fail to occur or they are not carried out in an effective scale. All that has 
significant negative implications for many smaller-scale farms in terms of competitiveness 
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and compliance with modern labor, quality, technological, environmental, and animal 
welfare standards.  
Principally, overuse of manual labor and low labor (safety, intensity etc.) standards, 
employment of animal power and primitive technologies, insufficient compensation of 
intakes of N, K and P from soils, shortage of disease and pest protection, bad animals 
healthcare, low yields etc., all they are common in Bulgarian farms [Bachev 2010].   
The last agricultural census also have proved that in a national wide scale the 
majority of key machineries (tractors and harvesters) are used by the largest farms – 
cooperatives and agri-firms (Figure 20). What is more, while most farms do (can) not 
employ owned key machineries they relay on tractors and harvesters “hired or used in 
association” to safeguard the effective supply of a critical to farm mechanization services 
(Figure 21). 
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Source: MAF, Agricultural Holdings Census, 2003                
 
Figure 20. Share of different type of farms with UAA using tractors and harvesters 
  
Our study demonstrates that a significant part of surveyed farms still use no major 
services at all. For instance, more than 40% of unregistered farms, two-third of agro-firms, 
and one-quarter of cooperatives report they do not apply services for supply of 
“technological knowledge and advice”. More than a third of unregistered farms, one-fifth of 
agro-firms, and some portion of coops do not use “mechanization services”. A half of 
unregistered farms and majority of small farms do not employ services for “maintenance of 
machinery and equipment”. Almost a third of unregistered and small crop farms do not use 
service for “spreading chemicals and pesticides”. “Veterinary services” are not employed 
by one-third of unregistered livestock farms and more than one-fifth of livestock firms. 
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Figure 21. Share of farms with UAA using “owned” or “hired and in association” 
machinery 
 
The “lack of any necessity” from services is a reason for “not using” for some portion 
of surveyed farms.  However, major factors for not applying a service supply contract are 
the “lack of outside supplier”, “high price for outside procurement”, “problems with 
contracting outside service supply”, and “quality problems of outside supply”.  
Markets for some services are still not well-developed in the (entire) country and 
there is a week contract position (contractual asymmetry, monopoly situation) of some 
type of (smaller-size, unregistered) farms. Subsequently, a significant fraction of farms 
block otherwise effective (in terms of needs, productivity) service supply transactions 
because of the lack of needed outside supply or the unacceptable prices.  
However, “the high price” for outside procurement is often a consequence of the 
“small farm size”41, which makes impossible the effective internal exploration of acquired 
services (e.g. know-how, new technologies, mechanization etc.). As a result of not carrying 
out of these important for farms activities there are serious problems for meeting modern 
technological, market, food safety, environmental and animal welfare standards. 
Furthermore, a part of important services such as technologic-know how, disease 
control etc. are with non-material character (little appropriability), which impedes 
transactions though market or contract form (impossibility for mutually beneficial exchange 
and protection of rights). That is why the internal organization (own or co-production, 
                                                 
41
 Insufficiently developed farm size usually is a result of blocking of other critical for the farm 
development transactions such as the high costs for credit supply, for marketing of output etc. 
[Bachev 2006]. 
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coalition) or public intervention (involvement of a third party through assistance, provision 
or mix mode) are the only feasible forms for governance.  
Most frequently market and private sector organize non-material service supply along 
with (complementary to, in package with) supply of the major material inputs (machinery, 
chemicals etc.) in a form of “free” advices, consultations, maintenance etc. 
The amount of market supply of agrarian services is not significant and varies 
according to the type of farms and the kind of services.  
The outside contract for service supply (purchase of a service) is an alternative form 
for the internal organization of labor (“own production of services”). That mode of farm 
extension is usually used for standardized and less specific to farm operations (plugging, 
spreading of chemicals, guarding etc.). Here contracting and controlling (output 
assessment) of the service supply do not require high costs, and the maximum scale and 
scope economies are realized through specialized service market.  
Alternatively, the hiring and the internal utilization of labor would involve additional 
costs: for organization and monitoring of workforce, for “training” of labor, for social 
payments (insurance, redundancy etc.), for compensation in non-working days (holidays, 
rainy days, out of season periods etc.). Besides, inter-farm organization would be 
associated with necessity to supply (through purchase or lease) of specialized machinery 
and other material assets for carrying out such services increasing additional procurement 
and transaction costs.  
Our survey has proved that major reasons for outside (market, contract) or collective 
(in a coalition) supply of certain services is the “best price”, “high quality”, “additional 
services”, “lack of problems in contracting and implementation”, “high confidence in 
supplier”, or “lack of another supplier in the region”. All these indicate that farms receive a 
certain benefit from extra-farm management of transactions - price, quality, supplementary 
services interlinked to main supply etc.  
This organization is preferred when there is built a good reputation of a supplier (high 
quality, big confidence) and costs for negotiation and enforcement of contracts are not 
considerable (more universal character of services and possibility for low costs control; 
simultaneous management of supplies of two or more interlinked services etc.). In many 
instances, services provided by specialized market agents or member organizations 
(cooperative, co-ownership) have such character. 
Nevertheless, there are many cases of mini-monopoly or undeveloped markets 
forcing farms to get needed services from a single supplier in the region. That is true not 
just for general services like public administration, garbage collection, energy and water 
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supply, but for specialized farm services like veterinary, mechanization, extension and 
advice etc.  
Unilateral dependency (abuse of power) is particularly typical for diverse public 
(community, state) services which often are “too expensive” for farms 42  in terms of 
complicated procedures, time, efficiency, formal and informal (bribe) payments etc. 
Most farms report that the frequency of using the same supplier is high (“always” or 
“predominately” the same provider) which minimize the costs of their relations (building 
reputation, confidence, system for coordination and stimulation, self-restriction of 
opportunism, standardization of transactions) and intensifies bilateral transactions. 
Nevertheless, more than 19% of surveyed farms have more than “one supplier” or “a new 
supplier every time” for outside services. That is a result of necessity to use diverse 
(“other”) services from various (specialized) provides or numerous smaller-scale suppliers. 
According to most of the managers of surveyed farms finding suppliers, negotiation, 
enforcement and dispute resolutions of contractual deals take a considerable time and 
efforts (Table 5). Thus transaction costs associated with the service supply are a major 
factor limiting the effective enlargement of farms.   
 
                                                 
42
 Even when these services are formally “free of charge”. 
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Chapter 12 
 
 
5. MANAGEMENT OF FARM INPUTS SUPPLY 
 
Surveyed farms govern in different ways the supply of major inputs. An internal 
organization (integration though “on farm making” and own production) is common for 
essential inputs such as seeds and seedlings in crop farms, and forage for animals and 
breeding animals in livestock farms (Table 10).  
The supply of building and animals is also practiced by a good number of farms as 
own production (reproduction, new construction, modification etc). 
The internal organization of inputs supply is an alternative mode to external 
procurement (through purchase or lease) of assets, and/or outside service supply, or other 
(not input intensive) mode for farm extension.  
For instance, instead of supplying fertilizers a farm leases-in new fertile lands every 
season or applies more labor force (labor intensive expansion, organic farming). Similarly, 
alternative for the supply of material assets is the purchase of material services 
(mechanization, plant protection, harvesting, transportation etc.). 
Usually the restriction of a market supply of farm specific assets is a result of the high 
transaction costs associated with undeveloped markets for purchase and lease of inputs; 
high uncertainty and risk of price dynamics and/or availability of inputs in a needed periods 
or moments of time; difficulties in quality verification of seeds and forage; monopoly or 
another dependency from a supplier etc.  
Besides, a part of the machinery (tractors, harvesters, milking installation), buildings 
and productive animals are either highly specific to a farm (strong mutual dependency with 
other farm assets) or especially needed in particular “critical” periods (harvesting, milking 
etc.).  
For instance, productivity of milking cows strongly depends on knowledge and care 
for individual animals, long-term investments in animals (feeding, healthcare, breeding 
etc.), and in some instances even from the relationships of animals with a particular worker 
(typical for buffalo breading).  
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Table 10. Governing of inputs supply in farms (percent of farms) 
 
Inputs 
type 
Supplier Unregi-
stered 
Coope- 
ratives 
Agro-
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large 
 
 
Chemicals 
Own production 17.86 0.00 0.00 19.23 0.00 0.00 
Own cooperative 3.57 4.76 6.90 3.85 7.89 0.00 
Own farm 
organization 
7.14 0.00 6.90 3.85 7.89 0.00 
Market supplier 71.43 95.24 86.21 73.08 84.21 100.00 
Seeds 
and 
seedlings 
for crop 
farms 
Own production 46.88 52.27 32.65 58.33 40.32 29.63 
Own cooperative 3.13 15.91 12.24 2.78 9.68 25.93 
Own farm 
organization 
0.00 0.00 10.20 2.78 6.45 0.00 
Market supplier 50.00 31.82 44.90 36.11 43.55 44.44 
 
Forage for 
livestock 
farms 
Own production 54.84 65.00 50.00 58.97 54.55 46.15 
Own cooperative 0.00 0.00 14.71 0.00 3.03 30.77 
Own farm 
organization 
0.00 0.00 20.59 2.56 15.15 7.69 
Market supplier 45.16 35.00 14.71 38.46 27.27 15.38 
 
 
Machinery 
Own production 12.00 23.33 19.51 12.00 19.15 25.00 
Own cooperative 20.00 10.00 26.83 12.00 19.15 29.17 
Own farm 
organization 
0.00 6.67 19.51 0.00 19.15 4.17 
Market supplier 68.00 60.00 34.15 76.00 42.55 41.67 
 
 
Livestock 
Own production 36.84 50.00 27.78 40.91 39.13 25.00 
Own cooperative 0.00 12.50 22.22 0.00 26.09 0.00 
Own farm 
organization 
21.05 18.75 11.11 18.18 21.74 0.00 
Market supplier 42.11 18.75 38.89 40.91 13.04 75.00 
 
 
Buildings 
Own production 73.33 64.29 41.38 82.35 51.43 45.00 
Own cooperative 0.00 17.86 24.14 5.88 22.86 15.00 
Own farm 
organization 
0.00 10.71 27.59 0.00 20.00 20.00 
Market supplier 26.67 7.14 6.90 11.76 5.71 20.00 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
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In addition to their specific character, these type of long-term biological assets have 
comparatively high frequency of use, relatively shorter period of effective life, and 
possibility for “full” exploration of technological economies within (small-size) farm 
boundaries. 
In order to avoid likely risk from using an outside contract, a preference is given to 
using of own organization (inputs supply cooperative or another farm organization) or 
entirely integrated mode (own procurement, on farm making). For instance, instead of 
extension of its specialized activity a livestock farm integrates supply of forage (an entirely 
different - crop activity) in order to avoid an unilateral dependency from a supplier of forage 
or to use free internal recourses (which otherwise are costly or impossible to trade on 
market).  
Also when there is potential for join (collective) realization of economy (scale and 
scope) in inputs supply or when it is economical to protect dependant transactions 
(through a better coordination and control, preventing possible opportunism of a supplier) 
then it is formed or participated in a private organization for inputs (service) supply such as 
cooperative and farm organization. The later is typical for supply of machinery, buildings 
and animals in surveyed farms.  
In a national-wide scale the majority of key machineries (tractors and harvesters) are 
also either owned, hired or used in association by farms in order to safeguard the effective 
supply of a critical to farm assets (Figure 21). 
For long-term assets there are two possible contractual forms for outside supply – 
purchase and lease.  
In some cases leasing of buildings and equipments is used in agriculture as a 
temporary or permanent form for governing relations with suppliers of these resources. 
Employment of leasing is determined by the long-term universal character of material 
assets (stable, greenhouse, storehouse, dry house) and the relatively shorter cycle of 
agricultural activities using productively these assets. Acquiring a full ownership on such 
assets is not necessary since they are with low specificity to a particular farm.  
The lease contract let an effective management of the supply and a full pay-back of 
investment in lease period. The purchase of assets would only increase the overall supply 
costs (for negotiation of sale, checking authenticity, preparation of documentation of 
transfer, notary registration etc.), freeze a considerable amount of farm finance in these 
assets, and require additional costs for ceasing supply in case of failure of venture or after 
production cycle is complete (selling out, leasing out of unnecessary assets). 
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Furthermore, in the transitional period of restructuring of ownership (privatization, 
redistribution, demonopolisation), the lease contract was often the only possible form for 
supply of a great part of the long-term agrarian assets [Bachev 2000]. That was a 
consequence of indentified, disputed, or physically indivisible character of ownership of 
reorganized (liquidated, privatized, transformed) ancient farm structures – cooperative 
under liquidation, state and municipality farms and firms etc. 
Finally, unlike land lease contract the leasing conditions for very mobile assets such 
as machinery and animals (care, extend of exploitation, share rent, preservation and return 
to owner) are quite difficult to control from the owner (big information asymmetry, and 
possibility of opportunistic behavior from the lesser). That is why leasing markets for such 
resources hardly develop and the ownership (farm, group, cooperative) is the dominant 
form for governing of these assets in agriculture43. 
Surveyed farms apply market procurement predominately for standardized inputs 
such as chemicals, machineries, and livestock. Those are mass products, with a secure 
supply, and an occasional purchase. There are multiple (alternative) suppliers and market 
competition works well and governs effectively supply. Besides, the frequency of deals 
with the same suppliers is high which reduces transacting costs since there is a strong 
interest for continuing bilateral trade (self-restriction of opportunism). What is more, it 
become economical to invest in a specific capital for maintaining of a “regular” supply 
(getting to know the partner; development of trust and mechanisms for coordination and 
motivation; interlink organization of transactions etc.).  
The universal (standardized not specific for a particular farm or a buyer) character of 
most of the agrarian material inputs also additionally restrict the opportunism of suppliers. 
Principally, unsatisfied farmer can always turn to another supplier without significant a 
change in the costs of supply. 
The reported cases of diversification of suppliers are usually cased by the needs of 
different type of inputs (diverse kind of chemicals, seeds, machineries) which commonly 
have different suppliers.  
Nevertheless, often the effective (technologically optimal, sustainable) farm extension 
through internal, collective and (or) outside inputs supply modes has been severely 
restricted as a results of the big institutional uncertainty (not working public system for 
enforcement of private rights and contracts) and the high transacting costs for supplying 
                                                 
43
 Nevertheless, in recent years leasing of farm machinery (tracks, tractors, harvesters) started to 
develop as a form for interlinked organization of crediting and inputs supply in the conditions of not 
developed market for long-term credit supply in agriculture. 
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critical for a farm resources (technological knowledge, management skills, credit for fund 
the inputs supply etc.).  
For instance, the amount of used chemical fertilizers and pesticides in Bulgarian 
farms now represents merely 22% and 31% of the 1989 level 44 ; a negative and 
unbalanced rate of fertilizer compensation of N, P and K intakes from soils dominate 45; 
there has been 20 folds reduction in irrigated farmland after 1990; and merely 0,1% of the 
livestock farms possess safe manure-pile sites, around 81% of them use primitive 
dunghills, and 116 thousand holdings have no facilities at all [MAF]. 
The major reason for choosing a supplier most frequently pointed out by farms is “the 
best price”. At the same time “ the lack of alternative supplier” is either not a factor or it 
indicated rarely as a reason for selecting a supplier for a particular input. Thus market 
prices and competition relatively well coordinate the supply of part of main agrarian inputs.  
The existence of numerous suppliers relatively increases the transaction costs of 
supply (for searching the best price, partner, terms of supply etc.). Nevertheless, the 
competition of suppliers leads to reduction of market prices, improving the quality, 
minimizing unilateral dependency, and absolute contraction of costs for market supply.  
For a good part of surveyed farms a major factor for choosing a particular input 
supplier is “delayed (portion) payments” (with exception for animals). That mode effectively 
interlinks inputs supply with a credit supply to a farm.  
Short and long-term investments in agriculture usually require a longer pay-back 
period (at least until the next harvest season). Therefore, a delayed or fraction payment for 
outside input supply actually represents a parallel lending of a free or low interest (short or 
long-term) credit by a supplier.  
The interlinked organization (“input supply plus crediting”) facilitates transactions, 
minimize the overall costs for management, and intensify inputs supply and relationships 
between counterparts. A supply of material assets “in package” with crediting (“loan in 
kind”) is beneficial for farms since: it either saves own finance of significant capital 
investments; or economize costs for finding and servicing an outside loan (from a bank or 
another agent).  
In a situation of vast shortage of own finance sources and a high costs for external 
credit supply, that is often the only available form for the enlargement (or the preservation) 
                                                 
44
 That sharp reduction in chemical use has drastically diminished the risk of chemical 
contamination of soils, waters, and farm produce, and a good part of farm output has got “organic” 
character [Bachev 2008]. 
45
 Accordingly, an average of 23595,4 t N, 61033,3 t P205 and 184392 t K20 have been 
irreversibly removed annually from soils since 1990, and there has been a considerable increase in 
agricultural land affected by acidification [MAF] 
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of farm size. Not rare such an interlinked supply of long-term assets in fact represents 
leasing (rent) rather than a sell of actives. That specific form for governing of transactions 
with inputs supply industries corresponds to development of a particular lease market for 
more universal and easy to supervise assets (such as large machinery, building etc.)46. 
“On farm delivery” is often a main reason for selecting a supplier for chemicals and 
forage. Here the preference of a supplier is determined by the provision of an “additional” 
(transportation) service in a “package” with input supply. That form economizes on direct 
transportation costs (when “supply is free of charge”) for needed inputs. Besides, a 
significant economy is made from over passing needs to maintain own specialized (e.g. for 
dangerous chemicals) transport or for finding a supplier of specialized transportation 
service. 
“The high confidence in supplier”, “high quality” and “good reputation of a supplier” 
are also among the common reasons for choosing a supplier by majority of surveyed 
farms.  
At the time of purchase information asymmetry is considerable in terms of quality, 
origin etc. of inputs. That is why controlling of possible opportunism in supply is either 
extremely difficult or very expensive (e.g. through costly laboratory tests, expertise etc.).  
Often the pre-contractual opportunisms is “practically” detected afterwards (e.g. low 
quality or non-corresponding to specifications chemicals, seeds, forage, animals, 
machinery) being quite expensive for farms. Mistakes in these transactions result in failed 
yield, low quality or non-authentic produce, low productivity of animals, unusable or costly 
maintained (“second hand”) machinery etc. In order to avoid risks from this kind of 
“failures” the farms usually do not rely on anonymous (market) counterparts for supply of 
such inputs. 
“Receiving additional benefit(s)” is another important factor for selecting a particular 
supplier for some of new chemicals, machineries, animals and feed for livestock. Suppliers 
usually provides “free” non-material assets or services like training, know-how, technical 
advise, maintenance etc.  
Since the appropriability of these transaction is low (a non-material character), the 
“package deal” with the main material input is the only effective modes for effective 
organization. The largest farms and firms are most open for innovation (strong competition, 
high efficiency of introduction of innovations, bigger entrepreneurship) and for them this 
                                                 
46
 At the same time, similar lease market does not emerge for productive animals since lease 
contract is difficult to monitor (livestock could be easily consumed or resold). Therefore, purchase 
is the major form for outside supply of livestock. 
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specific form of contract is particularly important for supply of necessary technological 
innovations. 
For a considerable number of farms “inputs supplier buys the farm output”. That 
interlinked organization of inputs supply with marketing of farm output (“reciprocial supply”) 
minimizes the overall governance costs for two groups of transacting (a single contract for 
input supply and marketing).  
In many cases, this mode extends vertical coordination (quasi or complete 
integration) of farms with the supplier of a particular input (e.g. super elite and original 
seeds). In other instances, there is a mutual (e.g. capacity, time of delivery, perishability) 
inter-dependency and a buyer of farm produce (e.g. a milk or meat processor, dealer) 
organizes supply of a critical input (e.g. forage for livestock) in order to secure the origin, 
high quality, quantity, and time of delivery of critical raw material.  
There are also many cases “when input supplier assists the marketing of farm output” 
and that reason for choice of a partner is reported by some farms in animal, seed, 
chemical and forage supplies. Offering of a “free mediation” in marketing (interlinking with 
a new service) makes a particular supplier preferable among competitors, saving farms 
costs for marketing of output and overcoming market uncertainty. 
In the supply of short-term assets most surveyed farms use predominately “based on 
a market price” and “negotiated price in each deal”. The larger farms also apply a “fixed for 
a longer period of time price” for chemical and forage supply. Namely for the latter farms 
market uncertainty and fluctuation of prices to a great extend affect productivity (large 
consumers, high frequency of transactions, critical assets) and safeguarding supply 
through a special contract provision is essential.  
In the supply of long-term assets the most broadly employed form is negotiated price 
in each deal.  
The most common problems in inputs supply reported by surveyed farms are for: 
“finding needed inputs”, “finding a supplier”, “verification of quality”, “negotiation of prices”, 
“negotiating other terms of supply” as well as in the “process of implementation of 
contracts” and “resolution of emerging conflicts”. 
 Furthermore, for a good number of  farms “finding suppliers for needed materials, 
equipment etc.” and ”preparing, enforcing and disputing contracts” take a significant part of 
managers efforts and time (Table  8). All these is an indicator for the strong asymmetry in 
contractual position (contractual power) between farms and suppliers of certain inputs. 
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6. MANAGEMENT OF FARM FINANCE SUPPLY 
  
A major form for funding the activities of surveyed farms is “own sources” (Table 11).  
In transitional conditions of high institutional, market, and behavioral uncertainty most 
of the typical agrarian investments happen to be in a regime of high specificity (“berried in 
land” or “very mobile”). Besides, much of the human and intangible capital is highly 
specific to a particular farm (e.g. investment in training, learning by doing experience, 
organizational development, building of reputation etc.).  
 
Table 11. Governing of finance supply in farms (percent of farms) 
 
Supplier Type of 
funding 
Unregi- 
stered 
Coopera- 
tives 
Agro- 
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large 
Own financing Short-term 91.4 81.5 79.3 91.2 81 75 
 Long-term 48.6 48.1 55.2 55.9 40.5 62.5 
Relatives and Short-term 31.4 7.41 10.3 23.5 14.3 12.5 
friends Long-term 20 7.4 3.4 5.9 19 0 
Outside 
investor 
Short-term 0 11.1 6.8 0 11.9 0 
Long-term 0 0 20.6 0 4.8 25 
Farm 
organization 
Short-term 22.9 25.9 17.2 29.4 19 12.5 
Long-term 14.3 3.7 13.8 11.8 14.3 0 
Commercial 
bank 
Short-term 5.71 18.5 37.9 2.9 31 25 
Long-term 2.9 14.8 17.2 5.9 19 0 
Public 
program 
Short-term 31.47 59.3 69 32.4 57.16 75 
Long-term 37.1 33.3 17.2 44.1 26.2 6.2 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
Therefore, finding out an independent (market) investor to finance such assets has 
been quite expensive (costs to find a supplier, efforts to negotiate loan terms, losses 
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associated with meeting collateral requirements, extremely high interest rate or other “side 
payments”) or even impossible. Consequently, the internal rather than outside mode has 
been the most effective (or only possible) way to finance transactions (activity) supported 
by such assets. 
Our survey has found that most farms which integrate inputs supply (in-house 
production) with high land or farm dependency use internal procurement for finance as 
well – accordingly 58% of farms with internal livestock feed supply, 55% - for seeds self-
suppliers, and 43% - for own buildings suppliers.  
At the same time, share of farms which simultaneously supply inputs and finance 
internally is insignificant for more universal and mobile assets – accordingly 28% of 
animals, 6% for machinery, and only 4% for chemical self-suppliers.  
That proves that assets with low farm specificity tend to be financed by off-farm 
sources (e.g. loan contract). When specificity of transaction increases farms integrate not 
only the finance but also the input supply in order to protect dependant investments. 
Another reason for domination of internal mode for finance supply has been the high 
transacting costs for off-farm investments. In insecure transitional environment, investment 
in own farm has been more or the most effective way to use available financial resources 
along with the internal utilization of other often non-tradable household recourses (land, 
family labor, knowledge). 
Survival of a large number of the (member oriented) production coops has been also 
based on advance payments for services trough system of orders (“commissioning 
contracts”) with individual members. These cooperatives have integrated assets 
associated with highly specific activities to members - services to individual farms and 
households (e.g. food for households, feed for households’’ and private farms’ animals), 
employment opportunities for members etc. Those are mainly assets with high indivisibility 
or with a great potential for economy of scale (and scope) unachievable within individual 
farm boundaries.  
Therefore, a collective (joint ownership) mode has been broadly used to finance and 
govern such community-specific assets in order to overcome the “missing market” 
situation, to avoid any unilateral outside dependency (monopoly), and to secure productive 
use of existing large-scale facilities. 
For commercial farms the internal investment has been the most efficient way to use 
available financial resources as well. In highly risky financial markets (unstable nominal 
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interest rate, skyrocketing inflation47, boom of banks failures) the direct internal control has 
been the cheapest (often the only possible) form to safeguard investments from outside 
opportunistic expropriation. Besides, investment in internal farm-specific assets (such as 
entrepreneurship, know-how etc.) has been much more productive since it brings higher 
than market (rates of interest, dividends on shares, yields on Government bonds etc.) 
return on invested specialized capital.  
That is why the large farms and firms (which tend to perform much more effectively) 
invest to a greater extend their capital in own long-term assets for increasing productivity. 
Moreover, even farms which could find easier (“often”) necessary funds from “outside 
sources” make the internal investment in own short and long-term assets - 30% and 13% 
of surveyed farms accordingly. 
Nevertheless, internal sources for financing are limited by family savings, coop 
members specific demand (and funding potential), internal profit generation etc. That puts 
severe restriction on effective farm enlargement through internal finance supply. When it is 
necessary only 15% and 41% of surveyed farms are able “always or often” to find outside 
supplier for their long-term and short-term financial needs.  
Only larger farms has a greater access to external financing for their short-term 
assets as 81% of them “often” find needed means. Almost a half of surveyed farms do 
not use the internal mode to finance long-term assets at all.  
Besides, some farms have been using other transactions to find additional sources 
for internal funding. For instance, all farms show as a major reason for farmland sells-out 
and lease-out deals the “financing other farm activities”. 
Therefore, most farms need outside (mix) sources to sustain and enlarge their 
activities. However, high transacting costs restrict or even block the outside finance 
procurement. Consequently chronicle underinvestment, low productivity, limit of farm 
enlargement, backward technological development, unsustainable exploitation of natural 
resources, all they have been wide-spreading among Bulgarian farms [Bachev 2010]. 
Using “relatives and friends”, as external suppliers of capital, has been very popular 
in rural communities. It was especially common during transition period when uncertainty 
was so high that personal ties and trust (“bilateral reputation mechanism”) governed most 
economic transactions at national and even transnational scales. This mode for outside 
supply is still dominant for a good part of small and unregistered farms, being a singe 
mode for outside funding for the latter farms.  
                                                 
47
 Inflation was extremely high during transition period Consumer Price Index reaching 1231% in 
1999 comparing to 1990 level [NSI]. 
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Costs for negotiating and for contract enforcement are low since contracts are 
governed by “good-will” and personal trust between partners (usually as a part of broader 
friendships or family relationships). Often there is no a formal contract writing and 
registration, or any collateral requirements. Disputes associated with contract execution 
are less likely and they are easily overcome with no substantial efforts or needs for a third 
party (e.g. court, authority) involvement. Besides, a “preferential” (not rare zero) interest 
rate is habitually applied and there is a greater flexibility for loan terms.  
In certain cases outside “support” of activities of smaller farms is a part of the 
interlinked “direct marketing” deals. Since market food prices are quite high for the pocket 
of mass consumers (retail profit, VAT), and there is high uncertainty associated with 
quality of “free marketed” products (e.g. high level of residual chemicals; uncertain origin 
etc.), many urbane households use personal and family ties to secure a stable supply of 
cheap, quality and safe48  farm products though system of advance (or current) orders and 
financing. 
Regardless of its relative efficiency the “relative-friendship” form can not be a 
permanent mode for finance supply. There are “natural limits” of available (free, 
preferential) outside sources of that kind. While majority of farms using short-term crediting 
through this mode report they “always or often” find external sources when it is needed, no 
respondent confirms such state for long-term credit needs. Besides, when “farm efficiency” 
is not a criteria for investment decision-making neither form can be sustainable in a long-
run. Therefore, personal relations will be used as supplementary and eventually as a “last 
resort” mode of financing.  
Share of surveyed farms which get a financial supply from an outside investor is still 
low. Most of the suppliers of funding are Bulgarian investors. They tend to finance working 
capital of registered middle-size organizations (cooperatives and companies). Besides, the 
proportion of large agro-firms which get direct outside funding of long-term investment is 
quite big. Foreign investors finance entirely the investments in middle-size firms of different 
type.  
Evolution of this specific private mode for financing of farming activities is determined 
by the strong relation specificity of farm investments to an outside buyer of agrarian output. 
That is either bilateral (e.g. capacity, time of delivery, origin etc.) or most often unilateral 
dependency of farm assets from a particular processor, retailer, or exporter. The latter 
assets are usually associated with some specification of products (“special” quality or 
                                                 
48
 Food safety is becoming an important issue particularly for new rich and middle class Bulgarians. 
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production technology, “special” origin) which is of big importance for a buyer (vine 
producer, meat and dairy processor, produces of caned vegetable and fruit etc.).  
For the reason of high specificity of such investments to a particular (single) buyer 
they hardly could be financed by an independent outside supplier. Here risk from 
opportunistic behavior in post-contract (post-investment) stage in enormous. Farms would 
not make dependent investments unless they are safeguarded by some effective 
governing form such as long-term contract, taking economic “hostages”, or join investment. 
Therefore, either underinvestment in specialized capital (hold-up), or direct external (coo) 
investment by interested vertical partner.  
Our survey shows that all farms getting such funding of their long-term investments 
also provide an internal finance supply. Since farms are in a big shortage of working 
capital the outside investors (processor, trader) traditionally provide advance payments 
(financing current inputs supply) for interlinked future marketing deals.   
This mode for financial supply usually is a part of a larger contract(s) for governing of 
vertical links - reciprocial marketing, inputs and know-how supply, joint ventures etc. 
Participated farms get some interest, collateral etc. preferences as a part of the entire deal.  
On the other hand, the legal form of business organization (namely “agro-firm”) 
becomes important since it allows to build a formal partnership (e.g. direct participation in 
Management Board), brand name capital, daughter organizations etc., and to dispute them 
before a third party (e.g. court, Government authority, international arbitrage). Not rare 
such farms have been initiated (or taken over) from outside (off-farm) interests and 
develop as part of the diversification strategy of special business (bank, industrial, shadow 
etc) groups. 
Nevertheless, unilateral dependency of farms from downstream industries dominates. 
Only less than 9% of farms supported by the outside investors point out they are “often” 
able to find needed short-term financial resource from the outside sources and no farm 
gets an easy long-term external funding.  
Emergence of direct financing by foreign investors has been greatly associated with 
formal restrictions for foreigners to buy agricultural land until recently. That is why such a 
joint venture with a local agent is merely feasible way to govern foreign direct investment 
in farming sector. In recent years, cases of foreign direct investment in agriculture tend to 
be a result of increasing opportunities to profit from imported technological know how, 
modern organization, available marketing channels for special or mass products etc.  
Farms using that mode of funding get extremely favorable interest, terms, collateral, 
and overall paper work treatment (similar to “own” finance supply). At the same timer, that 
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is not low-cost mode for outside financing – no farm credited by foreign investor testifies it 
is easy to obtain external financing when it is required.  
Agrarian agents also invent more complicated forms to mitigate problems and 
facilitate financial transactions. Interlinked organization has been widely used to govern 
exchange between farms and input suppliers.  
We have already demonstrated that for a good part of farms a major factor for 
choosing a particular supplier of inputs is “delayed (portion) payments” which effectively 
interlinks input with credit supply. Such organization facilitates transactions, minimize 
overall costs for management, intensify inputs supply and relationships between 
counterparts.   
Supplying physical assets “in package” with crediting (“loan in kind”) is beneficial for 
farms since: it either saves own finance of significant capital investments; or economize 
costs for finding and servicing outside credit. In situation of a considerable shortage of own 
finance sources and high costs for external credit supply, that is often the only available 
form for enlargement (or preserving) farms size. 
One out of five surveyed farms use “cooperative or farm organization” as an outside 
finance supplier. Collective supply form is more important for short-term financial needs of 
smaller farms and for long-term funding of not-large and non-cooperative farms.  
Main reasons for selecting that mode of financing are related to the comparative 
efficiency and the low costs: “small paper work and bureaucratic procedures”, “best 
interest rate and terms”, and “lack of need to pay for successful project for financing”.  
However, for a good number of farms that is the “only source for outside financing” of 
long and short-term activities. More than 79% of farms getting short-term funding trough 
the latter mode, and a half of long-term credit users, report they “always or often” are able 
to find external crediting they need. Therefore, when market fails or when market 
procurement is quite expensive, farms need, develop, and use own special private 
organizations for finance supply.   
Evolution of joint (collective) ownership mode for farm finance supply has been very 
difficult in Bulgaria [Bachev and Kagatsume]. There were no traditions in farm association 
in the country. Transaction costs for initiation and maintenance of large-members 
organizations are quite high. Also incentives for equity investment are low since individual 
influence on policy and receiving benefit (individual use of organization, profit distribution 
etc.) is independent from the invested capital (a shortcoming from the cooperative mode). 
Finally, the farms which need collective support the most (potential membership) are 
extremely poor to contribute significantly to that financial joint venture.  
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A number of farm credit organizations have been initiated by private interest groups 
or by a third party (Government, international assistance program, NGO). Because of the 
mismanagement and corruption some of them failed – e.g. Bank of Agrarian Cooperatives, 
Bank for Agrarian Credit etc.  
Recently established Federation of Rural Mutual Credit Associations has got some 
success partly due to the significant public support in creation, initial granting of “equity” 
capital, and in exterior supervision. However it has been experiencing difficulties extending 
its activities since the exterior support was suspended.  
Some non-specialized in crediting farm organizations (inputs supply, marketing or 
producers cooperatives; professional association) also have credit programs. However, 
the latter activity is very limited and specialized - e.g. prioritized lending for breading 
animal, promotion of new products, introduction of know-how etc. Most of these 
organizations are “too small” to provide effective farm financing - to accumulate recourses, 
to realize economy of scale (and scope) on specialized lending activities etc. In some 
cases, they also heavily rely on a third party (Government, international assistance, NGO) 
support to carry out activity. 
Therefore, despite the obvious advantages of collective finance supply organizations 
in resource accumulation, risk sharing, non for profit operations, crediting preferences, 
“democratic” management etc., they cannot and have not develop as a pure private mode 
in transitional conditions. 
Market (credit, debt) finance procurement has been practically blocked for the much 
of the transition. It is effectively developing after 2000 but it is still not accessible for the 
majority of farms.  
“Flexibility” of financial recourses is considerable and it is very difficult (and costly) for 
creditor to monitor debtors and to control if loans are used effectively and purposely. That 
is especially true for agriculture where investments are hidden (“berried”) in land and 
therefore not observable at low cost.  
Moreover, other major agrarian assets are very “mobile” and liquid - e.g. animals and 
yields could be easily consumed or untraceably sold, machinery is “on wheel” etc. Hence, 
using major agrarian assets for safeguard as collateral is not always feasible. Agricultural 
land has been rarely accepted as guarantee against losses by the commercial bank for the 
reason of lacking real titles (until recently) and a low demand for purchase of farmland. On 
the other hand, farmers are not enthusiastic to offer their vital non-agrarian assets (e.g. 
houses) as collateral since farm investments are associated with a high risk. 
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There have appeared many “new comers” on both sides of market (banks and 
farmers) and transacting parties usually do not know each other (no history of relations, 
trust is to be built). Costs for a first contract between unknown market counterparts are 
much higher than for transacting with a high recurrence (“history”) between same partners 
(where keeping relationships has a special value).  
Consequently, in transitional conditions of big uncertainty, high information 
asymmetry, and strong incentive for opportunistic behavior (survival consideration, 
reputation does not matter), market has failed to organize effectively credit supply in 
agriculture [Bachev and Tsuji]. Moreover, farms have access only to market dept financing 
since equity market for trading agrarian shares have not developed at all in the country49. 
Only one-fifth of farms use commercial banks for funding short-term assets as share 
of farms using market for long-term capital procurement is twice lower. Agro-firms and 
larger farms employ to a greater extent the loan contracts for short-term finance supply. 
These farms can better meet market criteria for efficiency and for high collateral 
requirements. Besides, they have a superior ability to face sunk costs for finding a creditor 
and for completing loan agreements.  
Creditors have preferences to formal registered farm organizations which liabilities 
could be easier (than Physical persons) challenge in court throughout a longer period of 
time (the effective “life of investments”).  
The long-term credit market entirely “fails” for small farms. Large farms also do not 
prefer “pure” market forms for financing long-term activities since they have access to 
more economical modes for external finance (direct investment, joint venture).  
For majority of farms the main reason for choosing market mode for short-term and 
long-term finance is “the best interest rate and terms of credit”. It means that market (price) 
mechanisms govern well transactions for finance supply in these farms. Thus, majority of 
surveyed farms using commercial banks for finance procurement work according to the 
“rule of competition” meeting efficiency (pay–back) requirements and fulfilling financial 
obligations. 
Another major reason for selecting that form, especially for long-term credit users, is 
the “lack of need to pay for successful project for financing”. That proves that market than 
other “hidden” price mediates effectively relations between the supplier and debtor.  
However, for a great part of farms market form is the single (only possible) form for 
outside financing since “there are no other outside suppliers in the region”. Moreover, the 
latter farms have a single external lender as well as being in a situation of unilateral 
                                                 
49
 That could be also easily explained by transaction cost reasons [Bachev 2004]. 
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(funding) dependency. Consequently for a good number of farms there are only two 
(extreme) forms available for funding of long-term activities – internal (own) supply and 
(“free”) market mode.  
For a significant part of debtors of the bank short-term credit the “tradition” also plays 
an important role. Long-term customer relationships between a farm and a bank are 
coupled with development of relation-specific capital. It helps overcoming problems of 
information deficiency (asymmetry), builds confidence between partners, restricts pre- and 
post-contract opportunistic behavior, and ultimately minimizes the overall transacting costs 
for financial supply.  
Almost 74% of short-term credit users and a half of the long-term debtors of banks 
indicate they are able “always or often” to find external financing when it is necessary. It 
means that transacting costs for market mode for employing-farms are relatively small. 
In environment of high economic and behavioral uncertainty other specific forms have 
also emerged to facilitate agrarian credit supply. Share financing of investments with a 
loan from banks and own sources is commonly used – accordingly by 62% of the long-
term credit users and one-third of the short-term creditors. This special (mixed) mode of 
finance supply increases farmers incentives for effective use of investment, divides risk 
between banks and users, and economize on total governance costs.  
According to the specific characteristics of clients different levels of credit volumes 
and equity requirements are practiced. Besides, sources are usually own used for 
financing of more farm-specific assets (e.g. land and land improvement) while credits are 
directed to finance more universal and liquid assets. The internal financing is also 
necessary to secure effective collateral for lending contracts which is generally demanded 
to recover bank losses in case of investment failure.  
Correlation between own and bank financing is lower for short-term credit users 
where 67% of bank users do not match credit supply with internal funding. Here “future 
crop” is usually used as a guarantee (“yield as collateral”) for loan contracts.  
Besides, bank often explicitly requests “purchase of insurance” to be made by 
credited farms. For instance, a half of the short-term debtors are obliged by relevant banks 
to buy an insurance for vegetable yield, 31% for cereal harvest, and 11% for milk-cows. 
Such insurance is also requested for one-forth of cereals producers and one-third for cow 
owners which use long-term credits from banks.  
Since the risk of crop failure is immense lending banks require their collateral (future 
yields, milking-cows) to be protected (“insured”) from possible losses. Despite there 
unwillingness farmers have to pay the supplementary price for insurance supply in order to 
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obtain needed (interlinked) bank credit. In this case the risk is carried by a specialized 
market supplier (insurance company rather than the bank) and debtor-farms are charged 
with extra (transaction) costs to assure bank loans.  
Another interesting form which has developed is to get “free agro-market information” 
from crediting bank – correspondingly 11% and 25% of farms using short-term and long-
term credit. In this case farms receive “for free” additional service supply in package 
(interlinked) with the credit supply contract.  
Banks gather or buy such information since it is vital for their investment, lending etc. 
decision-making. They offer this information to farms since they are interested in high 
efficiency of their clients investments (and timely return of banks loans). Here, economy of 
scale for organization of agro-market information supply is realized by bank and farms get 
specialized information supply though (in package with) lending contracts. This 
governance mode provides individual farms with a service which otherwise would be very 
expensive (to buy from market or to supply through a special private organization) or not 
available at all (blocking of market information supply transactions during first years of 
transition). 
Independent to existence of lending contracts, some of surveyed farms report getting 
other “free services” from banks – technological knowledge and advises, advises on 
protecting from diseases and predators, veterinary assistance, and farm management 
counsels. Farming related services of banks are extending along with expansion of their 
agrarian credit activities and the number of their prospective customers.  
Despite “enormous” development of agrarian credit markets since the beginning of 
transition, the majority of farms still do not use market for organization of their financial 
supply. In some instances market mode happens to be quite expensive – e.g. “too high” 
interest rate and other related “payments”, lost flexibility (and efficiency) of agrarian 
recourses put (as collateral) under bank’s control. In other cases, market form has not 
been accessible at all - missing market situation.  
Furthermore, recent financial crisis strongly limited available financial resources on 
the market and increased the costs of borrowing. Subsequently, farms have been looking 
for and designing more efficient non-market (private, trilateral, hybrid) forms for outside 
finance supply. 
A main form for external funding for majority of surveyed farms is “some kind of state 
program for agriculture”.  
During the entire transition period agrarian credit market was blocked in the country 
and Government intervention in finance supply “made” carrying out farming possible. The 
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government assistance has been predominantly directed to providing preferential credit for 
working capital for particular productions (mainly cereals).  
In last years before EU accession preferential long-term funding programs have been 
also made available for some priority areas (e.g. growing vineyard, purchasing machinery, 
modernization rural infrastructure, recovering traditional productions etc.).  
Most public programs come with a subsidized interest rate, facile terms and collateral 
requirements. Schemes with a partially granted-credit have also been introduced recently 
(part of the loan is forgiven after investments are made). Thus along with necessary credit 
the farms get “additional” financing through a subsidized loan price, forgiven debt, or 
increased flexibility of own resources.  
In most cases, there is a requirement for sharing investment (and risk) by financed 
farms aiming to increase incentives for efficiency. What is more, since 2000 “cross-
compliance” requirements (“good farming practices”, eco-conditionality) have been 
obligatory for participation in public support programs. That is why the latter form of public 
crediting (subsidizing) proper farming activity is also a specific (interlinked) mode for public 
payments for additional (e.g. environmental) services by farmers50.  
Public supply form is preferred by most of using farms because of the “best interest 
and term”. However, the best collateral and paper works associated with public mode is 
also an important for a good number of applying farms. 
Different types of farms do not have an equal access to public funds for financing 
activities. Our survey demonstrated that major beneficiaries of preferential short-term 
credit are registered bigger farms. These farms have larger needs for working capital and 
are very active looking for cheap external funding. They have also got better experience in 
preparation of project proposals and lobbying for their selection. Besides, these farms 
develop a special relation-specific capital with funding agencies (personal ties, good 
reputation) and have effective capacity for “under the counter” payments (bribes) for 
projects approval. Finally, larger farms are more important in political and economic 
respects (powerful agents, major suppliers for internal and export markets) and therefore 
have easy access to Government support.  
Nevertheless, larger farms do not use much the public mode for funding long-term 
assets. They have either greater internal capacity (profit generation, equity sell) to cover 
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 Nevertheless, the actual compliance to most of the new standards for animal welfare, 
biodiversity and environmental preservation etc. has been low because of the unawareness in 
farmers and public officers, high enforcement costs, insufficient administrative capability, and lack 
of political will [Bachev 2008].  
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their long-term needs or an effective access to cheaper outside sources for financing 
(private investors, banks etc.).  
The formal status and the “registration” of farms is important for executing agency 
since it is easier (less costly) to check the history and the reliability of farms, and to 
enforce the legal agreements and liabilities.  
For a good number of surveyed farms state funding of long-term assets is the only 
way for external finance supply. This mode is vital for a significant number of farms since 
53% of the users of long-term and 17% of the users of short-term credits from State 
programs do not have internal financing at all. Farms getting funding through public form 
indicate that mode is a cost-effective for meeting their financial (short and long-term) 
needs - all involved farms “always or often” have an access to outside financing when it is 
necessary. 
Part of State financing comes through hybrid modes. In some instances, these modes 
are purely public forms – when an international (e.g. European Union, World Bank, other 
donor) funds for farming support are match (shared) by the Government contribution (e.g. 
SAPARD, NAPARD etc.). In other cases, public credit goes through private banks. The 
later hybrid mode allows minimizing the overall costs for public lending since programs are 
executed (and risk bearded) by specialized private agents. Banks are much more efficient 
than public agencies in servicing credit supply, selecting clients, controlling contract terms, 
monitoring loan repayments, securing collateral etc51. In some cases the risk is assumed 
by the state agency against acquisition of agricultural land since most banks do not accept 
farmland as collateral. 
Other forms have also been practiced for direct or indirect public financing of farm 
activities: assisting farm associations and funding their activities; exemption form taxes on 
agricultural land and farm activities; guaranteed minimum prices for some products (e.g. 
tobacco); providing free agro-market information and extension service supply; public 
funding of agrarian research and innovation etc.  
These trilateral modes either assist (public funding, public in-house production, public 
provision etc.) important agrarian transactions which could not be carried out effectively 
through market or private modes; or accelerate development of “private” (or quasi-public) 
organization for collective supply which otherwise would not emerge; or they are 
associated with securing additional own (internal) finance for farms.  
Other instruments have also been used to facilitate market and private financing.  
                                                 
51
 For instance, the big number of bad dept-holders from SFA, the large share of unused (and later 
on canceled by EC) funds from SAPARD - to name just two “good” examples for low (bad) 
operational efficiency of public agencies in farm crediting. 
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For instance, a system of “trade with receipt on deposited grain in public warehouses” 
has been institutionalized. That has made possible separation of the moment of marketing 
from the inputs supply transactions. Consequently farms are able to use  grain-receipts as 
a collateral and to get a short-term lending for working capital while looking for the most 
favorable date for marketing (usually grain prices are lowest after harvesting time when 
needs for working capital for next season is high).         
A great number of smaller and mainly non-cooperative farms get outside supply from 
“European Union, World Bank, or another international farm program”. Targeting such 
weak (vulnerable) farm groups has been a policy priority for donors programs. In fact, up 
to EU accession in 2007 for all users of that mode of short-term finance, and for a 
significant share of long-tern debtors, that is the single mode available for external funding. 
Moreover, a great share of farms using above mode does not apply (have) any internal 
financing of activities. Other major reasons for short-term funding users for selecting that 
form are the simplified procedures and the lack of side-payments.  
In addition to that, the best interest rate and terms (unusually preferential) are also 
important factor for long-term debtors in choosing an international supplier. All participants 
in long-term international lending program point out there are able to find “always and 
often” external financing they need. Conversely, less than 12% of users of that mode are 
positive about their short-term needs.  
That is partly associated with a (long-term assistance) policy priority of donor 
agencies, partly with low costs for supervision of the efficiency of utilization of received 
loans. While it is easy to monitor the acquisition of new machinery, building of farm 
facilities, the real investments in working capital are often quite expensive to verify (e.g. 
amount of paid salaries, fees for services, short-term inputs in land etc.). 
Since the beginning of transition there have been a number of international 
institutional, Governmental, NGO`s etc. initiatives targeting farming in some regions 
(mountains, borders, less populated, undeveloped); or minority groups (Turkish, gypsies); 
or young (future) farmers; or segments of population (handicaps, drug users); or with 
specific purposes (education, extension, demonstration).  
All these forms for international intervention has come out to fill the gap when a 
national third party (Government, local authority, private) involvement in farm finance 
supply either failed (capacity and competence deficiency, lack of budget recourses) or has 
not been quite efficient (bad planning, mismanagement, corruption). 
For different types of surveyed farms there are diverse reasons for selecting the 
mode of a financial supply.  
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For majority of farms the most important factor for short-term credit supply is the 
immediate payments (best interest) and the terms related to financing. Dominant “market” 
criteria are essential for a good part of the registered middle-size farms as well. It means 
that official price and conditions (competition for available market and institutional sources) 
govern well the financing supply.  
However, for a big fraction of farms economizing on overall transacting costs (e.g. 
related paper works, side payments) is also important for choice of financing mode. In 
addition, receiving interlinked services and the tradition are crucial for larger operators. 
The later modes are associated with extra transacting benefits and further cost cuts.  
Nevertheless, for a great proportion of farms there is no alternative form for financial 
procurement. These farms do not have an access to another supplier, and they either 
have to accept financing situation (internal restrictions, bilateral relations, or monopoly 
situation) or to reduce farm size. 
Frequency of finance supply transactions “with a particular partner” (or “mainly with 
the same partner”) is quite high for all type of farms.  
High recurrence of relations between the same parties minimizes transaction costs 
since there are strong mutual incentives to continue bilateral relations and self-restrict 
opportunism. Besides, it is efficient to invest in relation-specific capital (building good 
reputation, gathering information about counterparts, developing trust and mechanisms for 
coordination, interlinking of exchange) because such costs can be easily recovered by 
multiple transactions.  
No more than 9% of surveyed farms report they “use many suppliers” for short-term 
and 12% for long-term crediting. As far as short-term financing is concerned, those are 
mainly large farms which have bigger needs for funding. They diversify suppliers according 
to investment characteristics (and minimize total costs for finance supply), or perform a 
strategy to avoid dependency from a sole lender. For long-term supply, these are 
predominately middle-size firms which can not assure their growing financial needs 
(associated with the strategy for expansion) from a single supplier.  
“State program” and “cooperative, farm organization” are chief short-term lenders for 
most farms indicating they use “always or mainly the same supplier” (80% and 64% 
accordingly). High frequency with “commercial banks” and “relatives, friends” is important 
for short-term financing of 39% and 28% of farms while recurrence of funding with outside 
investors is reported by few farms.  
For long-term repeated financing major sources are: “outside investor” (74%) and 
“State program” (52%). “Cooperative, farm organization” and “relatives, friends” are 
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significant for a good number of farms with unchangeable lenders (36% and 31% 
accordingly) while “foreign investor” - for around 7% of them.  
The regular (frequent) transactions between the same partners is an important factor 
for costs saving for both sides. Therefore, the above figures give some ideas about the 
most likely external creditors for further enlargement of farms. 
Organization of finance supply from a new supplier is usually associated with large 
costs (to find a “good” lender, negotiate satisfactory contract terms, present reliable 
guarantee, pay premium interests or side payments etc.). That is why no short-term 
funded farm and lees than 9% of long-term externally financed users “change partner 
every time”. Mostly smaller (exclusively unregistered and firm) farms look for a new 
supplier since they are having greater problems to find external funding (new comer, no 
proper collateral, greater financing needs for modernization and extension etc.). 
According to the managers of surveyed farms “the relationships with banks and the 
preparation of projects for crediting” takes high efforts and time for all farms (Table 5).  
For various types of farms the overall transacting costs for credit supply (both for 
“successful” and “failed” projects) are different. Their level is greatest for majority of large 
farms and firms, many middle-size farms and cooperatives, and a good number of 
unregistered and small farms.  
Different farms have unequal needs for external finance and divers potential (skills, 
reputation, ties) to govern credit supply. Nonetheless the superior amount of related costs 
in larger farms, their relative level (for a unit of transaction) is smaller since they can 
explore the economy of scale (and scope) on credit supplying activity (e.g. investing in 
specialized human or relation capital for dealing with lending agencies; negotiating a 
package credit contract for funding a number of activities etc.). 
Moreover, credited farms spent different efforts to deal with various suppliers. Only a 
minor share of farms with lenders outside investors, international program, and long-term 
banks and State program, report high efforts devoted for credit supply deals. At the same 
time, a relatively large portion of farms with high efforts are debtors to State and bank 
short-term crediting program, and “cooperative, farm organization” financing.  
The short-term financing from major suppliers is associated with larger transacting 
costs for farms because of the “short-term” nature of contract (and needs for periodical re-
contracting). Besides, transactions with outside investors are much more smoothly given 
the existing high bilateral (assets) dependency and the strong incentives to reach a deal 
with minimum costs.  
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Lastly, transacting efforts with international donors are small since these programs 
are strongly prioritized for particular type of farms - here “small number condition” prevails 
on both sides.  
For majority of surveyed farms “high collateral requirement” is the main factor limiting 
the financial supply.  
Most agrarian assets are highly farm-specific and therefore less suitable to be used 
as a guarantee for outside (e.g. non agrarian) supplier. Market value of such property is 
much lower than its in-farm significance. Thus external supplier wanting to safeguard 
lending transactions against possible opportunism (misuse, delay of return, or 
expropriation) demands “too high” securities from the farm’s point of view. Hence such a 
high requirement for “economic hostages” (or “unequal” exchange) restricts or even blocks 
the credit supply contracts.  
Yet another critical factor for numerous farms is the high price (interest and terms) of 
credit resources. Apparently many farms can not use financial funds effectively according 
to market criteria or requirements of lending organizations. 
Significant share of surveyed farms feel there is “no enough agrarian credit available 
in the country”. The high transaction costs make difficult the emergence of market and 
private modes for credit supply, and plentiful farms still have no access to external 
financing.  
For some part of farms “shortage of information about finance opportunities” is a 
principal reason complicating credit supply. Obviously information asymmetry is quite high 
in the area and for many farms it is too expensive (impossible) to get necessary 
information for funding possibilities.  
Finally, some farms face enormous credit related costs (for preparation of proposals, 
bureaucratic procedures, payments of fees and bribes etc.) which limits or make 
impossible finance supply transactions.   
Furthermore, a number of unwanted forms for off-farm finance supply have been 
broadly practiced. Delay of payments or non-payments by downstream partners 
(middlemen, processors etc.) has been widespread. That is in fact unwelcome (usually 
interest free) crediting of trading partners by farms. For the reason of strong unilateral 
dependency (monopoly) and (or) high enforcement costs of contracted terms (through 
inefficient and expensive court system) farms has to accept that form of “subsidized 
marketing”.  
Most farms with “bad experience” in that respect either under-invest in specific capital 
(changing or diversifying production structure, decreasing operations scale) or look for 
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more efficient forms for governing of (marketing) transactions such as requiring deposit 
and advance payment, using own organization (marketing cooperative) or personal 
contacts, internal integration (in-farm processing), joint investment with trading partners etc.  
Furthermore, a number of undesired off-farm “financing” has been  a common place 
as funding of private activities of corrupted government officials (informal stakeholders), or 
special interest groups in cooperatives and agro-companies; buying “security services” of 
criminal firms; loosing large equity or deposits in bankrupt banks and joint ventures etc. 
Accession of Bulgaria to EU and CAP implementation provides new funding 
opportunities for farms (for “agrarian and rural development“, “direct area-based payments 
to farms“, and “market support“). There is significant public financial resource for 
subsidizing farms, individual productions, farming organizations and essential activities 
such as: modernization, commercialization and diversification of farming; revival of 
traditional production and heritages; introduction of organic farming; maintaining 
biodiversity and environment; improving food safety and animal welfare; support for less-
favored areas and regions with environmental restrictions; infrastructural development etc. 
Available huge EU and national financing opens up new possibilities to resolve 
funding problems of agriculture (Figure 10). Nevertheless, due to restrictive criteria, 
unattainable formal requirement, high costs for participation, and widespread 
mismanagement (and corruption) the new public support is not effectively utilized and 
benefits unevenly different farms.  
In 2007 no public payment was made for projects associated with NPARD measures 
but area based payments for regions with handicaps. The progression in implementation 
of public support since 2007 has been very slow and far behind the targets (Table 12). 
Besides few successful areas52, the number of approved projects and public contracts has 
been insignificant while the amount of actually funded projects even smaller.  
What is more, the bulk of the public contracts and funding continues to go to a limited 
number of farms and many effective small-scale farms receive no or only a tiny fraction of 
the public support [Bachev 2010].   
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 Measure 112 “Setting up of young farmers”, Measure 211 “Payments to farmers in mountainous 
regions with handicaps”, and Measure 212 “Payments to farmers in regions with handicaps 
different from mountainous”. 
Table 12. Progress in implementation of 2007-2013 NPARD in Bulgaria 
 
Measure 
code 
December 31, 2008 December 31, 2009 August 23, 2010 
Approved  
projects 
Funding 
000 Euro 
Paid 
projects 
Funding 
000 Euro 
Approved  
projects 
Funding 
000 Euro 
Paid 
projects 
Funding 
000 Euro 
Approved  
projects 
Funding 
000 Euro 
Paid 
projects 
Funding 
000 Euro 
111 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 764 0 0 
% target 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - na - 0 - 
112 461 10616 41 512 2261 53009 1435 17974 4085 102125 4031 50384 
%  target  11.25 - 0.10 - 55.20 - 35.03 - 99.73 - 98.41 - 
121 365 60933 0 0 1502 156169 576 71427 1920 247476 1274 153950 
% target 6.77 6.27 0.00 0.00 27.86 16.09 10.69 7.36 35.62 25.49 23.64 15.86 
122 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
123 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 36 23829 2 1638 
% target 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.81 4.41 0,32 0.30 
141 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 708 5310 671 10059 
% target 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 3.37 - 0.32 - 
142 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
143 982 2 982 2 2525 779 2525 779 6621 2132 6621 2132 
% target 3.62 - 3.62 - 9.30 - 9.30 - 24.38 - 24.38 - 
211 24026 23882 24026 23882 26104 41978 26104 41978 26104 na 26104 na 
% target 40.04 - 40.04 - 43.50 - 43.50 - 43.50 - 43.50 - 
212 10017 7562 9977 7562 10785 12137 10785 12137 10785 na 10785 na 
% target 100.17 - 99.77 - 107.85 - 107.85 - 107.85 - 107.85 - 
214 1120 4839 1058 2448 1781 5034 1781 5034 1781 na 1781 na 
% target 2.80 - 2.64 - 4.45 - 4.45 - 4.45 - 4.45 - 
223 0 0 0 0 20 610 0 0 37 2320 0 0 
% target 0.00 - 0.00 - 1.00  0.00 - 1.85 - 0 - 
226 0 0 0 0 18 848 0 0 23 1107 23 1107 
% target 0.00 - 0.00 - 0.90 - 0.00 - 2.30 - 2.30 - 
311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 425 0 0 
% target 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0.09 0 - - 
312 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 88 13832 0 0 
% target 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 2.09 - - - 
313 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
321 0 0 0 0 72 123461 0 0 123 197446 94 78487 
% target 0.00 - 0.00 - 4.77 - 0.00 - 8.15 46.19 6.22 18.36 
322 0 0 0 0 144 81208 0 0 156 89771 133 37819 
% target 0.00 - 0.00 - 18.00 - 0.00 - 19.50 43.07 16.62 18.14 
431-32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 103 8461 11 142 
% target 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 7.92 - 0.84 - 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
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6. MANAGEMENT OF FARM INSURANCE SUPPLY 
 
During much of the transition Bulgarian farms had no access to specialized insurance 
products since they were either unavailable or too expensive [Bachev 2000].  
Agrarian insurance market has been developing in last several years but it is not 
widely used by farms. Our survey has proved that the only exception is insuring against 
“bad meteorological conditions” (hail, frost etc.), and “fires and natural disaster” which are 
practiced by a great number of large cooperative and business farms (Table 13). 
The larger farms have stronger incentives to sell the risk because they are highly 
specialized huge operators, and in the case of a risky event damages are significant. 
Besides, they have bigger financial means to insure crops, animals, and related assets. In 
some cases, they are in position to negotiate more favorable terms than bulk of the farms 
(big contracting power, economy of scale, available on farm experts or outside expertise).  
Moreover, a “purchase of insurance” is usually explicitly requested by banks and/or 
public agencies for participating in diverse commercial and public support programs. The 
main users of short-term (bank, Government) credits are the big cereals farms. Similarly, 
long-term credits are mostly taken by the larger grain, fruits and grape producers.  
Since the risk of crop failure is immense the lending banks or public agencies require 
their collateral (future yields, milking-cows, vineries) to be protected (“insured”) from 
possible losses. Despite (un)willingness the farmers have to pay the supplementary price 
for insurance supply in order to obtain “interlinked” outside funding. In this case, related 
risk is carried by a specialized market supplier (insurance company rather than bank or 
public agency) and debtor-farms are charged with extra costs to assure needed bank loan 
or public support. 
The rest of the farms use other forms to insure their products and assets such as: 
diversification of production, geographical remoteness of individual plots, hiring full-time 
specialists (e.g. pest control expert, agronomist), employing private security guards etc.  
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Table 13. Governing of insurance supply in farms (percent of farms) 
 
Objects Type of insurance Unregi- 
stered 
Coopera- 
tives 
Agro 
firms 
Small Middle 
size 
Large 
 
 
 
Grain 
Burglary 6,25 14,29 0,00 6,25 4,55 12,50 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 
18,75 60,71 71,9 28,13 54,55 81,25 
Diseases and pests 6,25 21,43 18,7 3,13 29,55 0,00 
Fires and natural 
disasters 
31,25 71,43 87,5 37,50 75,00 81,25 
 
 
Vegetables 
Burglary 0,00 0,00 6,25 0,00 4,55 0,00 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 
6,25 0,00 12,5 6,25 0,00 25,00 
Diseases and pests 3,13 0,00 0,00 3,13 0,00 0,00 
Fires and natural 
disasters 
3,13 7,14 0,00 3,13 4,55 0,00 
 
 
 
Fruits and  
grape 
Burglary 18,75 0,00 21,9 18,75 15,91 0,00 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 
3,13 32,14 21,9 3,13 27,27 25,00 
Diseases and pests 15,63 17,86 3,13 18,75 11,36 0,00 
Fires and natural 
disasters 
3,13 25,00 21,9 3,13 22,73 25,00 
 
 
 
Meat  
animals 
Burglary 9,09 35,71 30,0 8,00 28,00 66,67 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 
0,00 7,14 5,00 0,00 8,00 0,00 
Diseases and pests 0,00 14,29 15,0 4,00 8,00 33,33 
Fires and natural 
disasters 
0,00 28,57 0,00 0,00 16,00 0,00 
 
 
Milk  
animals 
Burglary 0,00 21,43 50,0 0,00 36,00 66,67 
Bad meteorological 
conditions 
9,09 7,14 0,00 8,00 4,00 0,00 
Diseases and pests 9,09 28,57 15,0 12,00 16,00 33,33 
Fires and natural 
disasters 
0,00 42,86 0,00 0,00 24,00 0,00 
 
Others 
Burglary 0,00 7,14 0,00 0,00 4,55 0,00 
Diseases and pests 2,70 0,00 0,00 2,70 0,00 0,00 
Fires and natural 
disasters 
8,11 14,29 0,00 10,81 6,82 0,00 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
In Bulgaria there is not an effective public system (police, municipal guards, court 
etc.) for protection and recovery of (“absolute rights”) and punishment of offenders. 
Farmers are among the most vulnerable for individual thieves and organized crimes since 
much of farm outputs and property is “in the open”, and dispersed in wide areas and many 
locations.  
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Therefore, agrarian property is widely assured by private modes and “costs for 
protection” for all surveyed farms are significant in terms of time and resources spent, 
hired security guards and services, “payments for property protection and restoration” etc. 
A good number of small farms do not use any public (collective) modes for insuring 
risk and face constantly severe hazards and damages.  
The main reasons for avoiding market supply of insurance are the high (unaffordable) 
premiums, unfavorable terms of insurance contracts (not-tailored to particular conditions of 
an individual farm), and low satisfaction from the services of commercial insurance 
providers (frequent disputes about the terms of contracts and extend of harms, lengthy 
delays of payment for damages etc.).  
Consequently, a great part of farming resources and activities is not assured (insuring 
labor is practically absent, most animal, machineries and buildings are uncovered etc.), 
and a considerable majority of farmers bear the entire risk of failures. 
Despite the potential efficiency (non-for-profit organization, members orientation, 
tailoring products to farms needs) the collective modes for farm insurance have not 
evolved in the country. Here the high transaction costs for initiation and development of 
large member organization, and conflicting interests of different farms etc. impedes that 
process.  
Moreover, an effective public intervention has not been undertaken to assist (initiate, 
support, legislate) farmers in organization of (“quasi-public”, “quasi-private”) mode for 
collective supply of agrarian insurance. Neither badly needed agrarian guarantee and/or 
compensation fund has been launched. Subsequently, a good part of affected smaller and 
middle-size farms (having little internal capacity to bear yield failures and property 
damages) experience severe looses, and see the scale of their operations (assets, 
financial means) and welfare further decreased. 
In last few years, the public veterinary, disease, technology etc. control and 
emergency assistance to farms have been enhanced - e.g. isolation and distortion of 
endangered animals, compensation of farms etc. These measures aim at protecting 
against significant industry and/or public risk(s) from certain diseases and epidemics – e.g. 
mad cow disease, foot and mouth disease, avian influenza etc. They have been driven by 
the public concern for potentially huge economic losses for farms, related industries, 
export, and/or human health hazards.  
Furthermore, some farms have got public aid to cover losses (or recover) from recent 
natural disasters – floods, rainstorms, mudslides, and extreme droughts. The later modes 
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have been incidental and affected mostly larger operators having incentives and capacity 
to deal with complicated (and costly) bureaucratic procedures. 
Finally, competition in insurance industry has been increasing in recent years 
(including with foreign players). The later leads to an enlargement of the range of specific 
products offered for meet diverse insurance needs of farms. Nevertheless, the high 
assurance and related costs, and the targeted (to larger operators) policies of insurance 
providers make these products inaccessible to a great fraction of Bulgarian farms. 
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6. MANAGEMENT OF MARKETING OF FARM PRODUCTS 
 
A significant part of Bulgarian farms sells only surpluses of major commodity products 
(Figure 22). The portion of subsistence and semi-market farms among censured 
unregistered holdings is particularly high as less than thirty nine percent of them report 
selling products and for more than fifty percent those are surpluses not consumed by 
households [MAF]. 
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Figure 22. Share of farms selling regularly and only surpluses in Bulgaria 
 
Majority of surveyed farms market their output through some form of sell out deals as 
share of output governed by that mode of realization accounts for a significant part of the 
brut output of farms (Table 14). Most farm produces have “mass” standardized character 
and therefore free market prices or standard sell contract (spot market or wholesale 
market deals, classical contracts) govern effectively relationships with buyers. 
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Insignificant number of farms manages their marketing trough a special long-term 
contract for outside processing. However, portion of the output governed with such special 
mode reaches a good part of the overall output in respective farms. That form is most 
common for large farms.  
Necessity for a special contract form for governing the long-term relations with 
processing industries is caused by a high frequencies of transactions between same 
partners, big transacting uncertainty (price, behavioral), and existence of some form of 
asset dependency with downstream partners. High mutual (capacity, time of delivery, 
quality specifications) or unilateral dependency (negotiation power, monopoly situation) is 
often responsible for the preference to a special private mode for carrying out of farm 
marketing. Simple sells across “free” market would create serious transacting difficulties 
and could restrict or entirely block marketing. Therefore, instead of unreliable (and 
expensive) spot or classical contract, a long-term delivery contract is used to overcome 
transacting problems and minimize related costs. 
Complete (in-farm, ownership) integration is the most effective mean to govern 
“marketing” for highly dependant transactions when possibility to realize economy of scale 
(or scope) could be effectively explored within farm boundaries. Instead of (off-farm) 
marketing in-farm production consumption (diversification into inputs supply) or in-farm 
processing (diversification into processing activity) take place.  
Number of surveyed farms which entirely integrate “output realization” (within farm 
boundaries) is great as share of output governed in that way is significant. For instance, 
almost all livestock farms integrate the forage production, one completely different (namely 
a crop production) activity, overcoming of big uncertainty and risk associated with critical to 
livestock operations market or outside supply. 
The vertical integration is an effective alternative way for optimization of farm size to 
horizontal (one or more products) enlargement of farm boundaries. When it is too costly to 
trade on open (free) market for inputs procurements or marketing of farm outputs (big 
uncertainty, high unilateral dependency and possibility for opportunistic behavior, missing 
markets situation) then internal organization (in-farm production, in-farm processing) is an 
effective managerial response to market and/or contract “failures”. In-farm integration of 
transactions would be undertaken only if there is a significant costs economizing potential 
comparing to off-farm trade.  
. 
 Table 14. Directions for realization of outputs of farms (percent of farms) 
 
 
 
Type of farm 
Share of farms using output for: Share of brut output for: 
Household 
consumpti
on 
In-farm 
consumpti
on 
In-farm 
process
ing 
Long-term 
contract 
for outside 
processing 
Sell Household 
consumpti
on 
In-farm 
consum
ption 
In-farm 
processi
ng 
Long-term 
contract for 
outside 
processing 
Sell 
Unregistered 81.08 40.54 21.62 5.41 100.0 18.57 18.00 16.25 10.00 73.59 
Cooperative 46.43 64.29 14.29 3.57 100.0 12.46 24.00 19.50 40.00 74.93 
Firm 43.75 56.25 40.63 6.25 78.13 20.79 26.11 38.08 10.00 76.96 
Small-size 86.49 45.95 16.22 0.00 100.0 20.09 18.53 18.33 0.00 71.14 
Middle-size 40.91 40.91 31.82 4.55 93.18 16.78 34.00 25.93 10.00 75.68 
Large 43.75 43.75 31.25 18.75 75.00 9.29 35.00 46.00 20.00 84.17 
Total 58.76 43.30 25.77 5.15 92.78 17.72 27.90 28.12 16.00 74.94 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
 However, internal organization of new and not-specialized activities (diversification 
into new production, processing, retailing) is inevitably associated with an increase on 
internal transaction and/or production costs. When these costs are prohibitively high 
comparing to the benefit then internal organization fails, and activity is not carried at 
“effective” scale or blocked at all (“small” farms, backward technology development, 
unsustainable structures etc.). 
 “Own consumption” or “giving to relatives and friends” has been traditionally a basic 
mode for realization of output which is still dominating in majority of surveyed farms. This 
form of “direct marketing” is associated with low or zero costs (no searching costs, easy 
planning of demand, facile exchange), and a number of extra benefits such as non-for 
profit activity, full information about technology and origin of produce, interlinking with other 
activities etc. 
Finally, a good part of surveyed farms take part in service providing transactions. This 
form of marketing of farm services (instead of farm outputs) is more common for 
cooperatives and firms, and middle-size and large farms. Agrarian services occupy around 
13% of the product of service supply farms. Thus involvement in this kind of contracts is 
associated with utilization of free equipment and labor rather than with investment in 
specific assets for organization of agrarian services. In these instances, it is equally 
unprofitable (high transacting costs) both trading of temporally free resources (leasing out 
of equipment and machinery; selling out labor) and further specialization into services 
(service trading). 
Dominant modes for governing of marketing are quite specific for different farm 
products (Figure 23).  
Some market agent (mainly firms, and to the less extend farms or cooperatives) is 
broadly used for marketing of all products. That form is more often used for marketing of 
vegetables, grains, and meat from all type crop and livestock farms. Here standardization 
of products and technologies is higher, and thus market (prices, quality standards, 
competition) governs effectively relations with downstream partners. There is no any need 
to develop or use any special (private) form to carry out transacting, and the classical trade 
(across market) with a specialized market agent (a middle man) dominates. 
When specificity of farm products to a particular buyer (e.g. processor) increases then 
direct marketing contracts with respective partners are commonly used.  
Firm-processor is the major buyer for vegetables, fruits and grape, and milk for all 
kind of farms. Since product specification (special technology, special origin, special time 
 141 
of delivery, freshens) is important for a particular buyer(s), and strong site-specificity is in 
place (single buyer in the region, big capacity dependency), and frequency of transacting 
with a particular partner is high, facilitating vertical links through direct and tight-up delivery 
contracts is important for both sides.  
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Figure 23. Modes for marketing of major farm outputs (percent of farms) 
 
Marketing relations are usually coupled with development of specific capital for trade 
with the particular partner (modes for planning of production and deliveries, controlling 
qualities, dispute resolutions, interlinking marketing with finance and/or inputs supply). 
Such quasi integrating modes intensify and harmonize relationships, and minimize overall 
transaction costs for processor and farms alike. Tight-up marketing contracts with a firm-
processor are also practiced by a half of middle-size livestock farms for meat sells, and by 
a three-forth of large crop farms for grain trade. 
Furthermore, closely coordinated contracts for wholesale marketing to shops, hotels, 
and restaurants are also often applied when control on freshens, origin, quality, tile of 
delivery etc. of farm products is especially important – mainly fruits and grape, and meat; 
and to lesser extend milk and vegetables. This mode of marketing is particularly 
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widespread in management of relations between large agro-firm meat producers and such 
wholesale counterparts. 
Direct export is carried out by one tenth of grain, and fruit and grape producers. That 
forms permit to realize full benefits from trading at international markets when profit margin 
is quite significant (wheat, sunflower, fruits and grapes with special origin and quality etc.). 
Direct export is practiced by relatively larger farms which could make and return-back 
investment in specialized capital for such trade (e.g. experience, market information, 
personal ties, special origin and quality of products etc.). 
“Best prices”, “low costs”, and “maximum security” are main reasons for preferring the 
form of marketing to “another farmer, cooperative or firm” by all type of surveyed farms. 
Besides, a good part of farms report they have “many buyers”, and therefore faceless 
(rather than personal) relations dominate and the market mediates effectively transactions 
between agents.  
Frequency of deals with “the same partner” for a large share of farms is high: 37% of 
them “mainly” or “always” sell to the same agent, and only 2% of farms change the buyer 
every time (season). Big repetition of relations between the same counterparts restrict 
information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior, develop mutual trust and mechanisms 
for facilitating transactions (modes of planning, payment, guarantee, dispute resolution), 
and diminish the overall transacting costs. That is why for the larger operators the constant 
trade with a single buyer is the main mode for organization of marketing deals. 
Traditional form of wholesale market trade is used mainly by fruits and grape, and 
vegetables producers. Here standardization of products is quite developed and critical 
quality margins easily (cheaply) controlled by anonymous traders. This mode is more 
significant for the middle-size firms while majority of surveyed farms still more rely on other 
effective ways for marketing of outputs.  
Number of farms employing commodity exchange for marketing of output is even 
smaller. It concerns mainly some vegetables, fruits, and grains which have commodity 
(highly standardized) character and where (current and future) trade is not associated with 
great transacting (fees, measurement, enforcement, disputing etc.) expenses. 
Main motives for selecting the wholesale market by majority of using farms are the 
“best prices”, “low costs”, and “minimum risk”. That mode is most important for middle-
sized unregistered and cooperative farms. For all farms applying wholesaling the repetition 
of marketing on a particular market is rare (place is changed every time). It means that 
accessible (regional) wholesale market (s) do not give equal opportunities and farmers 
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have to select (change) particular market according to their profiting expectation (demand, 
price level, transportation costs etc).  
Direct retail marketing to final consumers is also practiced by some farms, and it is 
chiefly important for vegetables. It takes various forms - from on-spot “street” or “along the 
road” sells, through trade “on farm” or “farmers markets”, to a customized “home delivery”. 
Here freshens, appearance, origin, production technology (e.g. organic farming) of 
delivered products is extremely important for consumers.  
This mode does not involve big volumes and serve local customers and visitors (e.g. 
tourists). Despite “superior” sell costs (smaller amounts of deals) this form allows to realize 
“full” (retail) benefits of marketing and to get higher pay-off on investments in special 
capital - special varieties, origin, and quality of farm products; elaborated personal (client) 
relationships with buyers etc.  
While most farms practicing retail trade deal with many buyers, for around 10% of 
them (smaller holdings) clientalisation takes place and they have always the same buyer. 
In addition, cooperatives are traditionally used to supply basic food (e.g. meat, cheese) for 
their members and rural communities.  
Surveyed farms notify that “best prices”, “maximum profit” and “low costs” are the 
chief reasons for preferences to the retail form of marketing. However, in many cases the 
direct marketing by smaller producers is illegal – e.g. meat and milk do not correspond to 
formal hygiene and sanitary standards; traded vine is not certified etc.   
Member (own) cooperative is used only for a part of fruits and grape, and grain 
marketing.  
The collective mode of marketing (marketing or general purpose cooperative) is 
associated with a number of transacting benefits unachievable by individual farms – 
economy of scale and scope of marketing activities (search, promotion, operational etc. 
costs savings), better negotiating positions, interlinking transactions with storing, 
transportation, retails etc. That is why this form is common only for non-large farms.  
“Maximum security”, “low costs” and “best prices” are identified as major factors for 
using the own cooperative for marketing. Intensity of sell transacting through that mode is 
high and all applying farms “always” or ““mainly” use the same cooperative for marketing 
outputs.  
Nevertheless, despite the great potential for governing of transactions (non-for-profit 
member-owned organization) this mode is not widely used by farms – as little more than 
4% of surveyed farms are members of marketing cooperatives. In transitional conditions 
development and maintenance costs of cooperative organization are quite high and 
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majority of farms prefer to use other (more effective) market and private modes for 
governing relations with other agents.  
Selling out to state reserve is important marketing channel for a good number of 
registered and larger grain producers. State purchase contract is “preferred mode” for 
large farms since it gives a number of transacting advantages – a “stable” demand, a good 
price, a secure payment, low negotiation and enforcement costs.  
However, the total amount of marketed grain through that mode is relatively small. In 
certain years before EU accession there are incidences to use state purchase and sells as 
a mean to stabilize market prices as well53.  
“Minimum risk” and “tradition” are the most common factors for preferring the state 
agency as a partner by farms.  
Intra-farm (own) processing of farm output is most important for realization of fruits 
and grape, and to lesser extend for meat and milk.  
This mode of “internal marketing” is mainly practiced by larger farms. Namely the 
larger operational size and the high frequency of transacting give an economic opportunity 
for internal exploration of inter-dependant assets (in farming and processing).  
On the other hand vertical integration let to protect dependant investments and to 
pay-off from marketing of final (processed) products – getting full profit (on farm and food 
products), trade with special brand names, lessen market dependency (easy storage and 
transportation) etc.  
Most often cited reasons for intra-farm (production) “consumption” of farming 
products are “maximum security”, “maximum profit” and “minimum risk”. 
Interlinked contracts are frequently used by surveyed farms where a supplier also 
“purchases the farm output”. To the greatest extend these contracts are applied with the 
suppliers of seeds, chemicals, forage, and animals.  
This form is an indicator for emerging or existing (quasi, complete) vertical integration 
of farming carried out through tight up marketing and inputs supply contracts. Usually 
integrator is a large farmer, trader or processor (mostly seeds and animal dealers, milk or 
meat processors).  This form of governance “secure” inputs supply of needed farm 
products and row materials (in particular periods, quantities, qualities, origins) of the 
integrator through interlinking the critical inputs supply to farms. 
In some instances, the outside integrator own the technological know-how or 
exclusive rights on agrarian products (variety of seeds, breads of animals etc.) and 
                                                 
53
 Since 2007 EU CAP is applied having “market intervention” as a main pillar.  
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contract the mass production with respective farms. In these cases, the integrator is the 
exclusive supplier of farms with these inputs (produced or distributed by integrator).  
In other instances, the integrator “organizes” supply of critical to farming inputs (e.g. 
forage) in order to guarantee the quality of needed farm products (e.g. row milk). This 
mode is preferred by farms since it allows economizing on transacting costs for supply of 
critical inputs and marketing of major products. 
In a good portion of farms “supplier assists sells” and that is particularly truth for large 
farms for supply of forage and animals; for a significant share of smaller farms for seeds 
supply; and for a part of middle-size and cooperative farms for chemical supply.  
This “free of charge mediation” in organization of marketing deals (interlinking supply 
with a new service of mediation) makes a particular supplier preferred among competitors. 
It secure a stable (or increasing) demand of material inputs from a particular farms while 
for participating farms that “trilateral” organization minimizes costs of marketing of final 
output restricting associated uncertainty.  
For majority of surveyed farms (including all unregistered and small farms) there is an 
alternative buyer (s) and they are in a position to chose the most effective way for (and 
thus to govern) marketing of outputs. Only 5% of surveyed farms report they have a single 
buyer, and therefore face a unilateral dependency (monopoly) situation.  
Most commercialized farms confront to the greatest extend the “missing” market 
situation - more than 12% of the largest farms. The lack of markets is particularly vital for 
vegetable producers where according to one-forth of them (exclusively middle-sized firms) 
there are no buyers of output at all. Missing market situation is also being faced by a good 
part of grain producers which accounts for as much as 12% of the large and the 
cooperative farms. Apparently a significant number of commercial vegetable and grain 
farms “overproduce” or can not effectively meet the “market demand” for quality and 
packing requirements, acceptable prices etc. for farm products.  
In addition, for a significant number of farms “there is no information for buyer” which 
makes marketing of vegetables and grain difficult.   
“Low prices” and “unstable prices” are the main problems for marketing of all sort of 
farm produce in all surveyed farms. It proves that majority of farms are still not able to 
react effectively to market competition and (seasonal) fluctuation of market prices.  
Besides, “lack of price information” is an important factor obstructing marketing of 
grain, fruits and vegetables. Asymmetry of information in all but vegetables markets is 
quite significant and a good portion of farms feel that “buyer is better informed” which 
impedes marketing.  
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As far as major factors for successful marketing are concerned for all products the 
most important for farms are the “beneficial prices” and the “mutual benefits for partners”.  
On the other hand only negligible number of farms consider outside intervention (a 
“third party support”) as crucial for the marketing deals. Moreover, a minor share of farms 
(fruits and grape producers being exception) regards the “lack of competition” as critical for 
the effective organization of marketing.  
All these prove that for most farms the expectations for well working markets (and 
thus for a fair unassisted exchange) is the most important factors for marketing of farm 
produces. 
“Unreliability of the buyer” is among the chief factor impeding marketing of surveyed 
farms. With small exceptions (in marketing of vegetables of larger farms) tendency for 
opportunistic behavior of buyers dominates. Irrelevant to the type of farms most surveyed 
farms are a vulnerable side having no reliable (personal, private, public) mechanisms to 
control the opportunism of downstream partners.  
Moreover, for a significant number of fruit and grape, vegetables, meat and milk 
producers the “breach of contracts” is a major problem in marketing deals. In addition, for 
majority of smaller farms the “enforcement of contract terms” is a serious problem. 
For the vegetables, fruits and grape, meat, and milk it is often very difficult to 
formulate in a written (contract) form and to dispute negotiated provisions for quality and 
quantity variations, time of delivery, sequential obligations of either partners etc. Besides, 
contract enforcement for perishable products through a third party is quite expensive or 
impossible at all (technical feasibility, slow or ineffectively working court system). That is 
why some small and inexperienced farms are experiencing essential problems with 
marketing contracts and enforcement of contract terms. 
As far as main factors for successful marketing is concerned the “trust” and the “good 
intention of partners” are important for all type of producers. “Tradition” also plays a bigger 
role in effective sell for some part of surveyed farms. All that means that informal 
governing mechanisms (such as trust, long-term personal relations, self-restriction of 
opportunism, self-enforcement of contract) are considered as extremely important for the 
successful organization of marketing deals of farms.  
Besides, the “existence of written contracts” is a critical factor for marketing of 
vegetables, fruit and grape, and milk while the “oral agreements” are important for 
vegetables and meat producers. The later confirms that for more “delicate” (perishable) 
farm products a contract coordination (price, quality, quantity etc. adjustments) is essential 
and necessary for the effective organization of transacting.  
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Our survey has found out that majority of farms put great efforts and time for “finding 
markets for marketing of farm outputs”. The high costs of marketing are particularly typical 
for middle-size and large registered farms. These farms are the most commercialized and 
their overall efficiency strongly depends on the efficiency of marketing organization. That is 
why these farms invest (“efforts and costs”) to a greater extend in marketing than other 
farms.  
Nevertheless, while the general level of costs for finding best markets in larger farms 
is high, the relative level of transacting costs (per unit of output) is presumably lower than 
is small(er) farms. The larger operational size allows exploring economies of scale and 
scope of marketing activity, gives better negotiating and enforcement positions, and let 
effective investment in specific capital for marketing such as information costs, 
advertisement, product promotion, development of reputation and brand names, 
organization for a direct trade etc. 
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Chapter 16 
 
 
7. COMPETITIVENESS OF COMMERCIAL FARMS   
 
Our assessment on the competitiveness of commercial farms in the country has 
found out that the majority of surveyed farms 54 are with a good and high competitiveness 
(Figure 24). Nevertheless, more than a fifth of all farms are with a low level of 
competitiveness. 
Furthermore, different types and kinds of farms are with unequal competitiveness. 
Diverse agri-firms (Sole traders and Companies) are with good competitive positions 
and the portion of enterprises with high competitiveness is particularly big. On the other 
hand, a quarter of cooperatives are with insufficient competiveness.  
 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
All farms
Unregistered
Cooperatives
Firms
Field crops
Crop-livestock
Mix crops
Mix livestock
Grazing livestock 
Pigs and poultry
Permanent crops
Vegetables
Low
Good
High
 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
Figure 24. Share of farms with different levels of competitiveness in Bulgaria 
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 This chapter of the book is based on interviews with farm managers of 58 unregistered holdings, 
104 cooperatives, and 18 agri-firms conducted in the middle of 2010. 
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Most of the highly competitive farms are specialized in mix livestock55 and vegetables. 
For all other groups of specialization, the farms with a good competitiveness comprise the 
greatest share in respective groups. In mix crop-livestock, mix crops and permanent crops 
every forth farm is non-competitive. 
The analysis of different aspects of the farms competitiveness shows that the farms’ 
low productivity, profitability and funding availability, and insufficient adaptability to market, 
institutional and natural environment, and serious problems in financial and innovation 
supply and in marketing of products and services, all contribute to the greatest extend to 
decreasing the overall level of farms competitiveness (Figure 25). 
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 Figure 25. Importance of individual elements of farm competitiveness in Bulgaria 
 
The analysis of the level of efficiency of diverse type of farms shows that majority of 
farms have a good productivity, profitability, financial availability and financial 
independence (Table 15).  
However, according to the managers of a considerable number of unregistered 
holdings, and grazing livestock, pigs and poultry, and mix crop-livestock farms the 
productivity of their farms is low.  
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 The number of surveyed farms in groups with specialization in “Mix livestock”, “Grazing 
livestock”, and “Pigs and poultry” is very small (only 2). 
  
Table 15. Share of farms with different level of efficiency in Bulgaria (percent) 
 
Type of farms 
Productivity Profitability Financial availability Financial dependency 
low good high low good high low good high low average high 
Unregistered 44,83 48,28 6,90 51,72 37,93 10,34 62,07 20,69 17,24 51,72 34,48 13,79 
Cooperatives 11,54 84,62 1,92 26,92 73,08 0,00 25,00 75,00 0,00 23,08 53,85 23,08 
Firms 11,11 55,56 33,33 33,33 55,56 11,11 33,33 55,56 11,11 22,22 55,56 22,22 
Field crops 15,69 74,51 9,80 29,41 64,71 5,88 29,41 60,78 9,804 25,49 54,9 19,61 
Mix crop-livestock 38,46 46,15 7,69 46,15 53,85 0,00 46,15 46,15 7,69 46,15 38,46 15,38 
Mix crops 33,33 66,67 0,00 50,00 50,00 0,00 41,67 58,33 0,00 33,33 50,00 16,67 
Mix livestock 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 
Grazing livestock  100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 
Pigs and poultry 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 
Permanent crops 0,00 100,00 0,00 25,00 75,00 0,00 62,50 37,50 0,00 37,5 25,00 37,50 
Vegetables 33,33 66,67 0,00 33,33 66,67 0,00 33,33 66,67 0,00 33,33 33,33 33,33 
All farms 22,22 70,00 6,67 35,56 60,00 4,44 37,78 55,56 6,67 32,22 47,78 20,00 
   Source: interviews with farm managers 
Furthermore, profitability of 36% of all farms is evaluated as low, and more than a half 
of unregistered farms, and a considerable fraction of mix crop-livestock, mix crops, grazing 
livestock, and pigs and poultry farms are in this group.  
A significant portion of farm managers declare that availability of finance is insufficient, 
and unregistered holdings, farms specialized in mix crop-livestock, mix crops, grazing 
livestock, pigs and poultry, and permanent crops, suffer the most from the lack of funding.  
Only a fifth of survey farms are heavily dependent from outside funding (credit, state 
support etc.) as share of highly dependent farms specialized in permanent crops and 
vegetables is the greatest. 
The analysis of the level of adaptability of surveyed farms has found out that more 
than a quarter of them are with a low potential for adaptation to new state and EU quality, 
safety, environmental etc. standards, almost 37% are less adaptable to market demand, 
prices and competition, and every other one is inadaptable to evolving natural environment 
(warning, extreme weather, droughts, floods, etc.) (Table 16). 
 
Table 16. Share of farms with different level of adaptability in Bulgaria (percent) 
 
Type of farm 
Adaptability to: 
market institutions nature 
low good high low good high low good high 
Unregistered 51,72 48,28 0,00 31,03 68,97 0,00 37,93 55,17 6,90 
Cooperatives 34,62 65,38 0,00 23,08 71,15 5,77 61,54 36,54 0,00 
Firms 0,00 66,67 33,33 22,22 22,22 55,56 22,22 44,44 33,33 
Field crops 41,18 54,90 3,92 21,57 64,71 13,73 54,90 41,18 3,92 
Crop-livestock 38,46 61,54 0,00 38,46 61,54 0,00 38,46 61,54 0,00 
Mix crops 25,00 75,00 0,00 16,67 83,33 0,00 58,33 25,00 16,67 
Mix livestock 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 
Grazing livestock  100,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 
Pigs and poultry 100,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 
Permanent crops 25,00 75,00 0,00 37,50 62,50 0,00 50,00 37,50 0,00 
Vegetables 0,00 66,67 33,33 33,33 33,33 33,33 0,00 66,67 33,33 
All farms 36,67 60,00 3,33 25,56 65,56 8,89 50,00 43,33 5,56 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
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As far as farm medium-term sustainability is concerned, it is evaluated by 29% of the 
farms managers as low. The share of unregistered holdings, grazing livestock, and pigs 
and poultry farms with a small sustainability is the biggest (Figure 25). 
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Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
Figure 27. Share of farms with different levels of medium-term sustainability in 
Bulgaria 
 
On the other hand, less that 7% of all farms “forecast” a high mid-term sustainability. 
A particular type of firms – the companies, is the only exception among surveyed farms, 
and two-third of these enterprises envisages being highly sustainable in years to come. 
Detailed analysis of the diverse factors diminishing farms long-term efficiency and 
sustainability indicates that the significant problems in the effective marketing of products 
and services, and in the effective supply of needed innovation and know-how, are the most 
important for the good part of surveyed farms (Table 17). Apparently, the later farms have 
no (internal) adaptation potential to overcome these type of problems and will be 
unsustainable (inefficient) is a longer run56.  
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 These farms either have to restructure production, or reorganize farm (new governance), or will 
disappear in near future. 
 Table 17. Share of farms with different level of problems of farm sustainability in Bulgaria (percent) 
 
 
Type of 
problems 
All 
farms Unregistered Cooperatives Firms 
Field 
crops 
Crop-
livestock 
Mix 
crops 
Mix 
livestock 
Grazing 
livestock 
Pigs & 
poultry 
Permanent 
crops Vegetables 
Effective supply of needed land and natural resources 
Insignificant 23,33 37,93 17,31 11,11 23,53 15,38 25,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 25,00 33,33 
Normal 61,11 44,83 67,31 77,78 62,75 69,23 66,67 100,00 100,00 0,00 37,50 33,33 
Significant 14,44 17,24 13,46 11,11 13,73 15,38 8,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 25,00 33,33 
Effective supply of needed labor           
Insignificant 34,44 51,72 26,92 22,22 33,33 30,77 33,33 0,00 0,00 100,00 50,00 33,33 
Normal 51,11 31,03 61,54 55,56 50,98 53,85 58,33 100,00 0,00 0,00 50,00 33,33 
Significant 14,44 17,24 11,54 22,22 15,69 15,38 8,33 0,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 33,33 
Effective supply of needed inputs           
Insignificant 32,22 48,28 25,00 22,22 29,41 46,15 41,67 0,00 100,00 100,00 12,50 0,00 
Normal 56,67 31,03 69,23 66,67 66,67 30,77 50,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 62,50 33,33 
Significant 11,11 20,69 5,77 11,11 3,92 23,08 8,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 25,00 66,67 
Effective supply of needed finance           
Insignificant 30,00 55,17 13,46 44,44 31,37 38,46 25,00 0,00 0,00 100,00 0,00 66,67 
Normal 54,44 20,69 73,08 55,56 56,86 30,77 66,67 100,00 0,00 0,00 75,00 33,33 
Significant 14,44 24,14 11,54 0,00 9,80 30,77 8,33 0,00 100,00 0,00 25,00 0,00 
Effective supply of needed services           
Insignificant 48,89 51,72 44,23 66,67 49,02 46,15 66,67 0,00 0,00 100,00 37,50 33,33 
Normal 41,11 27,59 51,92 22,22 43,14 30,77 25,00 100,00 100,00 0,00 62,50 33,33 
Significant 10,00 20,69 3,85 11,11 7,84 23,08 8,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 33,33 
Effective supply of needed innovation and know-how          
Insignificant 42,22 62,07 30,77 44,44 43,14 23,08 41,67 0,00 100,00 100,00 50,00 66,67 
Normal 36,67 20,69 44,23 44,44 37,25 46,15 41,67 100,00 0,00 0,00 25,00 0,00 
Significant 20,00 17,24 23,08 11,11 19,61 30,77 16,67 0,00 0,00 0,00 12,50 33,33 
Effective marketing of products and services          
Insignificant 17,78 34,48 5,77 33,33 17,65 15,38 16,67 0,00 100,00 100,00 0,00 33,33 
Normal 50,00 37,93 59,62 33,33 56,86 46,15 50,00 100,00 0,00 0,00 12,50 66,67 
Significant 30,00 27,59 30,77 33,33 23,53 38,46 33,33 0,00 0,00 0,00 75,00 0,00 
Source: interviews with farm managers 
The serious (unsolvable) problems associated with the marketing are critical for a 
considerable section of agri-firms, and farms specialized in mix crop-livestock, and 
permanent crops. The severe problems in the effective supply of needed innovation and 
know-how are most important for the sustainability of cooperatives, mix crop-livestock, and 
vegetable farms.  
Furthermore, great difficulties in effective supply of needed land and natural 
resources face a quarter of farm specialized in vegetables and permanent crops.  
Harsh problems in effective supply of needed labor are critical only for grazing 
livestock holdings.  
Big difficulties in effective supply of needed inputs experience a good fraction of 
unregistered holdings, and farms specialized in vegetables, permanent crops, and mix 
crop-livestock production.  
Significant problems in effective supply of needed finance are reported by a main part 
of unregistered holdings, and farms specialized in grazing livestock, mix crop-livestock, 
and permanent crops. 
Finally, substantial difficulties in effective supply of needed services are common for a 
big section of unregistered holdings, and farms specialized in permanent crops and mix 
crop-livestock operations. 
 
Competitiveness of unregistered farms 
 
The majority of surveyed unregistered holdings are with a good level of 
competitiveness, and around 24% of them are highly competitive (Figure 28). At the same 
time, more than a fifth of all unregistered farms are not competitive. 
Unregistered holdings with a different specialization are with unequal competitiveness. 
Most highly competitive farms are in vegetables, field crops, and mix livestock 
productions. On the other hand, a half of the holdings in permanent crops, a third of all 
farms in mix crops, and 29% of mix crop-livestock operators are with a low level of 
competitiveness. 
The analysis of different components of the competitiveness of unregistered holdings 
indicates that the low productivity, profitability, and funding availability, along with the 
insufficient adaptability to changing market, institutional and nature environment, and the 
severe problems associated with marketing of products, are mostly responsible for 
diminishing the competitiveness of these farms (Figure 29). 
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Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
Figure 28. Share of unregistered farms with different levels of competitiveness in  
Bulgaria 
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Figure 29. Importance of individual elements of competitiveness of unregistered 
farms in Bulgaria 
 
On the other hand, the higher efficiency in supply of factors of production and the 
lower dependency from outside funding, enhance the overall competitiveness of 
unregistered farms. 
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Competitiveness of cooperative farms 
 
A half of surveyed cooperatives are with a good level of competitiveness, and a 
quarter of them are highly competitive (Figure 30). At the same time, one out of four 
cooperatives is not competitive.  
The cooperatives with a diverse specialization are with different level of 
competitiveness. 
Most of the highly competitive cooperatives are in permanent crops and mix crops. At 
the same time, a significant number of cooperatives in field crops and mix crops are with a 
low level of competitiveness. 
The analysis of different elements of the competitiveness of cooperatives shows that 
the low productivity, profitability, financial availability and independency, together with the 
insufficient adaptability to market, institutional and nature environment, and the difficulties 
associated with finance, land and innovation supply and marketing mainly affect the 
reduction of competitiveness of cooperatives (Figure 31).  
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Source: interviews with farm managers 
 
Figure 30. Share of cooperatives with different levels of competitiveness in Bulgaria 
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Figure 30. Importance of individual elements of competitiveness of cooperatives in 
Bulgaria 
 
Competitiveness of agri-firms 
 
All surveyed agri-firms are with a good or a high competitiveness. What is more, a 
significant number of these farms (44%) are highly competitive (Figure 31).  
Nevertheless, while three-quarter of the firms in field crops are with high level of 
competitiveness, all firms in mix crops and permanent crops are with a good 
competitiveness, and vegetables producers are equally divided in good and high 
competitive groups.    
The analysis of individual factors the competitiveness of agri-firms exposed that the 
low productivity, profitability, funding availability and independency, and the serious 
problems in labor and land supply and marketing, greatly contribute to decreasing firms 
competitiveness (Figure 32).  
On the other hand, the high adaptability of firms to evolving market and institutional 
environment, and their considerable efficiency in finance, innovation and service supply 
raise the overall competitiveness of these farming enterprises. 
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Figure 31. Share of agri-firms with different levels of competitiveness in Bulgaria 
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Figure 32. Importance of individual elements of competitiveness of agri-firms in 
Bulgaria 
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CONCLUSION 
 
We have demonstrated that the New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics 
is a powerful methodology which let us better understand the “logic” and adequately 
assess the farm contracts, efficiency and competitiveness in the specific market, 
institutional and natural environment of a particular agrarian agent, type of farm, sub-
sector of agriculture, and country. 
The analysis of the post-communist transition and EU integration of Bulgarian 
agriculture has found out that fundamental property rights and institutional modernization 
has been associated with evolution of a specific farming structure consisting of numerous 
small-scale and subsistent holdings and a few large cooperatives and agro-firms. 
Furthermore, agrarian agents have developed and use a great variety of effective 
contractual arrangements to govern their relations, resources and activities – formal, 
informal, simple, complex, interlinked, market, private, collective, bilateral, trilateral, 
multilateral, hybrid etc.  
Various type of farms and contracts have quite different efficiency, adaptability, and 
sustainability in the specific Bulgarian conditions of undeveloped markets, badly defined 
and/or enforced formal rights and rules, inefficient forms of public intervention, specific 
“Bulgarian” way of EU “common” policies implementation, dominant informal “rules of the 
game” etc. What is more, diverse farming organizations possess unlike competitive 
advantages in rapidly changing market, institutional and natural environment. While most 
market farms are with a good competitiveness, a great part of agri-firms are highly 
competitive, and a considerable fraction of unregistered holdings and cooperatives 
uncompetitive. 
Suggested new approach has a significant academic as well as practical importance.  
First, it provides a new framework for analyzing and assessing farm contracts and 
competitiveness in individual sub-sectors, regions, and countries.  
Next, it gives new tools for assisting the design of individuals, business, and 
collective contracts and organizations, and for improving public policies and forms of public 
intervention in agrarian sector.  
Finally, it gives new devices for making more realistic prediction about likely 
prospects of development of farming structures in the specific conditions of different sub-
sectors, regions, and countries.  
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